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The main concern of this thesis is to assess the performance of the 
transnational corporations in the transfer of technology to Egypt. 
The thesis first, reviews the economic literature concerning the 
economic rationale behind the phenomenon of direct foreign investment 
and its effect on transnationals' performance in host developing 
countries. It surveys the debate on the transfer of technology to 
developing countries and the major issues that arise and then looks at 
the development of the industrialisation process in Egypt from 1952 to 
1974, the date that marks the adoption of the Open Door Economic 
Policy. The magnitude of foreign investment is assessed by sector and 
industry and the domestic policy context which might affect the outcome 
of the transfer of technology is discussed in some detail. 
The main part of this thesis reports the results of a survey undertaken 
in Egypt on the contribution of the transnational corporations to the 
transfer of technology. It was found that the finms surveyed have not 
engaged in a genuine transfer of technology. The transnationals were 
found to be keen to transfer mostly unadapted technology from their own 
home countries or other advanced markets. Accordingly, no genuine 
effort has been made in fields such as research and development, 
training of local personnel and co-operation with local research and 
development institutes. Moreover, these firms were found to 
concentrate on products with a high import content. In the meantime, 
their record of exports from Egypt has proved to be very poor. 
These conclusions are mostly consonant with what has been argued by the 
critical literature and dissonant with the conventional view of the 
transnationals' impact on developing countries with regard to both 
direct foreign investment and the transfer of technology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For developing countries industrialization has often been seen as the 
panacea for facing the problems of poverty, unemployment, lop-sided 
development and income inequality. It has also been seen as the most 
reliable path for building strong economies, and hence narrowing the 
gap between them and the developed countries. (Wright and Russel, 
1975: 74-75). Such a belief could be legitimately justified on the 
grounds of the historic experience of the now developed world. These 
countries have built their advancement in industrialization from the 
time of the industrial revolution in Britain and its spread to other 
European countries. Japan added another example of eliminating poverty 
and backwardness mainly through industrialization (Mabro and Radwan, 
1976: 1). In addition, developing countries, as a result of the 
deterioration of the terms of trade of their exports of primary goods 
realized the inevitability of diversifying their economies and 
avoiding the fluctuating prices of their exports of primary products, 
(Singer and Ansari, 1977: 36). 
Moreover, industrialization has been considered as a stimulus for 
increasing growth in other sectors. It has been noted that the 
industrialization spill-over affects the rest of the economy by 
introducing intermediate inputs and capital goods. In doing so, it 
results in transforming sectors such as agriculture, construction, 
transport and services. Thus productivity in these sectors increases 
and hence releases resources to be invested further in industry 
(Hughes, 1984: 6). Equally important, industrialization gives the 
impetus for training and upgrading labour skills by providing labour 
and management with new modes of thinking, discipline and organization 
(Mabro and Radwan, 1976: 1, Bos, 1984: 37). 
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Based on these notions and beliefs most of the developing countries, in 
one way or another, have gone through some sort of industrialization 
process. Primarily, they launched industrial programmes especially 
in the 1950s and the 1960s based upon what was called import-
substitution industrialization (lSI). They aimed to produce 
domestically some goods then imported from the developed countries. 
Thus, it was necessary to protect their infant industries by using 
tariff and non-tariff, measures (Hughes, 1984: 6). This policy·s 
primary concern was to lessen imports and meet local market needs from 
local production, and hence improve the balance of payments position. 
However, this policy turned out to be • import-dependent· • Developing 
countries had to import most production requirements such as capital 
goods equipment, intermediate inputs, and raw materials. These imports 
by far exceeded the rate at which imports of some manufactured consumer 
goods decreased (Singer and Ansari, 1977: 36-37 and Hughes, 1980: 13). 
Therefore, countries started to shift to policies depending on outward 
looking industrialization, i.e. industrialization for exports. This 
tendency has gained significant attention especially after some 
countries have achieved a relatively successful industrialization based 
on this policy. However this strategy has its own limitations. It 
depends, partly, upon the extent to which the developed countries· 
markets, which absorb about three-fifths of total developing countries· 
exports of manufactured goods, are open for such exports and also on 
the rate of growth in the former countries. It, in addition, makes the 
developing countries' development more vulnerable to any fluctuations 
that might take place for one reason or another in the world market 
(Kirkpatrick & Nixson, 1983: 35-40; Hughes, 1977: 7). 
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For developing countries, industrialization and technology are seen as 
inseparable (Patel, 1974: 4). To get technology, they have to appeal 
to developed countries where the bulk of commercial technology exists. 
A few developed countries such as the U.S.A., West Genmany, the U.K., 
France and more recently Japan constitute the main sources for this 
technology. The U.S.A., for instance, represents a source of about 55% 
of 60% of the world commercialized technology (UNIOO, 1981: 4). In the 
meantime developing countries, mostly, have been suffering from the 
lack of needed technology. In consequence, policy-makers in these 
countries have sought more economic co-operation from the developed 
countries. So, they have gone through many changes in their economic, 
legal and political systems in order to attract direct foreign 
investment (OFI), in addition to importing foreign technology via 
many other channels such as licences, management contracts and hiring 
foreign skills. 
Thus many of these countries opened their anms to welcome OFI by 
offering a package of incentives and guarantees which include tariff 
protection, duty exemptions on imports of machinery, equipment and 
other production requirements and guarantees against nationalization or 
confiscation. (Martin, 1973: 117 & Lim, 1983: 207). 
In this regard, the TNCs come to play an important role in the 
economies of developing countries. It is worth noting that the TNC is 
defined as a: 
"Corporation which owns (in whole or in part) controls and 
manages income generating assets in more than one country." (Hood & Young, 1979: 23) 
This definition is chosen for the TNCs under study here. Nevertheless, 
there were many attempts to define these companies on criteria such as 
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the number of countries in which they operate (six countries at least), 
or the net sales of the corporation ($100 mn at least); or the 
percentage of ownership (25% or more) to be held by the parent firm in 
the subsidiary (Lall and Streeten, 1977: 10). These definitions are 
not used in this study, since adopting them will exclude many firms 
that are working and affecting in one way or another the host 
economies. In addition, they are based on arbitrary criteria. 
In this respect, there are also some alternative structurally-based 
definitions where the transnationality is to be determined in the light 
of the firms' organization and hierarchy. Also, it is thought that 
transnationality could be determined according to behavioural criteria, 
where the philosophy of the company determines such a feature (Buckley 
and Casson, 1985: 2). However, these definitions could be categorized 
as features rather than definitions of the TNCs, as pOinted out by 
Kirkpatrick and Nixson, 1981: 370-73). 
These companies have witnessed unprecedented growth in the period after 
the Second World War. They play an important role in the world economy 
and have subsidiaries nearly over all the world (Dunning, 1981: 3, 
Vernon, 1977: 13). These companies are rather important so far as 
technology transfer is concerned since they dominate the international 
technology market. UNIDO noted that the transnationals monopolize the 
process of commercialization of technology to developing countries 
(UNIDO, 1981: 4-5). 
In this regard, it has been argued that the TNCs transfer and make 
available to a production enterprise the technical elements and know-
how necessary for production (Cary, 1979: 37). By dOing so, they 
stimulate economic growth and development in developing countries. 
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Thus they contribute towards solving the problems of unemployment, 
balance of payments deficits, inequality of income distribution and so 
forth. (Biersteker, 1978: 27-30, Katrak, 1981: 454). 
On the contrary, it has been argued that the technology transferred via 
the TNCs to developing countries is double edged. In other words, such 
a technology produces desired and undesired results. More important, 
the undesired results by far offset the desired ones. The TNCs always 
introduce capital intensive and sophisticated technology to developing 
countries without a genuine adaptation (Singer and Ansari, 1977: 40). 
Such behaviour has resulted in adverse repercussions on the economies 
of these countries such as increasing unemployment in the long run, the 
creation of an unequal pattern of income distribution, and an increase 
in imports at a time when their record in exporting are very poor, thus 
adding to the onus of balance of payments rather than relieving it 
(Barnett and Muller, 1974: 58). 
Consequently, the industrialization policies of developing countries 
which depend on foreign corporations have come under close scrutiny in 
countries such as Brazil and Mexico (Wionczek, 1976: 147-154). 
The Case of Egypt: 
The situation in Egypt has, in fact, some similarities to that in other 
developing countries. This country over the last thirty years or so, 
has laid emphasis on industrialization. Thus it was necessary owing to 
the limited local capabilities, to seek foreign co-operation for 
technology and capital. Over the 1950s and the 1960s the role of the 
government in the economy was noticeable, where the government 
established some institutions and organizations to supervise and lay 
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down industrial plans. The first industrial programme was launched in 
1957 and replaced by the first comprehensive plan in 1960. This plan; 
with foreign assistance especially from the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern 
bloc achieved some tangible success. The compound rate of increase of 
GNP approached 6.5%, employment increased by 1.7 mn over the five years 
of the plan, many new industries were introduced and some others were 
expanded. In brief, this plan was described as a successful plan 
(Makki and Quyum, 1975: 158). However, this success was halted for 
many reasons, notably the cutting off of foreign aid, and the 1967 war. 
So, the rate of investment declined from 19.7% to 11.9% of GNP in 
1967, and rate of growth was 0.7% in the same year (Radwan, 1973: 
234). 
As a result, the Egyptian government under President Sadat thought that 
opening up the economy for foreign investment would be the remedy for 
the slowdown in economic growth. Consequently, foreign investors have 
been called upon to playa greater role in the Egyptian economy. Thus, 
the Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP) became effective with the 
promulgation of law 43 of 1974 amended by Law 32 of 1977 on foreign 
investment and free zones. This law, as in many other developing 
countries, has offered a package of incentives and guarantees in order 
to encourage foreign investors to make their capital and technology 
available to Egypt. This package includes tax exemptions on commercial 
and industrial profits for 5-8 years, these exemptions are extended to 
cover re-invested profits, tax exemptions on loans for foreign firms, 
and exemption of duties on imports of capital goods and components 
necessary for investment. These are in addition to guarantees against 
nationalization or confiscation. (Law 43 of 1974, articles 4,7,8,9, 
14-18). 
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This policy was based on the belief that once the doors of the Egyptian 
economy were opened foreign investment would flow in with capital and 
technology and hence mobilize the process of rapid economic development 
(October Paper, 1974: 37-38 and Parliament Debate 1974). Thus, 
transfer of technology was one of the main arguments used by government 
for adopting the ODEP. 
The Purpose of the Study 
The TNCs introduction of foreign technology in a developing country has 
a profound impact on its economic system. The latter in turn affects 
the whole socio-cultural aspect of the system such as employment, 
income distribution and the pattern of consumption. On top of that 
they deeply and thoroughly impact on local productive capability, local 
firms position local technological capabilities and the balance of 
payments. So, this study aims to examine: first, the performance of 
the TNCs in Egypt in respect of the transfer of technology in order to 
see to what extent the government argument is grounded in fact, 
secondly, the factors that contributed to shape such performance in its 
present state, factors which could be ascribed to the TNCs and to 
governmental and local policies and settings and thirdly, the lessons 
that one can draw from this study. 
The Scope of the Study 
In the light of the previously stated objectives, the main focus of 
this study will be the transnational corporations, foreign direct 
investment and the transfer of technology to the manufacturing sector 
in Egypt. With regard to the TNCs, as defined above, they should 
operate in productive activities. This means that this study does not 
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include firms either wholly or partly foreign owned which are just 
working as sales offices or agents of foreign firms. In addition, 
foreign investors that have no parent firm abroad are excluded on the 
assumption that firms based in developed countries are the most likely 
source of technology, 
Furthermore, companies engaged in direct investment are the main focus 
in this research. So, portfolio investment is out of the range of this 
study, since this sort of investment is different from DFI. Portfolio 
investment involves the acquisition of foreign securities without the 
participation in management or control of the companies concerned. 
Nevertheless, this sort of investment could be the start of direct 
involvement by taking part in the management and control of the firm 
concerned. As for direct investment, it embraces in addition to 
control, some other elements of production such as technology, 
managerial skills, capital and inputs (Hood and Young, 1979: 9). Thus 
foreign investors that have some securities or interests in companies 
operating in Egypt without participation in their control are not 
included in this study. 
Despite the adoption of the Open Door Economic Policy in Egypt for over 
ten years, most previous work in this field has confined itself either 
to the legal aspects and problems which might arise from foreign 
investment law compared with these of other developing countries, or to 
direct foreign investment and transfer of technology in general terms, 
changes in the structure of labour force and the rationale for the 
policy of ODEP (infitah) as a whole. Thus, this study represents the 
first attempt of its kind either in Arabic or in English to assess 
empirically the performance and impact of the transnational 
corporations under the present policy regime on the transfer of 
technology in particular and on the Egyptian economy in general. 
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Sources and Methodology 
This study draws upon two types of data source. First, published 
material in the economic literature about foreign direct investment, 
the transfer of technology by the transnationals to developing 
countries, patents, capital goods industries, and about research and 
development in developing countries. Secondary sources have also been 
used regarding the development of the industrialization process in 
Egypt; governmental policies and settings, R&D and education in Egypt 
both in Arabic and in English and both from England and Egypt. 
Secondly, primary official data was collected from the competent 
authorities in Egypt such as the Central Agency for Public Mobilization 
and Statistics; the General Authority for Foreign Investment and Free 
Zones; the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, and the 
General Organization for Industrialization. For the empirical part of 
this study data was collected by undertaking a survey of selected 
foreign firms over two visits to Egypt which lasted for four months 
from 5/5/84 to 4/6/84 and from 25/8/84 to 22/11/84. This survey was 
conducted via a) a survey questionnaire, b) Interviews with plant 
managers, and c) general plant visits. The questionnaire represented 
the main tool of this study. It was prepared after consulting the 
economic literature on the role of the TNCs in the field of transfer of 
technology to developing countries. This questionnaire was prepared 
both in English and Arabic in order to overcome language problems for 
both foreign and local co-operators. It was distributed by hand to the 
firms concerned and hence appointments were fixed by the time of 
delivery. 
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Nevertheless, some companies were visited twice or three times, in 
cases where such appointments were broken and sometimes to meet more 
than one representative. So, much of the time was spent in travelling 
between E1 Mansoura, Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said where these 
firms are located. 
Interviews took place with senior managers of some of the firms 
studied whenever their time allowed that. This is while the others 
excused themselves for time limitation and/or for some other reasons 
mentioned in chapter 5. These interviews aimed at discussing issues 
that the managers might be reluctant to write down such as technology 
cost, nature of training courses, their perception of their involvement 
in the Egyptian economy and sometimes to clarify some questions in the 
questionnaire. Data collected by the questionnaire and the interviews 
was supported, complemented and checked against what was seen during 
plant-visits. 
The collection of this data was surrounded with some difficulties. 
First, it was difficult to get a list of all firms operating in Egypt 
in order to select some of them for the survey. After writing to many 
authorities I had to appeal to the Egyptian-British Chamber of Commerce 
which reluctantly provided me with a long list which I had to ·copy by 
hand. In the meantime, I had to surmount some administrative hurdles 
which involved submitting both the questionnaire and a list of selected 
firms names and addresses to the Egyptian Education Bureau in order to 
get the approval of the authorities in Cairo. As a result I waited 
about nine months to visit Egypt and undertake the field work. 
In Egypt, I had to deliver my questionnaire and fix the appointments 
personally, because of the fear of the delay in the case of using the 
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mail and the difficulty of using the telephones. In addition, I had 
to spend considerable time in travelling to the selected firms. 
Sometimes wrong addresses were supplied, making it necessary to spend 
extra effort and time for corrections. The most serious problem was 
the refusal of some firms' representatives to co-operate with the 
survey. Thus, it was necessary to rely on personal contacts in such 
cases where possible. 
In general, in spite of these problems it was possible in the end to 
collect data which may give some indications about the role of the TNCs 
in the transfer of technology to Egypt. Nonetheless this data has its 
own limitations. Some of the required data were difficult to obtain 
either from the surveyed companies or the Egyptian authorities 
concerned. Such data included the cost of production, value added in 
Egypt, raw materials and other input, prices, value of exports and 
imports and so forth. Thus, it was not possible to analyse, 
comprehensively the exact cost of technology transferred to Egypt by 
firms studied. There are also limitations related to the number of 
surveyed firms. It was possible to collect information and data only 
on about 25 firms out of 45 were selected for the survey. So, a 
caution should be taken into account in generalizing from those data. 
The Structure of the Study 
This study is divided into six chapters. The first chapter contains 
two sections. The first reviews the main theoretical hypotheses that 
tried to explain the rationale behind the phenomenon of OFI. It is 
noted that the TNCs investing in foreign markets have monopolistic 
advantages which they try to capitalize on and defend in order to 
maximize their returns in the long-run (Magee, 1977: 303-307). Some 
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others argue that OFI result from factors such as governmental policies 
to restrict imports into host countries either by tariffs or non-tariff 
measures and as a result of the penetration of these markets by their 
rivals which may create barriers against their entry (Martin, 1973: 
42). This is while there is an argument that cheap labour and cheap 
raw materials playa significant part in this regard. This is in 
addition to the measures taken by host governments to attract foreign 
investment. 
Section two highlights how far this rationale affects the actual 
behaviour of the transnationals in developing countries. It has been 
argued that these companies' operations in these countries retard 
economic development. The TNCs generate capital drainage, increase 
unemployment by employing capital intensive technology, create or add 
to the unequal pattern of income distribution, increase imports at a 
time in which their export records are very poor in the majority of 
developing countries and hence have an adverse effect on the balance of 
payments. 
The second chapter is an attempt to shed some light on some major 
aspects that might arise from the transfer of technology by the TNCs. 
It has been widely argued that the international market in technology 
is highly imperfect. It is concentrated in developed countries and in 
very few of them and dominated by the TNCs where they take the lead in 
for example R&D activities, innovation, and taking out patents. On 
the opposite side the developing countries are in a weak pOSition, 
since they lack the necessary technological infrastructure. Thus, it 
has been argued that the TNCs tend to introduce advanced and capital-
intensive, inappropriate technology to developing countries, without a 
significant adaptation (Kirkpatrick and Nixson, 1983: 50). 
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Rather important, these companies are not keen to embark upon a genuine 
transfer of technology to the host countries for example real training, 
R & 0, and subcontracting to local suppliers. So, they are working as 
enclaves in developing host economies. 
The third chapter explores the main features of the development of the 
industrial process in Egypt, together with the relative weight of OFI. 
There have been many attempts since the 1952 Revolution to 
industrialize Egypt. They were relatively successful in diversifying 
the Egyptian economy in general and industry in particular. 
Nevertheless, such attempts suffered a set back in the second half of 
the 1960s which had adverse effects the economy. So, the government of 
that time (early 1970s), thought that the panacea lay in the invitation 
to OFI to come to Egypt. However, the results up to 1982 were far from 
satisfactory. Foreign capital introduced into the country was 
concentrated mainly in the finance and service sectors and reluctant to 
enter industry. So, these developments of both industrial development 
and foreign capital will be examined in this chapter. 
The fourth chapter discusses the government policies which might 
influence the transfer of technology to Egypt. In this regard, it has 
been thought that government policies and intervention by adopting 
clear policies toward OFI and the transfer of technology have a 
tangible effect on the ultimate outcome of the transfer of technology 
by the transnationals. Thus, this chapter discusses Egyptian 
government policies towards OFI, technology transfer, R & 0, education, 
industrial development and patents. In this chapter it is clear that 
Egypt has not yet formulated a strategy towards either the OFI or the 
transfer of technology. Thus, the absence of this strategy has been 
manifested in the absence of a legal framework to organize and monitor 
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the technology transfer process. The education system is still in 
general biased towards a general and theoretical type of education and 
disconnected with the development needs. Further the R&D system in 
Egypt suffers from many defects: its links with the productive sector 
are generally poor, it concentrates on the basic type of research and 
suffers from the lack of harmony between its institutions. 
The fifth chapter tries to present the performance of the TNCs in the 
transfer of technology to Egypt on the basis of the fieldwork data 
collected. Here we show that, as in most developing countries, the 
TNCs tend to introduce a technology similar to that used in advanced 
markets. Such a technology is, mostly, capital intensive. In the 
meantime, these companies are slow to undertake a genuine adaptation 
that might make their technology more appropriate to the local milieu. 
Rather serious is the reluctance of the TNCs to embark upon a genuine 
transfer of technology through real training that could result in 
implanting the key information underlying technology in use in the 
local personnel, R&D in Egypt and getting rooted into the Egyptian 
economy by having strong backward and forward linkages with the 
productive sector. In addition these firms' record in exporting is 
very poor, while their imports are increasing over time. 
The sixth chapter is an attempt to put the results of the field work in 
a broader context, the aim being to see how far the Egyptian economy 
has been affected by the performance of the transnat10nals, 
particularly via the transfer of technology, and how far the Egyptian 
economy is different from other developing economies. Here we find 
that the Egyptian economy industrial structure imbalance has been 
increasing under the Open Door Economic Policy. The share of the 
industry in terms of GDP, employment and exports is declining. 
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Imports from the developed markets by far surpassed the exports to 
them. This is not to mention the increasing rate of repatriated 
profits, royalties, and expatriates salaries, a situation that puts the 
Egyptian balance of payments in a very critical situation. In 
addition, the use of capital intensive technology by the TNCs and the 
imitation of this policy by local companies is making the situation for 
creating employment even worse, widening the pattern of unequal income 
distribution over the 1970s compared to the 1960s and leading to more 
alienation of local R&D units rather than an increase in their links 
with the productive sector. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Theory and Practice of Transnational Corporations and Direction 
Foreign Invest.ent 
This chapter, discusses the theoretical background necessary for 
explaining the dynamism of the transnational corporations' performance 
in general and in developing countries in particular. In addition, 
it includes a short review of the empirically observed behaviour of 
TNCs, in some economic fields, in some developing countries. 
Consequently, this chapter will be divided into two broad sections. 
The first will embrace the theoretical hypotheses that try to explain 
the DFI phenomenon while the second will include the review of some 
aspects of the performance of the corporations in question. 
Part I: A Review of The theory: 
Direct foreign investment has recorded an unprecedented increase since 
World War II. This is while the portfolio investment prevailed over 
the period before the War and especially before the 1930s. Although 
the two phenomena, more or less include a movement of capital across 
national borders, they are different. Direct investment contains 
in addition to capital other elements such as control, management, 
production techniques and know-how. Even further such elements might 
be considered the crucial factors behind the investment decision in 
foreign markets. (Parry, 1975: 40). 
The growth of DFI since the war has accompanied the striking growth 
of the transnational corporations. These companies, in fact, often 
represent the main vehicle through which this sort of investment takes 
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place. Thus, their activities have spread widely over nearly all 
economic sectors. It has been estimated that there are about 20,000 
T .N.es. in the world economy. They produce about one-fifth of the 
world's output. Even more, there are some companies whose production 
might exceed the production of nation state countries. ITT for 
instance produces more than the GNP of economies such as Greece, 
Israel, Norway and Venezuela (Buckley & Casson, 1976:11). 
Nevertheless, up until now, a unified theory to interpret the 
phenomenon of OFI via the TNCs, has been sought. It is supposed that 
such a theory would explain some crucial points in this respect such 
as the characteristics of firms that engage in such investment, the 
unique advantages which they possess compared to other firms, the 
aims of investing in foreign markets, the timing and location of 
investment, why direct investment is chosen rather than other means 
for serving foreign markets such as licensing, management contracts, 
exporting, what are the characteristics of countries that receive a 
particular kind of investment, and the concomitant consequences on 
both host and home countries, resulting from undertaking overseas 
investment. 
Although the phenomenon of OFI raises many such issues, most, if not 
all, explanations relied on two or three features. Each of these 
explanatory elements represent hypotheses about the origins of OFI 
rather than a unified theory. 
Correspondingly, the main theme of this section is to throw some light 
on some of the main hypotheses. So it might be convenient to start 
with, capital movement hypotheses, trade theory, market imperfections, 
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hypotheses related to the importance of markets, foreign exchange, 
and labour and to end with some concluding remarks. 
1.1.2 Capital .oveaents and direct foreign inves~nt 
Here, we shall try to see the relation between the theories of capital 
movement and OFI. Therefore, the main essence of each will be reviewed 
briefly as follows:-
1.1.2.1 The Classical Explanation: 
The essence of this argument is that the rationale underlying 
capital movements is the maximization of profits. Thus, such a 
movement across countries' borders takes place because of interest 
rate differentials. So capital flows from countries that are well 
endowed with it to countries that lack this advantage because the 
rate of interest is lower in the former and higher in the latter 
(Nurkse, 1972:98-99). 
Regarding OFI, the hypotheses on which this argument is based have 
been criticized on the grounds that they are presupposing the existence 
of perfect competition. In so doing they have ignored the monopolistic 
nature of the market, where large firms are dominating (Sutton, 1980: 
3-4). This theory does not make distinctions between the mere movement 
of capital and direct foreign investment as illustrated above (Dunning, 
1973:299); most of the studies undertaken about the motives of OFI, 
have not supported these hypotheses. This sort of investment has 
been proved to take place for many reasons other than interest rate 
or profit differentials. In this connection, Agarwal suggested that: 
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II MNCs are faced with a multiplicity of goals 
in their investment decisions for their worldwide 
operations •.•• 11 (1980: 744). 
Consequently, this theory's hypotheses do not explain the OFI 
phenomenon, but rather relate more to the wider nature and objectives 
of portfolio investment. 
1.1.2.2. Other Hypotheses: 
In this respect it might be of interest to mention the main outlines 
of the Marxist approaches to the movement of capital. The transfer 
of capital, in these approaches, represents the intrinsic nature of 
capitalism. Nonetheless, they differ on the driving force that backs 
up such movements: 
First: The Capital Surplus Hypothesis. 
This approach contends that the export of capital was a result of a 
super-abundance of it in capitalist countries. This capital could 
not find profitable investment opportunities in the home market. So 
it inevitably looked for outlets in overseas markets. (Hobson, 1938: 
Chapter 6) (1). In this respect Magdoff argued, that, although a 
flow of capital to foreign markets might result from its abundance 
in its domestic markets, the significant factor lies in the nature 
of the capitalist system. This is where pressures from competition, 
technical advance and imbalances between production and consumption 
make the search for foreign markets necessary (Magdoff, 1972: 148-49). 
1. Mentioned in Brown, 1974: 172 
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In fact, such an argument is a subject to some of the criticisms 
addressed to the classical hypotheses. It over-concentrated on the 
abundance of capital considering it the main and the sole factor behind 
foreign investment. Thus, it gives the impression that foreign 
investors provide host markets with plenty of capital. However, from 
the empirical studies, it has been shown that this is myth rather 
than reality. {Muller, 1973:136-37}. 
Second. The declining rate of profits. 
The argument of this approach is based on the way in which the 
capitalist mechanism works. It argues that the development of 
capitalism leads to more concentration of factors of production in 
fewer hands. Characteristically, the organic composition of capital 
tends to be higher and thereby the profits begin to decline. As a 
result of such decline, the metropolitan countries try to export 
capital, and hence start looking for a higher return elsewhere. The 
desired return can be found in countries where the organic composition 
of capital is lower {Hoogvelt, 1982:181; G1yn & Sutcliffe, 1976:147-
149}. 
This approach in turn has been the subject of criticism. Magdoff 
criticised it in several respects. He contended that the previous 
argument is confined to the imperialist era. As far as investment 
in primary materials such as in oil and mining is concerned it takes 
place according to Magdoff, not only because of higher profits, but 
also for geological reasons viz, investment follows such materials 
wherever they are to be found. With regard to manufacturing 
investment, the criteria for it is not the decline of average rate 
of profits at home, but the II •••• gap in marginal profitability which 
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produces the flow of foreign investmentll (1) (Magdoff, 1972: 155-156). 
So, average profits at home might be higher than the marginal profits 
that the investor would achieve in foreign markets. 
Thus, these hypotheses, although containing some useful elements, could 
not satisfactorily explain the OFI phenomenon. 
1.1.3 The Free Trade Hypotheses 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory runs as follows: free trade between 
countries takes place because of the differentials in production which 
are based on the comparative advantage of each country. Such 
advantage is reflected in factor prices and hence cost. So, a country 
might benefit from producing goods that depend on its endowment of 
factors of production and hence enjoy lower costs. In such a case 
it is in its interest to export them for goods which their production 
needs a scarce resources and hence is costly. This theory assumes 
perfect competition; the non-existence of transport costs; 
international immobility and at the same time national mobility of 
factors of production; and identical production functions in all 
countries, (Bhagwati; 1964: 17:18; Kitamuza, 1971: 113-35). 
It is clear that such hypotheses cannot explain the phenomenon of 
OFI. Therefore, there have been some tentative attempts to relax 
some of these hypotheses such as allowing for production functions 
to differ in order to see its effect on OFI; the existence of transport 
costs, etc. (Corden, 1974: 196-199; Johnson, 1975: 35). 
(1) for more details see Hobson and Lenin in Brown, 1974: 172. 
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Nevertheless, with the relaxation of some assumptions, the rest of the 
system must remain working under perfectly competitive conditions. 
And, if such an assumption is to be abandoned, there would be no free 
trade at all (Rugman, 1980: 367). 
Correspondingly, such hypotheses were criticised by many economists. 
Sagasti is critical of free trade theory on the ground that: 
(i) its hypotheses ignore the effect of technological factors on 
production functions. They consider them as exogenous. 
(ii) Free Trade Theory in its pure form ignores the nature of the 
market. The capitalist market is of a monopolistic nature that 
has led to the exploitation of developing countries (1980: 10; 
also Gruber, 1967: 30). 
In this respect Rugman contended that this theory's hypotheses as seen 
above do not fit OFI phenomenon: 
II ••• the theory of direct foreign investment is the converse of 
the pure theory of international trade ll • (Rugman, 1980: 366) 
also (Parry, 1975: 23) 
This is because under free trade with perfect competition, the absence 
of transport costs and so on, there would be no need for OFI by the 
TNCs. The phenomenon of OFI is the result of imperfection in the goods 
or factor markets. This is where firms tend to internalise the 
exploitation of their specific advantages. Hence the TNCs are a 
substitute for free trade. (Rugman, 1980: 367). 
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Against this situation of the relation between the previous different 
hypotheses and the DFI phenomenon, it was necessary for some others to 
try to explain this phenomenon directly. 
1.1.4 Market I.perfection and OFI 
The foundations of this line of argument were laid by Hymer (1960) 
and have been developed by many economists since: (for example, 
Kindleberger 1969, Caves 1971). 
The main theme of their argument concerns the market imperfection 
effect on the direct foreign investment. They argue that foreign 
firms in establishing and operating production or service facilities 
in markets other than the home market, have some disadvantages compared 
with local firms. These disadvantages emerge from the fact that they 
are operating far from the decision making centres; they may be 
ignorant of the characteristics of new markets; and they will have 
to confront different legal systems. So, corporations that invest 
overseas must have some advantages to which their potential competitors 
have no access. In addition, these advantages should enable them 
to acquire returns greater than they get from home markets, in order 
to offset the previous disadvantages (Kindleberger, 1969: 11-12). 
Kindleberger summarized the monopolistic advantages that could result 
in DFI as follows: 
(i) In goods markets, they include product differentiation, special 
marketing skills, retail price maintenance, and administered 
pricing. 
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(ii) In factor markets, they embrace the existence of patented 
or appropriated technology; access to cheaper financial 
resources and managerial skills. 
(iii) Economies of scale, internal and external, that might lead 
to vertical integration. 
(iv) Finally government policies regarding the methods of serving 
the local market i.e. either by imports or local production. 
The latter policy might result in high tariffs, that could 
bring OFI into existence (Kindleberger, 1969: 14, 25). 
These advantages are, in fact, necessary for a firm to invest in a 
foreign market. But why do firms favour OFI rather than serving 
foreign markets in other ways such as exporting and/or granting 
licences? The answer to this and similar questions has been the task 
of some writers who accepted Hymer's main argument. 
Buckley and Casson, argued that a market's imperfection works as an 
incentive for firms to internalize the exploitation of their resources 
such as technological superiority, and managerial skills. In 
so doing, the TNCs would be in a position to achieve higher profits 
and, thereby the internationalization of markets across national 
boundaries would result in direct foreign investment. Such a process 
has some benefits and costs. Benefits might include avoidance of 
time lags, communication costs, using tactics like transfer pricing, 
in addition to other measures, for circumventing the government's 
influence. Meanwhile, costs might include some communication and 
administrative ones. So, the internationalization process would 
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continue to the limits where both costs and benefits become relatively 
equal (1976: 36-45). 
Johnson, argued that the TNCs can recapture the costs of R & 0 for 
generating technology by setting up and undertaking direct investment 
in foreign markets (1970: 40-41). In this respect, it has been 
contended by Magee that these corporations tend to internalize the 
exploitation of their technological edge via OFI. This is in order 
to be able to prolong their control over the information monopoly. 
In addition, this is more noticeable where the transnationals are 
specialising in highly sophisticated technology. (1977: 303-307). 
Moreover, in an attempt to explain the rationale behind OFI, Caves 
argued that such investment might take the form of horizontal and/or 
vertical expansion. Regarding horizontal expansion the TNCs may go 
abroad in order to exploit their unique assets. By so doing they 
get engaged in producing similar products to those produced in their 
home markets. Thus the technology required for producing the similar 
products might be transferred at lower costs and lower risk as well. 
These corporations by using product differentiation and mass 
advertising campaigns might create an impression to the customers 
that their products are better than the others existing on the market. 
In addition, they are in a position to perpetuate as long as possible 
this way of performance via continuous product differentiation. Such 
a device protects their products from imitation and/or makes it very 
costly for potential competitors. 
Regarding vertical integration, it could occur by the transnationals 
in order to secure sources of inputs and to lessen uncertainty 
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about this issue which is crucial if their monopolistic character 
is to be maintained. (Caves, 1971: 1-27). 
Economies of scale, as well, could playa part, as argued by Horst 
(1972), in motivating the TNC to invest in foreign markets. These 
economies enable firms to incur the fixed costs and risks that might 
result from such investment. The TNCs have access to numerous cheap 
financial resources necessary for investing abroad, in addition to 
the availability of skilled managerial staff able to handle and deal 
with the risks of such investment. 
These resources, in fact, enable the companies to invest abroad both 
horizontally in order to produce the same line of products and 
vertically to secure a permanent source of inputs on relatively cheap 
cost and prices (Horst, 1972, 258-260). 
Vernon in his theory of the product life cycle tried to explain OFI 
in a sequential order. This theory divides the development of the 
product life into three stages. In the first stage, the product is 
to be produced initially in the home market, and stays for a while 
in it. At this stage the product might need some specific requirements 
that might not exist in other markets such as high skills, 
sophisticated production techniques, high income able to afford it 
and so forth. The second stage begins when a significant demand for 
the product emerges in countries with similar income and the product 
becomes in relative terms more mature. The producing firms then serve 
such markets via exports. At this stage, concomitant with the increase 
in demand and hence exports, there would be an increase in imitation 
by rivals from other developed countries. Such imitation might be 
considered, in fact, as a real threat to the innovating firm. 
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Therefore, it would be in its interests to get engaged in undertaking 
DFI in these countries. In this regard Vernon argued that 
II ••• threat in general is a more reliable stimulus to action 
than opportunity is likely to be •.• An international 
investment by the exporter become a prudent means of 
forestalling the loss of a market ll • 
The third stage starts with the complete standardization of both 
products and techniques used in their production. In this case they 
are at the disposal of other competitors and not confined to the 
original innovator. As a result, the price emerges as a significant 
factor in competition. Thus the developing countries' markets where 
cheap labour exists come to act as field for such competition and 
to be chosen as a production location ll • (Vernon, 1966: 200). 
As a matter of fact, this theory has some useful elements that 
illustrate the role of monopolistic advantages in mobilizing foreign 
investment. In addition, it throws some light on how the holding 
companies try to keep and guard such advantages to maximize their 
returns from them. 
Nonetheless, product life theory has been subject to criticism that 
could be summarized as follows:-
(i) It has been argued that this theory describes the post-war 
DFI by the TNC, and does not explain recent trends. Products 
are no longer innovated for a certain market, since they are 
planned and diversified over many markets (Buckley & Casson, 
1979: 76). 
(ii) Kojima expressed his discontent with the theory on the ground 
that it deals with the linkages between the monopolistic 
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advantages of investing firms and the location of production. 
In the meantime it cannot suggest or predict a convenient type 
of investment or technology for the developing countries (1978: 
139). 
(iii) In addition, it was noted that Vernon confined his analysis 
to the final products. This is in spite of the fact that most 
foreign investment that takes place in developing countries 
are making components. Moreover, there are many other means 
that the transnationals could use to prolong their 
oligopolistic position, other than DFI, such as trade-marks; 
brand-names, patents etc. (Adikibi, 1981: 50-51). 
In the end, it might be worth noting that Hymer's thesis was 
subject to criticism very recently by, for example Dunning, Rugman, 
and Teece. The first two critics argued that Hymer over emphasised 
the issue of market imperfection; ignored the importance that 
hierarchical organisation has on efficiency; and was not concerned 
with the location issue. They further argued that he hardly paid 
attention to the question of political or social factors related to 
developing countries. And he completely neglected the implications 
of DFI by the transnationals on these countries (Dunning & Rugman, 
1985: 229-230). Teece added that Hymer paid no attention to the effect 
that horizontal integration might have on efficiency (Teece, 1985: 
231). However, they emphasised the positive aspects they saw in Hymer's 
analysis such as introdUCing the phenomenon of DFI, in the framework 
of industrial organisation analysis (1). 
(1) for more detail see Dunning & Rugman, 1985; Teece, 1985 
- 28 -
Thus it is evident from the previous approaches towards DFI that each 
is an attempt to find an explanation for this phenomenon via the TNCs. 
In addition none in itself is sufficient to do so, albeit, it is 
necessary. 
1.1.5 Markets and Direct Foreign lnvest.ent 
The TNCs are an international organisation that conceive all the World 
markets as if they are their own markets and hence plan on a global 
scale. By and large markets are of crucial importance for these 
companies where they could capitalize on their own unique advantages, 
mentioned above. Thus, the larger the markets, the greater the 
possibilities would be for achieving more returns and efficiency and, 
thereby the more chance for understanding DFI (Scaperlanda, 1969: 
559-560) • 
As far as direct foreign investment is concerned it may be noted that 
its expansion depends to a significant extent on the growth of markets. 
Kindleberger summarised such crucial interplay in this law: 
"Direct investment is tied to markets, if markets grow, 
the firm must grow, if the firm stops growing, it dies. 
Anything that inteferes with the growth of the firm ••• , 
while the organic life of the market goes its way will 
k ill the fi rm" • (K 1 ndl eberger, 1969: 9) 
On account of this it is not surprising to find that the TNC are very 
sensitive to the movements of each other towards markets. That is 
why, when a firm initiates investment in foreign markets, it works 
as a strong stimulus for the others to counter this movement by 
penetrating the same market of the home country. This phenomenon 
is more noticeable in fields with fairly narrow product lines (Sutton, 
1980: 92). This sort of investment might be considered as a defensive 
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investment. The other firms fear that the initial investment could 
create barriers against their entry to the host markets and hence 
they should go and set up some facilities {Martin 1973: 42-60}.{1} 
These movements of actions and counter-actions have increased in recent 
years, especially after the emergence of the Japanese and the European 
firms as a real threat to the Americans who used to dominate the 
field. American firms came to realise that they are challenged in 
European, home, and even in third world markets. So, they felt that 
they should meet such a challenge. The most likely way to do this 
is embarking on more direct investment in overseas. (Hymer & Rothworn, 
1970: 8l) (2). 
Nonetheless, not all foreign direct investment is of a defensive 
nature. Some companies initiate such investment in order to take 
advantages of the potential growth of foreign markets. This could 
be deduced from what has been noted by Dunning that 70~ of U.S. 
investment was made in both Latin America and Canada in 1950. It 
declined to 64~ in 1959 and continued to decline to the extent that 
Europe in 1972 had replaced the position of the both areas because 
of the establishment of the EEC, which resulted in creating a large 
market. This is in addition to the differentiation treatment against 
(l) 
(2) 
for more detail about defensive and aggressive strategies see: 
Brookes & Remmers, 1970: 230-243; Rowthorn, 1975: 158-180; 
Gilpin 1975: 9; Dunning 1973; Agodo, 1978 and many others. 
see Bergsten, 1975: 260, Hymer & Rowthorn, 1970: 81-91. 
N.B. Regarding the actions and counter-actions it might be 
of interest to refer to the potential threat to the TNCs of 
the developed countries coming from the emergence of some 
TNCs from some developing countries such as India, Brazil, 
Argentina, Taiwan etc. Such sort of investment, albeit, modest 
is increasing over time. See Lecraw, 1977, 443-455; Lall 
1981: 228-257. 
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imports from non-member countries. (Dunning, 1981: 73). The same 
could be noted of the American investment in Australia (Johns, 1967: 
260). In this respect Parry suggested that: 
lilt is likely that the apparent link between trade bloc 
formation and international investment is capturing a market 
size effect rather than the trade barrier effect alone". 
(Parry, 1975: 46). 
In connection with this, it has been noted that DFI by the 
transnationals has been affected by the import-substitution 
industrialization policy adopted by some countries since the World 
War II. These companies in order to avoid the tariffs and other 
barriers step into these markets and establish production facilities 
(Martin 1973: 42; Rugman, 1980: 367). However, there are some 
economists who contend that tariffs and other restrictions for 
protecting the local markets, have no significant impact on the 
decision to invest abroad (Stevens, 1974: 75) (1). 
1.1.6 VI Foreign Exchange Hypotheses and Direct Foreign Investlent 
Aliber, in an attempt to create some sort of links between foreign 
exchange differentials and DFI phenomenon argued that: the world is 
divided into different areas with different degrees of currency 
strength. Thus, firms from strong currency areas move to other areas 
where currency strength is relatively soft, insofar as strong 
currencies enable such firms to buy assets at cheaper prices which 
would not happen if the two currencies have the same strength. So, 
the TNCs via borrowing or using their own finance which is often from 
strong currencies might be able to initiate investment in host 
(1) for more detail see Brash, 1965: 25, 40; Horst, 1978: 291-295. 
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countries. Further, by so doing, they have advantages on potential 
competitors in host markets that do not have the same position (Aliber, 
1970: 20-27). In addition, Aliber argued more recently, that the 
transnationals invest in markets other than the home one in order to 
internationalize the costs and risks of foreign exchange exposure at a 
low cost (Aliber, 1983, in Teece, 1985: 233-34). 
This theory, in fact, has some useful elements. It could explain, 
partially, the insistence of some foreign investors on the devaluation 
of the local currency of the host country, especially in developing 
countries. Further such devaluation makes it easier for investors 
to take over local firms or to share them as partners in joint 
ventures. Nevertheless, it was not safe from criticism. It does not 
explain the cross-penetration of investment between developed 
countries. Further it is unable to interpret the continuous flow of 
American and British foreign investment in spite of the relative 
weakness of their currencies compared to the position in the 1960s 
(Lall, 1975: 21). It has been noted, in this respect, that the 
transnationals have had access to the variety of financial resources as 
a result of the existence of the Eurodollar and Eurobond markets. They 
can, hence, diversify their financial contributions and not depend on 
one currency, not to mention that their wide operation might enable 
them to have a basket of different currencies (Brown, 1974: 222). 
As a matter of fact, the previous theory and some of its critics have 
over emphasized the issue of capital as if it is the only or the main 
reason for OFI. In the meantime, they overlooked the fact that these 
companies do not bring in significant capital to developing countries. 
And, in addition, they depend, mainly, on local resources for most of 
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their financial requirements. Thus, it is evident that capital is not 
even the main rationale behind the decision to invest abroad. 
1.1.7 Other Explanations 
It has been noted that the MNC's decision to invest abroad may reflect 
some interest in taking advantage of wage differentials between 
countries. Low wages mean low cost, high returns, and hence a more 
competitive edge, especially in the third stage of Vernon's theory, 
i.e. when the product becomes standardized (See above). This becomes 
more evident, when the productivity in the host countries is the same 
or even higher than in the home country for the same products. 
(Barnet & Muller, 1974: 41; Robinson & Tharakan, 1979: 52,90, 105). 
This section cannot end without reference to the incentives offered 
by the recipient countries especially from the Third World to attract 
OFI. They, mostly have the dogma that such overseas investment might 
help in alleviating the crises from which they have been suffering 
for a fairly long time. Therefore, these countries, mostly, are 
generous in offering a wide variety of incentives such as income tax 
exemptions, import duty concessions on investment requirements, import 
restrictions, easy access to foreign exchange and on favourable tenms 
(Martin: 1973,117). 
In so dOing and under these circumstances the developing countries, 
often, hardly pay attention to the effect of such incentives on the 
flow of direct investment and on their economies as a whole. In this 
regard, there is an argument. that these incentives add to the cost 
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of the oFI in developing countries and have no significant effect 
on attracting oFI (Ruber, 1973: 128). 
In conclusion, as hinted above, there has not yet been a unified theory 
that could explain or answer all the questions that arise from the 
big issue of oFI. Thus none of the previous hyphotheses per-se, has 
been able to stand for explaining the rationale behind oFI. In an 
attempt to fill the gap Dunning put forward his 'eclectic theory' 
which seems to generate from the theory of industrial organisation. 
In addition, he went further trying to combine all parties that might 
affect the decision to invest abroad together, e.g. the investing 
firms, host countries and the home country. 
Dunning argued that some conditions must be satisfied for DFI to take 
place: first, the investing firm must possesses some monopolistic 
and unique edges over other firms. Some of these have been discussed 
above. Secondly, the investing firm should be able to internationalize 
the exploitation of its advantages, and that the direct investment 
way must be the best method for such exploitation. This ability 
depends upon the firm's capabilities. In addition, elements related 
to countries in which direct investment would take place must be taken 
into consideration (Dunning, 1981a: 46; 1981b: 30-64). 
Again, as a matter of fact, there is no one factor that might be 
sufficient to explain the DFI phenomenon. Also, the factors that 
affect such a decision vary over time, from one branch of production 
to the other and in the same branch according to the stage of 
production, and from one country to another affected to some extent 
by the conditions prevailing in those countries such as its level 
of development and of market growth. 
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Part 2 Perfonlance of the TNCs in Practice: 
In the previous section, there was an attempt to review the major 
theoretical explanations in the economic literature of TNC investment 
behaviour in foreign markets. Later, in this section, we attempt 
to explore some theoretical aspects related to the performance of 
these companies in developing countries, supported by empirical 
evidence whenever it is possible. The purpose of this review is in, 
fact twofold. First, it aims to see whether there is a connection 
between the rationale of the transnationals to invest abroad and their 
performance. Secondly, it aims to give some background to their 
performance in the area of transfer of technology which is the focus 
of this thesis. 
Developing countries, mostly, have tried to attract direct foreign 
investment either via the adoption of import substitution 
industrialization policy 'lSI' or via the adoption of the so-called 
'open door policy'. This latter has been done in the hope that such 
investment would provide them with finance capital, create employment 
opportunities, increase exports and decrease imports and thereby 
improve the deterioration in the balance of payments. Moreover, there 
is a relatively commonly held belief that DFI is the most effective 
way that could provide these countries with production techniques 
and advanced technology possibly leading eventually, to their economic 
development. 
As regards these issues, there are, in general two main and contrasting 
views. The first, which is pro-TNC, believes in the virtues of the 
transnationals. This view considers these companies as vehicles for 
stimulating economic and social development allover the world and 
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especially in developing countries which lack most of the resources 
that such companies have the capabilities to provide. In contrast, 
the second view which is anti-TNC contends that the cost of 
transnational investment exceeds the benefits to the economies of 
developing countries. 
1.2.2 The Financial Aspects: 
The net financial effect of the transnationals on developing countries 
depends upon several variables. Among these variables are: the main 
source of foreign exchange, its magnitude, and the rates of inflow 
and outflow. Thus the TNCs might have positive effects on developing 
countries if the main source of their capital was from external 
sources, and the difference between inflow and outflow was positive. 
Hence, they could be regarded as contributors to the capital formation 
in these countries. By contrast the net effect might be the opposite, 
when the source of capital is internal, i.e. from the host countries 
while the outflow rate exceeds the rate of inflow as a whole. 
In this regard, there is a view that the TNCs have been acting as 
agents to transfer cheap resources from the developed to the developing 
countries. They offer these countries sizeable amounts of foreign 
exchange that they badly need for their development. (Barnet & Muller, 
1974: 152). 
Penrose claimed that the transnationals· subsidiaries have access to 
unlimited financial resources of their parents and, hence the recipient 
countries receive not only management and foreign technicians, but 
also foreign capital (Penrose, 1956: 232). By doing so, these 
companies contribute significantly to ease the balance of payments 
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crises which in turn has further repercussions on the economy of the 
host country. Further the most significant contribution of foreign 
investments is the mobilization of host countries' resources, resulting 
in increases in income, employment and growth (Biersteker, 1978: 27-
28). 
On the other side, the opposite argument is that the allegation that 
the transnationals provide significant capital to developing countries 
has been proved to be metaphor rather than reality. The 
subsidiaries operating in developing countries are representative 
of the interests of their parents. These interests are based on 
minimizing the dependence on their own capital. In the meantime they 
should raise their finance capital locally in host countries markets 
(Barnet & Muller, 1974: 152). 
Moreover, TNC outflows exceeded by far inflows into developing 
countries. Such drainage might take place via a variety of channels 
such as royalties, interest, dividends, fees, and transfer pricing. 
As a result, the net flow is, often, negative for host economies. 
This situation has led some economists to comment that, the poor 
countries are helping the rich countries financially instead of the 
opposite. (Muller, 1973: 247). 
While such behaviour has been taking place in the needy countries, 
these companies are ready to leave their earnings in developed and 
rich markets to be re-invested. Thus, the rate of outflow out from 
developing countries by far exceeds the rate of outflow from developed 
countries (Barnet & Muller, 1974: 152). 
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Empirical Evidence: 
The review of empirical studies or evidence may contribute to the 
verification of the previous theoretical debate. The recent statistics 
on the U.S. foreign investment in 1981 revealed that it increased by 
$4.8 billion (bn) by the year end. Thus, the total American investment 
abroad amounted to some $227 bn. at the end of the same year. The 
components of this increase were only reinvested earnings which 
accounted for $13.0 bn., whilst the rest of it offset other inter-
company net flows and adjustments. 
Out of the considered increase, the share of the developing countries 
accounted for $2.832 bn. (21.7~). So the total American capital 
investment in these countries amounted to $56.109 bn. in 1981. 
Against, such stock and investment of earnings the total income from 
these countries amounted to $12.283 bn., in addition to $1.331 bn. 
from fees and royalties. This means that the rate of return was about 
24~ of the total stock in 1981. By contrast, the share of developed 
countries in the previous increase amounted to $8.762 bn. in 1981 
reaching a total of $167.112 bn. The total income generated from 
these countries amounted to $18.790 bn., in addition to $4.805 as 
fees and royalties, i.e. the total rate of return was 14~ (Wilchard, 
1981: 11). 
From the previous general indicators, one could infer: 
(i) A disproportionate rate of return from developed and developing 
countries, viz, the countries which receive less pay more 
and those which receive more pay less. 
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(iil The rate of outflows from developing countries was high. It 
accounted for about 24% in one year against investment stock 
accumulated over many years. 
(iii) Even for the year concerned (1981) these countries paid some 
500% of what they received as reinvested earnings. Thus, one 
could imagine the net effect of such practices on the balance 
of payments in countries in terrible need of foreign exchange. 
In a study on Kenya, Langdon has noted that over the years 1957 to 
1972, the ratio of inflows to outflows was 1:3 including retained 
profits as inflow. This ratio escalated to approach 1:6 after 
excluding retained profits (Langdon, 1981: 72). (1) 
In Nigeria, the outflows surpassed the inflows by six times over the 
period from 1960 to 1973. Over the same period the rate of inflows 
was 13.6% while the rate of outflows was 29.1% (Obadan, 1978: 66). 
This phenomenon is not unique to Africa. It could be found in most 
developing countries which host foreign investment. Muller, analysing 
American investment, noted that over the period from 1957 to 1965, 
only about 17% of foreign investment in Latin America came from the 
U.S. He noticed, in addition, that 
"Each one dollar of net profits is based on an investment that 
83% financed from local savings. However, 21% of the profits 
remains only in the local economy". 
(1) Inflows amounted to 8520 K.shs over 1957-72. About 4920 K.shs 
out of them were equity invested in 1956, 3600K.shs as loans 
during the period. This was in addition to about 9280 K.shs 
as retained profits. In the meantime the outflow amounted 
to 55100 K.shs. 
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Even worse, the dependence of the American investors on local sources 
for finance was increasing over time. Thus, the proportion of foreign 
capital of the total invested by those investors decreased from 17~ 
in 1957-1963 to reach some 9% in the last two years of the same period 
1963-1965. (Muller, 1973: 136-137). (1) 
In brief, it is evident that the TNCs' contribution to finance economic 
development and ease the balance of payments deficits in developing 
countries, is working contrary to the way these countries expected. 
This effect might become clear in the long-run where the outflow 
surpasses the stock of foreign investment. And these companies work 
as siphoning agents for drawing scarce resources from developing 
countries to be reinjected in developed countries. 
However, these companies' performance might mitigate this effect 
through mobilizing local resources to contribute positively to domestic 
development and not to pour outside the country, and through 
encouraging exports and decreasing imports as far as developing 
countries are concerned. This is what will be explored in the next 
sub-section. 
1.2.3 Exports and I.ports 
Balance of payments, in fact, reflects, inter alia, the movements 
of exports and imports. At the same time, the magnitude of this 
reflection depends, mainly, on many variables, such as the quantity 
(1) Muller considers re-invested profits and depreciation as local 
resources. This proportion was 59~ in 1957 to 1965 and 60~ 
in the last two years of the same period. See also, Clairmonte 
& Cavanagh, 1983: 462. 
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of exports/imports, their prices, and their destination. 
Correspondingly if the outcome of these activities is positive, i.e. 
the transnationals export large amounts of products from developing 
countries and the prices are as those prevailing on national and 
international markets, then the ultimate effect could be favourable 
to the balance of payments. In this case, one should bear in mind 
the imports of the companies in question, whether they offset exports 
or not. In contrast, the ultimate outcome could be negative, if the 
previous variables go in the opposite direction and the imports exceed 
exports. 
Here again there are two controversial contentions: the first 
argument is essentially that the transnationals have access to many 
markets allover the world, via their subsidiaries, and marketing 
techniques. Therefore, they are in a position to contribute positively 
to exports from developing countries that, surely, lack such 
opportunities (Reuber, 1973: 200). Moreover, this view assumes that 
the manufacturing subsidiaries export more than local firms do 
(Biersteker, 1978: 30). 
On the other hand, it has been argued that the role of the 
transnationals in exports from developing countries varies according 
to types of export production. These companies' participation might 
be in the form of offering marketing services such as information 
about potential markets and their conditions, licensing brand-names 
etc. This is when the goods are labour intensive or do not use 
sophisticated technology such as footwear, textiles and sports goods. 
Such participation goes further in the case of capital-intensive and 
sophisticated goods to include, besides the marketing services, 
technical information. Nevertheless, the argument comes to the 
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conclusion that the TNCs' contribution to exports from developing 
countries is modest. In addition, the local firms show higher 
propensities to export more than foreign companies and not vice-versa 
(Kirkpatrick & Nixson, 1983: 52-54). 
In connection with that there is an argument that the TNCs have made 
their export decisions on a global basis in the way that achieves 
their own interests. So, they may impose some restrictions on exports 
from their production facilities abroad. Such restrictions might 
range from the absolute prohibition of exports to linking them to 
specific markets in which there would not be a contradictory interest 
(Lall & Streeten, 1977: 134-140; Vaitsos, 1970: 41). 
Moreover, the transnationals are keen to keep their export/import 
transactions as intra-firm trade. By doing so, it might be easier 
for them to manipulate the transactions terms and hence use the well-
known transfer pricing tactic (Barnet & Muller, 1974, 158). 
Not only have they done that but they have also aggravated the 
situation by their tendency to import from abroad at an increasing 
rate. Most of these imports, in fact, come from their parent or their 
sister companies in other developed or developing countries. 
Meanwhile, they are reluctant to get deeply rooted in host developing 
economies (Cohen, 1973: 169). 
Empirical Evidence: 
Each view tries to manipulate figures in the way that backs up its 
argument. The first view which argues that the TNCs encourage exports 
from developing countries depends on export figures from some states 
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in South-East Asia and Latin America. The situation in such countries 
regarding the involvement of the transnationals is shown in table 1.1. 
Tabl e 1.1 
TNCs share in the exports of manufactured 
products as percentage of the total. 
I 
Country Year TNCs' share of manufactured exports I 
't I 
I 
South Korea 1974 27.8 
Taiwan 1971 20.0 
Singapore 1976 90.0 
Colombia 1970 35.0 
Argentina 1969 30.0 
Mexico 1969 26.0 
Brazil * 1972 43.0 
SOURCE: Robinson & Tharakan, 1979: 98. 
* Brazil's share is taken from Nayyar, 1978: 62. 
It is fairly evident that the transnationals playa significant part 
in exports from the above countries. Nevertheless, it has been noted 
that exports from these countries represent the majority of exports 
from developing countries (Nayyar, 1978: 61). The natural deduction 
is that the TNCs' significant participation was confined to particular 
countries which have been used as platforms for exports by these 
corporations (Robinson & Tharakan, 1979: 97). This is in addition to 
the fact that there is a little evidence that could support the 
previous first view. 
On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence that backs the argument 
that the TNCs' contribution to exports is often modest. Nayyar has 
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shown that the share of American firms in exports from these countries 
averaged 9% of total manufactured exports of these countries over 
the period 1966-1974. Even further the share of the transnationals 
from America, Europe, and Japan may reach 15% and not show any sign 
of improvement since the base year (1966). Moreover, he registered 
that the U.S. majority owned affiliates' share in such exports declined 
from 11.5% in 1967 to 8.7% in 1974 (Nayyar, 1978: 78, table 4). 
In this respect the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has 
noted that, the share of American subsidiaries exports from Latin 
America declined within the period 1966/1976 from 10% to 6% as a 
percentage of their total sales. This situation is much worse in 
certain sectors such as transport equipment, chemicals, non-electrical 
machinery, and electrical machinery. Export percentages of these 
former manufacturers amounted to 3.5%, 0.9%, 8.2% and 5.1% respectively 
in Brazil. The same trend was found to stand for the Mexican case 
(Marinho, 1981: 26). Further, Chile's position is no exception. 
Lahera noticed that the transnationals' exports amounted to 5% of 
total Chilean exports to the U.S. and 10% only of their total sales 
went abroad in 1979 (Lahera, 1981, 118). 
In addition, most of such limited parts of the TNCs, are intra-firm 
transactions. In Latin America, Marinho, recorded that the ratio 
of this pattern of trade increased from 68% to 73% and from 54% to 
82% over the period 1960 to 1972 for Brazil and Mexico respectively 
(Marinho, 1981, Table 9: 27). Helleiner, has noted the same trend 
for developing countries 1n general. Over the period 1970-1975 the 
share of developing countries' majority foreign owned affiliates' 
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exports to their parent companies increased from 69% to 82% of their 
total exports (Helleiner, 1981: 18). 
Such a pattern enables these companies to manipulate their prices to 
coincide with their interests. Thus, these prices have no linkages 
with the anms-length prices. It was estimated that these companies 
underpriced their exports by around 40% compared to the price received 
by national firms (Muller 1973: 140. See also Marinho, 1981: 18-19). 
At a time when the transnationals are reluctant to export from 
developing countries, they are showing an increasing trend for imports, 
especially from their home countries (Long, 1981: 388). In Chile, 
in 1979, the behaviour of these companies in this respect, is 
shown in table 1.2. 
T abl e 1.2 
Trade Balance of the Chilean National Economy and the TNCs in 1979. 
National Total 
TNCs 
TNCs share of the total in ~ 
Nati ona 1 Total 
(excluding mining) 
TNCs 
TNCs share in % 
Share of mining in the external 
trade of the TNCs 
SOURCE: Lahera, E, 1981: 119. 
Exports 
3,821.1 
284.3 
7.4% 
1,509.5 
171.1 
11.3% 
39.8~ 
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1 
Imports 1 Balance 
1 
I 
4,442.7 1- 621.6 
1 
I 
518.3 1- 234.0 
11. 7% 1 37 .6% 
1 
1 
1 
3,297.5 1-1,788.0 
505.4 I - 334.3 
15.3~1 18.7~ 
1 
1 
2.5~1 
1 
The figures shown above summarize the fact that the TNCs depend on raw 
materials for their exports from Chile. Exports of these companies 
finance about 55% of their imports including mining exports. Had 
mining exports been excluded this ratio would decline to about 34%; 
not to mention the tiny contribution of these companies to the total 
exports from this country. 
In brief, it is clear that the transnational corporations add to the 
crises of the balance of payments of developing countries rather than 
ease their situation. As seen above, this could take place either 
as a result of the negative outflow/inflow ratio, or the similar 
situation for exports/imports ratio or both. (1) 
1.2.4 Transfer Pricing 
Vernon defined transfer pricing for the American companies as: 
liThe process in whi ch U.S. controll ed fi nos prefer to regi ster 
the lowest possible profits in the host country and the highest 
possible profit in the U.S.A." (Vernon, 1971: 137) 
The use of this device might be due to the intrinsic nature of these 
companies to maximise their returns from their involvement in foreign 
markets. Therefore, as La1l pointed out, they may use it in conditions 
such as the loss in one centre of operations, where they try to offset 
it by maximising profits from the others. In addition, he listed some 
of the reasons behind such behaviour, including TNCs' tendency to use 
transfer pricing in countries with a high rate of taxes; a high rate of 
currency fluctuations; high political instability, and restrictions on 
the repatriation of profits. (La11, 1973: 175-177). 
(1) For more detail see Lal1 & Streeten, 1977: 141. 
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Thus the transnationals, in this case, are keen to determine the prices 
of their transactions whether exports or imports, independently of 
those prevailing on the international markets. They usually tend to 
under-price their exports and over-price their imports. Correspond-
ingly, they sometimes use a triangular method of trade. In this way, 
they ship their products (on paper) to a tax-haven country and reship 
them to the destination country. By doing so, their exports of inputs 
or raw materials reaches the country concerned over-priced, where they 
add extra prices such as transportation and insurance costs. However, 
the fact is that these companies shipped nothing to the second country 
but it is just a paper accounting device. (Muller, 1973: 141-142). 
In a comparable way they under-price their exports from the host 
countries. In so doing, they could show lower profits and thereby 
escape tariffs, taxes and other local duties. Most important, 
especially in the long run, they might be able to avoid political 
provocation and public criticism in developing host countries (Vaitsos, 
1970: 37). So, it is in their interests to tighten control over their 
trade which, as seen above, turned out to be of the intra-firm 
transactions pattern. (Lall, 1979: 62) 
As a matter of fact, this phenomenon is not limited to the developing 
countries. It takes place in the developed as well, but it tends to 
be more severe and nearly common in the former ones. The difference 
might be ascribed to administrative and/or political causes. In 
developing countries, they have been suffering from many administrative 
deficiencies. They cannot get correct information about TNCs· 
behaviour internally or internationally. This is an addition to the 
difficulties of evaluating such information, supposing they obtain it. 
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These countries are very sensitive to the issue of foreign investment. 
So, they are reluctant to rationalize the transnationals' performance, 
on the basis that it might be misunderstood. Nevertheless, there 
are many countries which stepped in and have taken actions in this 
regard and the like, as will be seen in Chapter Two. In contrast, 
developed countries are well equipped with an efficient administrative 
apparatus capable of coping with such TNC practices (Lall, 1979: 65). 
Nevertheless, in the conventional literature there are some views, 
albeit weak, which contend that the activities of the TNCs in 
developing countries may increase their tax revenues. They, in 
addition, refute the argument that the TNC uses the transfer pricing 
technique, arguing that the possibility of using transfer-pricing 
does not mean its frequent use (Biersteker, 1978: 31). 
The final word in such a situation is to be left to the empirical 
evidence, where the literature on transnationals is full of ample 
evidence on the use of transfer pricing. So, in such a case one should 
refer to some studies as: Vaitsos, 1970: 318-19, appendix 10; Barnet 
& Muller, 1975: 157-160; Muller, 1973: 143, Lall & Streeten, 1977: 
150-152, and UNCTAD, 1975, 
1.2.5 ~plo,.ent and Inca.e Distribution 
It has been argued that the TNCs contribute effectively to solving 
the problem of unemployment in developing countries. This has been 
due to their capital injections in these economies, and hence the 
establishment of new projects and the mobilization of local resources 
(Biersteker, 1978: 2-3). By doing so, these newly created employment 
opportunities would equalize income distribution rather than 
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concentrate it. Thus, the TNCs have been regarded as the best 
mechanism for national redistribution of income (Horst, 1978: 358). 
However, the critics of the transnationals contend that these 
companies' contribution regarding employment creation is insignificant. 
Such a poor record might be due, from their standpoint, to the use of 
high and sophisticated technology which tends to be labour saving and 
capital intensive. These companies incline towards full mechanisation 
and to replace supervision posts by machines. Their impact has spilled 
over to many local companies. The latter companies, in an attempt to 
match the transnationals' have been pushed to use capital intensive 
technology irrespective of the conditions of the milieu in which they 
perform. The TNCs also, have often been recruiting those who are 
skilled or semi-skilled whilst leaving the rest (Sunkel, 1970/71: 518). 
In doing so, they widen the gap between the two categories of labour 
and help little to solve the unemployment problem. 
In this regard, the critics argue that, the TNCs work to accentuate 
the skewness of the income distribution pattern in developing 
countries. Apart from their role in employment issue as seen above, 
the capitalists who share these companies and/or have interests with 
them capture the largest part of investment returns. Thus the gap 
between the haves and the have nots get wider over time (Muller, 1973: 
133). Even further, these companies via their concentration in towns, 
contribute not only to accentuating the problem of unemployment, but 
also to deepening the uneven pattern of development within the 
developing counties similar to that which has been established between 
developed and developing countries (Hymer, 1975: 48-56). 
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Empirical Evidence: 
In fact, most of the evidence at hand shows that the TNCs' 
contribution to employment and the pattern of income distribution 
backs up the critics' view. In 1970, according to an ILO estimate 
the major countries of Latin America (1), have suffered from 28% 
underutilization of their labour force and this after a period of 
two decades of development relying on the TNCs (Marinho, 1981: 13). 
In Chile, for instance, the contribution of the transnationals in 
generating employment was negligible, amounting only to 1.4% of the 
total employed in 1979 (Lahera, 1981: 116). The same trend holds 
for Egypt's case as will be seen below. 
With regard to income distribution, it was found that in Latin America, 
which is the biggest receiver of direct foreign investment relative 
to the rest of the third world, 30% of the population gets some 72% 
of the income, 50% of them get 14% and 26% get also 14%. Even worse 
the gap was getting wider over time. In Brazil, the poorest 40% of 
the population saw that their share of income declined from 10.5% 
in 1960 to 7.1% in 1970 (Marhino, 1981: 13). In this regard the 
Brazilian President Emilio Medici commented that 
Brazil is doing well but the people are not". (Barnet & 
Muller, 1974, 150) 
A similar tendency could be observed in other countries like Mexico 
(Muller, 1973: 132-133) 
(1) These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico 
and Venezuela, whose population makes up around 75% of the 
total for Latin America. 
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1.2.6 Displac~nt of Indigenous Fin.s 
It has been argued that, the TNCs create a competitive market in host 
countries, inasmuch as they inject successful projects into these 
economies and hence break down local monopolies. In addition, the 
transnationals by doing so, eliminate weak and uncompetitive local 
firms. Thus, only the efficient firms would remain in the market 
and thus benefit host countries through more efficient use of their 
scarce resources. (Areskoug, 1975/76: 540-542). 
In conflict with this argument, the critics contend that the 
transnationals extend their monopolistic characteristics to host 
countries. In addition, these companies tend to take over local ones. 
This is since such a way of performance would then save finance and 
time. More importantly the TNC would inherit the share of the 
purchased company in the market. This eventually leads to the removal 
. 
of an actual competitor from their way, not to mention that the fierce 
competition of these large enterprises undermine their local 
competitors. Hence, they dominate the host developing markets in 
the end, supposing there are no counter actions on the side of host 
governments (Sunkel, 1970/71: 525; Newfarmer, 1979: 25). 
Empirical Evidence 
In Brazil, Newfarmer pointed out that until 1975 more than one-third 
of the 242 U.S. based corporations were acquisitions. Furthermore, 
over the period from 1973 to 1975 nearly two of every three 
subsidiaries came via this route. Such a tendency was evident in 
the electricity industry where the acquisition ratio increased from 
66% to 77% over the period from 1970 to 1974 (Newfarmer, 1979: 39, 
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41). A similar trend was found in Kenya in 1973 (Cronje, 1976: 37, 
38). In fact this development weakened the local enterpreneurial class 
who found no way for them with the unfair competition of the TNCs. 
Furtado commented, in this respect that: 
"The process of forming a local entrepreneurial class has 
been interrupted ..• , the elimination of the national 
entrepreneurial class necessarily excludes the possibility 
of self-sustained national development, along the lines of 
the classical capital ist development ll • (Furtado in Sankel, 
1971/72: 527) 
1.2.7 Conclusion 
It is evident from the previous review that the rationale that has 
motivated the TNCs to invest in developing countries has been 
manifested in their behaviour in such countries. It has been argued 
that these companies plan on a global scale and they invest in other 
markets in order to maximise the global returns from their monopolistic 
advantages. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that they use 
similar production techniques as those used in advanced markets. 
So their record in employment creation is therefore poor. This is 
with the exception of the establishing of some assembly lines of 
production, especially in South-East Asia, in order to take advantage 
of cheap labour and thereby gain a competitive edge. 
Rather, it is clear that the most important aim of the TNCs is 
defending their markets or opening new ones. So, the developing 
countries' markets are the focus of these companies investment. The 
fact has been mirrored in the poor record of exports from these 
countries. In the meantime, these companies are importing at an 
increasing rate, especially from their parent countries and the 
countries where their other subsidiaries exist. 
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Given that the limited inflow of capital by the transnationals into 
the developing countries has been superseded many times by the outflow 
from these countries, the reverse effect of these companies on the 
balance of payments becomes evident. So, it can be argued that the 
TNCs are accentuating the crises of the developing countries rather 
than alleviating them. 
However, there are some advocates that contend that these companies 
contribute effectively to development in developing countries. 
Nevertheless, they do not have much strong evidence to support their 
views. 
Having discussed the rationale behind the OFI decision by the TNCs 
and their actual performance in developing countries in general, one 
may ask is it the same in the transfer of technology? This is the 
question that will represent the main theme of the chapter to follow. 
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atAPTER TWO 
Aspects of the Transfer of Technology by the TNC, 
to the Developing Countries 
The previous chapter reviewed the theoretical debate on the rationale 
behind the TNCs' involvement in overseas markets. It was argued that 
there has not been a unified theory to explain all the aspects related 
to this phenomenon. There are some views that attribute it to market 
imperfection and to the monopolistic advantages that these companies 
have over local ones. However, others ascribe it to motives such 
as defending and/or acquiring new markets; cheap labour; raw materials 
and the desire for diversification. The overview of the 
transnationals' general performance showed that the links between 
the TNCs and the rationale that guides their investment overseas are 
close and strong. 
In this chapter, we discuss the issue of transfer of technology via 
DFI by TNCs to developing countries. Over the last 15 years there 
has been an increasing stress on the transfer of technology from 
developed towards developing countries. Such emphasis has occurred 
at both international and national levels. At the international level 
the United Nations Assembly is continually arguing that this transfer 
could be the most important area for international co-operation. 
Not only has it done that, but also it has brought attention to the 
point that such a transfer should aim at building up technological 
capabilities in the recipient developing countries (UNCTAD, 1976: 
148). 
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At the national level, most of developing countries have seen foreign 
technology as the main device for achieving their industrialization. 
The greater the speed of the introduction of modern technology, the 
greater the growth of output, and the faster would be the solving 
of their chronic problems. 
In this connection there has been an increasing emphasis on the role 
of the TNCs since they have held the lead in commercialization of 
industrial technology on the international market. In consequence, 
their role has received a great deal of scrutiny at both the 
theoretical and empirical level as will be discussed below. 
But what is the technology that has raised all this attention? 
Actually, there has not been a unified theory that responds to all 
the questions that might arise from technology and its transfer, 
development, etc. As a result we find definitions as numerous as 
the number of those who have written about the subject. Nevertheless, 
the word technology, for analytical purposes, appears to embrace two 
major elements. The first, is that what is called 'hard technology' 
which includes machinery, and equipment embodying technology in it. 
The second element could be titled 'soft-technology', that includes 
the necessary 'knOW-hOW' for the effective use of the first element. 
And, it includes the technical information that underlies the hard 
technology. (Merhav, 1969; 33; Baranson, 1969; Galbraith, 1967; Ruber, 
1973; Streeten, 1972; Oloko, 1964: 23, 25; Stewart, 1974: 17; Jennets 
Liander, 1978: 109; Teece, 1977: 245; Sagasti, 1980; Emmanuel, 1982: 
9, etc). 
* It may be worth to noting that the word technology is der1ved from 
the Greek word 'Techno' that means 'art or skill'; and the word 
'Technics' that means one who possesses a certain art (Zvorikine, 
1963: 59). 
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Turning to, the role of the TNCs in the transfer process, it might 
be dependent upon: 
A) The TNCs: their characteristics; global strategies including 
the rationale to invest abroad; and their perception with regard 
to the developing countries in particular. 
B) The developing countries: their technological capabilities; 
their policies and attitudes towards importing foreign 
technology; and their view as to the imported technology in 
relation to indigenous potential. 
Consequently, this chapter will discuss these factors in an integrated 
way under the following heads: the market of technology; mechanisms 
of technology transfer; and issues arising from the transfer process, 
in the following order: 
2.2 The Technology Market: 
Having understood the rationale of the decision to invest in foreign 
markets in Chapter One, the understanding of the structure and the 
dynamism of the technology market is of crdcial importance to 
comprehend the performance of the TNC in developing countries. 
Characteristically, the technology market has had the following major 
features: it is highly imperfect; the transfer process is often a 
one way phenomenon from the developed to the developing countries; 
and the technology is not freely transmitted. These features are 
in fact correlated and they M1ght be due to the object of the deal 
and the relative power of both the seller and the buyer of this 
object. 
- 56 -
Technology represents the object of the market, and as seen above, it 
could be in 'hard' or 'soft' form. In the first form, it is embodied 
in goods (e.g. machinery and equipment). Mostly this form is 
indivisible. This means that the transfer of one part necessitates 
the import of the others, often from the same supplier. Thus the 
monopolization of one element leads to the monopolization of other 
complementary ones. Hence a state of imperfection arises in this 
case where the purchaser would not be able, supposing he wanted to, 
to turn to other sources for his requirements. This situation might 
be extended to technology products as well. For example, the import 
of one part of a car, makes it necessary or at least favourable to 
import the complementary parts from the same source (Vaitsos, 1970: 
14). Furthermore, the second form is information, and what the 
developing countries want in this respect is information about 
information, a situation which, taking into account their weakness, 
adds to the imperfection of the market (Vaitsos, 1975: 190). 
In addition, technology in both its forms is differentiable. The 
supplier tends to change its technical characteristics over time in 
order to distinguish it from the potential rivals. As a result, the 
recipient would be obliged to maintain more links with the same 
supplier than otherwise it should be. This is in order to keep abreast 
of the latest modifications, even if they are not essential (Clark, 
1975: 14). 
With respect to the source of the technology, it has been concentrated 
in the developed countries or in other words in the northern 
hemisphere. Rather importantly the commercialization of technology 
is concentrated in a few of them such as the U.S.A., the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the U.K., France, Canada and more recently Japan. 
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The U.S.A., for instance, has been responsible for 55% to 60% of 
world technology trade (UNIOO, 1981: 4); Goshal 1982: 31). 
Within these markets, the TNCs are the main source for 80% to 90% of 
the commercialized technology to developing countries. Moreover, these 
companies become in some cases the sole supplier of technology needed 
by these countries (UNIOO, 1981: 4-5,9). In this connection, it 
has been argued that the transnationals are responsible for the largest 
proportion of technology innovation in the world. In eight of the 
OECO countries, for instance, it was found that eight TNCs accounted 
for between 30% and 50% of all industrial R&D (Pavitt, 1971: 61). 
Nonetheless, it was argued that small firms contribute significantly 
to the invention stage (Freeman, 1974: 198-221). 
Thus, it is clear that there is a close relationship between the 
transnationals and technology. This situation makes them keen to 
maintain their technological superiority which strengthens their 
bargaining position on the technology market. So, as Parker puts 
it: 
"Mul ti nati onal corporati ons and technology are mutually 
dependent". (1973: 202) 
Correspondingly, these companies do not spare any effort to maximize 
their returns via spreading the exploitation of their technological 
edge, over large number of countries as Hymer, 1966: 275, argued. 
In this way, they act regardless of the interests of the developing 
countries. Hence, it has been found that the TNCs have the 
propensity to invest more in highly sophisticated technology, and 
can ensure that their technological secrets could be maintained 
for a relatively long time (Cary, 1979: 21, Vernon, 1974: 276). 
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Furthermore, in pursuance of their goal of tightening control over 
their valuable assets, they do by far the largest amount of foreign 
patenting, as will be discussed below. This is, as argued by Penrose 
(1975: 776, 783) in order to create unreal scarcity in the technology 
market. Thus, knowledge gets monopolized, bought and sold. In so 
doing, the TNCs are enhancing their unique position relative to their 
bargainers, and hence are able to dictate their own terms to get the 
fruits of their assets in price determination for technology and other 
complementary parts and markets for connected goods. So, some writers 
have commented that patents offer the transnationals unlimited monopoly 
power (Watson & Halman, 1970: 112; Lall, 1976:9). 
The transnational corporations, in a tentative attempt to prolong their 
powerful position, even after the expiry of patents tend to use brand-
names and trade-marks. It was found that they are extravagant users 
of brand-names relative to non transnationals. Alam and Langrish 
comparing the role of the TNCs and non-TNCs in the transfer of 
technology to LOCs, found that 93~ of the agreements studied employed 
foreign brand-names while the comparable figure for the non-TNCs 
was 37.5~. (Alam and Langrish, 1981: 384). Using these means, the 
transnationals strongly establish themselves in the host market 
and get their products imprinted in the minds of people. It follows 
that the consumers demand not only that the final products embody 
the imported technology, but also that the final products are directly 
imported when that technology is has longer to be imported for one 
reason or another. In addition, the entry to the market by other 
competitors becomes very difficult or at least costly (Clark, 1975: 
14; Fortner, 1977: 41). 
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The transnationals prefer to trade in technology in the form of a 
package including, know-how, machinery, equipment, skills, and 
management. In this way the purchasers get deprived of the possibility 
of buying their requirements from alternative sources maybe on more 
favourable conditions. They, thereby, as Vaitsos suggested, create 
non-competitive markets for each one of the elements (Vaitsos, 1973: 
370, 374; 1975: 189). 
On the other side of the markets stand the developing countries. As 
a matter of fact these countries' position adds to the market's 
imperfection. During a period when the commercial technology is 
concentrated in relatively few hands in the advanced economies, (UNIDO, 
1981: 3), the purchasers of it are numerous and include nearly all 
developing countries. Furthermore, the developing countries are 
lacking most of the elements of technological capability in terms 
of R&D, scientists and technologists, technically skilled people, 
a dynamic industrial sector and a capital goods sector, which are 
important not only to strengthen their bargaining power but also to 
select, assimilate, adapt, imitate, and reproduce the suitable 
tec~nology. 
Furthermore, the developing countries are suffering from what Streeten 
labelled a 'Communication gap' (Streeten, 1972: 217,218). These 
countries never get a complete or sufficient idea of the potential 
alternative sources or prices of required technology. The main and 
sometimes the only source of this information is the supplier itself. 
Naturally the TNCs would be biased towards their own technology and 
willing to supply it if the recipient country satisfied their 
conditions (Vaitsos, 1973: 370, 374). See West 1979: 297, 299; UNIDO, 
1981: 3; Vaitsos, 1979: 101. 
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The developing countries are thus the weakest part of a highly 
imperfect world technology market. Consequently as Lall suggested: 
II ••• , (the) Third World is bound to be exploited in 
international technology markets ll • (1979: 77) (1) 
Thus the structure of the technology market has reflected itself on all 
other aspects that might arise or are related to the transfer of 
technology by the TNCs to developing countries as a whole. For more 
details about technology market see: Turner, 1974: 1; Helleiner, 1975: 
165; Ewing, 1977: 2; Mercier, 1978: 210; Emmanuel, 1982: 123-124. 
2.3 Mechanisms of Technology Transfer 
As far as technology transfer is concerned, it is worth noting that 
there is no definite view about the most workable and reliable 
mechanism in such a process. 
But, before entering into the subject matter what does the word 
mechanism mean? It has been referred to it generally as any means of 
making available to a production enterprise those elements of technical 
knowledge which they use in installing and operating their production 
facilities (Cooper et al., 1971: 8). In this respect, these elements 
might be transferred in a variety of ways such as the flow of books, 
scientific journals, periodicals, technical assistance programmes, 
patents, licensing to private or public firms, management contracts or 
via direct foreign investment by the TNCs (Patel, 1974: 1-8; UNCTAD, 
1975: 10). 
(1) It must be noted that Lall has changed his position on the 
grounds that the general climate in developing countries towards 
the TNCs is changing. He argued that technology never comes 
cheap and its transfer, especially to developing countries is 
costly. So innovators must be allowed to appropriate 
substantial benefits if they are to innovate at all. 
(Lall, 1984: 2-16). 
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These channels in fact, represent a wide range of knowledge. 
Nevertheless, it has been noted by Cooper and Sercovich, that such 
channels, except OFI and licensing, transmit inadequate, simple, old 
and un-practicable elements. So, they are to be considered unimportant 
economically (ibid, 1971:8). 
With regard to the developing countries, as a result of their position 
in the technology market, they tend to use most of the previous 
channels. Thus the main theme of the following analysis will be 
focused on the most significant channels that provoked a great deal 
of controversial argument. These are licensing per se and under OFI's 
umbrella, in addition to patents within the realm of the 
transnationals. 
2.3.1 Direct Foreign Inyes~ent 
Direct foreign investment represents a mechanism of controversial 
potential, as far as the transfer of technology is concerned. In 
this respect some questions might arise: Why is OFI mechanism is 
preferred by the TNCs? What sort of technology does it transfer and 
what elements? Does the TNC undertake R&D in developing countries, 
and if they do what kind of R&D? 00 they arrange genuine training 
for local personnel? If yes, what is the type of such training, (for 
example, theoretical, on the spot, or independent courses) and if 
they do not arrange such training, why not? Finally what is the 
comparable position of developing countries regarding these issues, 
that could affect the eventual outcome of the whole process? 
As a matter of fact both OFI and technology transfer have the same 
core, which is the internationalization of production. The treatment 
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of DFI necessitates the exposure to the issue of transfer of 
technology as one of the major impulses of the transnationa1s to invest 
abroad as seen above. In addition, the treatment of technology 
transfer necessitates throwing some light on the mechanism of DFI 
as a potential for maximizing the companies' returns from such a 
process. In this respect Kojima suggested that the core of the issue 
of the transfer of technology is the same as that of direct foreign 
investment (Kojima, 1981: 13). 
In this connection, it is considered that the TNCs tend to 
internalize the exploitation of their technological advantages in 
foreign markets. These advantages are firm-specific, hence the 
exploitation by the company itself might enable it to maintain 
technological superiority as long as possible. It would be in a 
position to hold the control and the secrecy, at least over the vital 
elements, in its own hands. Moreover, the returns would be higher 
and the cost lower if the companies performed in such a way, insofar 
as, they could provide complementary needed services and other things 
more efficiently, being near the production facilities. Additionally, 
the investing companies would be in a position to generate more profits 
from other sources in addition to technology transactions such as 
from selling inputs, and raw materials, using such tactics as transfer 
pricing. (Cary 1979: 14-20). 
Rather, the developing countries' position in technology adds further 
dimensions to the issue. It implies that not only would they be bound 
to obey the TNCs' conditions but also, these countries invite the 
companies into their economies for direct involvement in the form 
of direct investment. 
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The transnationals, in this respect, prefer the establishment of wholly 
foreign owned subsidiaries (W.F.O.S.) in the host developing economies. 
This occurs especially in companies that enjoy plenty of investible 
resources such as capital; technological advantages; skills; and 
managerial capacities. Also, it often takes place in fields 
characterized as technologically sophisticated. This is in order 
to protect such technology from being leaked to rivals, and on the 
basis that the recipient countries lack the capacity and capabilities 
to use such technology. In doing so, there are immediate results. 
First, they work as enclaves in host economies, where technological 
elements are, often, not accessible to the local personnel. Secondly, 
the most important key decisions regarding technology and production 
are to be taken by the parent corporation, that is, these decisions 
are taken in other countries where the headquarters are located. 
Thus, the modern sector in host countries seem to be divorced from 
the rest of their economies (Ewing, 1977: 2). (1) 
Technology supplied via WFOS and majority foreign owned subsidiaries 
(MFOS) is usually, as seen above, in the form of a package, rather 
than alternative arrangements (UNCTAD, 1974: 29; Alam & Langrish, 
1981: 385). Transactions of this kind between the parent and its 
subsidiary are, often, unaccompanied by written contracts. They do 
not need, actually, to write such contracts, since the parent company 
is able to give its instructions through its own system of information 
directly. This also might due to the fact that the subsidiaries are 
guided by the global strategy planned to be carried out by them. 
(1) For more detail see Barnet & Muller, 1974: 171-172; Baranson, 1970: 
438; 1979: 44; Aggarwal, 1978: 85; UNCTAO, 1975: 11, UNCTC, 1982: 
126. 
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Nevertheless, this does not exclude that there are some corporations 
that write contracts with regard to the issue of transfer of 
technology. Often, they do that not for their subsidiaries, but in 
order to avoid any potential requirements from the recipient host 
countries such as that for reducing payments, exporting, the usage 
of local inputs or materials, etc. (UNCTAD, 1972: 20). 
Transfers in package form means in addition that the technology used 
by these companies never becomes understood or known by the recipient 
countries. It leads to what Vaitsos called • pseudo transfers of know-
how' (1974: 398). In consequence, these countries are obliged to 
revolve around the orbit of these companies. Moreover, the possibility 
for overpricing the complementary element would be more likely in 
such a situation. Thus, it has been noted that the suppliers of 
technology employ hidden devices in order to extract a high return 
from countries already suffering from a scarcity of foreign exchange 
(West, 1978: 320). 
Meanwhile, what aggravates the situation is that the transnationals, 
in this way, tend to transfer capital intensive and advanced 
technology coincident with their interests at a time in which it is 
in conflict with the interests of the recipient host countries 
(Emmanuel, 1982: 320). This is since, capital-intensive technology 
developed in labour-scarce countries is, often, transferred by these 
companies to labour surplus countries without real adaptations 
(Aggarwal, 1978: 88). 
However, there has been some argument that WFOS is the best method 
of technology transfer to the developing countries. Such an 
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argument goes further to suggest that these subsidiaries should be 
freed from any restrictions, which might hamper their activities, 
II ••• , a wholly owned subsidiary has at its finger-tips technical 
know-how of the parents and the experience and the knowledge 
of other affiliates as well. This range of technical knowledge 
is not available to minority owned affiliates or to independent 
licences ••• , The selection of the latter two routes may occur 
at very high cost in terms of technical assistance from the 
international companies ll • (Cary, 1979: 37; Watanabe, 1972: 
427, UNCTAD, 1975: 10). 
In an attempt to circumvent the deficiencies of WFOS and MFOS 
developing countries have shown a bias towards a joint-ventures pattern 
of direct foreign investment, in order to induce some sort of 
indigenisation and control that could result from taking a part of 
equity share. This sort of ownership would lead in their view to 
a harmony of interests between them and the investing companies. 
In this respect, also, some writers expressed the views that joint-
venture (JV) firms are an effective mechanism in the transfer of 
technology. These ventures, via the close association between local 
personnel and foreign expertise at different levels in management 
and production could contribute to the transfer process in a tangible 
way. Meanwhile, local participation might restrict the freedom with 
which resources might be expatriated to the minimum level (Cooper 
& Sercovich, 1971: 22). 
On the side of foreign corporations, they might prefer to embark on 
DFI in this form in cases where they do not have enough resources 
in terms of managerial personnel, skills, and capital that are 
necessary for WFOS or even MFOS and if they are investing in markets 
with some political or economic risk. (Singer and Ansari, 1978: 204-
205). (1) 
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It is worth noting that the relationship between equity ownership 
and control is not straight forward. For example, the participation 
in ownership does not mean necessarily that the local partner would 
affect significantly the control of the venture or at least minimize 
the control held by the foreign partner. (Cooper & Sercovich, 1971: 
24). The TNCs are keen to maintain control over their subsidiaries, 
even in cases with foreign minority ownership. This could be achieved 
via maintaining their control over the factors of the production that 
achieve their interests. Thus, it is not surprising to find that 
key managerial and technical positions, especially those related 
to technology and production, are occupied by expatriates. In 
addition, there is the desire to preserve the secrecy of their 
technology, so that it is not leaked to the locals. In so doing, 
these ventures, actually block technology information to the local 
personnel and its diffusion through the whole economy. (Constantino, 
1977: 49). Bearing in mind the position of both the supplier and 
recipient of technology on the international market, it is hardly 
surprising that the TNCs are concentrating their control over the 
operations of their subsidiaries at their headquarters. 
In an empirical study about JVs in Iran, Rafii has noted that, often, 
the foreign partner dictates his conditions to his local counterpart, 
even in cases with minority foreign ownership. In the automobile 
industry, for example, the JVs' production was confined to parts 
determined by the foreign partner, and they were not allowed to 
assemble parts produced locally except after written approval by the 
minority partner/licensor. Such control extended to include imports. 
He found that just 3 firms out of 25 were permitted to 
(1) For more detail see Cary, 1979: 15; Singer, 1975: 209, 14-15. 
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purchase their inputs from elsewhere rather than from the licensor 
(Rafii, 1978: 2-53-54). Even further, it has been noted that tie-in 
clauses were more heavy in joint-ventures than in W.F.O.S. (UNCTAD, 
1975: 15). 
Indeed, joint-ventures might pay lower prices for purchases of 
intermediate components than do W.F.O.S. But, on the other hand, 
they pay more royalties and service fees. Patel, in this respect, 
noted that salaries of foreign consultants exceed by several times 
those paid to their local counterparts undertaking similar work (1974: 
10). 
Moreover, in the joint-ventures investment pattern, the TNCs tend 
to transfer usually the same sort of technology they are using in 
developed markets and produce the same or similar lines of production. 
In addition, such transactions tend to be in the form of a package. 
In India, for instance, Davis concluded that: 
II ••• , 52~ of 119 agreements investigated were comprehensive 
packages in joint-ventures. In contrast it was 5~ in licences' 
{Davis, 1976: 142}. 
From this information, it can be seen that the role of joint-ventures 
is not so different from other forms of DFI, regarding the issue of 
technology transfer. This has led some to suggest that joint-ventures 
have not proved to be better channels for the transfer of technology 
to the developing countries than other forms like WFOS or MFOS (Singer 
& Ansari, 1978: 203-207). 
Direct foreign investment could play its major potential role regarding 
technology via channels such as adaptation, training of local personnel 
in the elements of technology introduced by foreign investors, 
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undertaking R&D, and the integration in the host economies in way 
that might lead to the creation of a local entrepreneurial class. 
These issues will be discussed below. 
A) Adaptation: 
The terms 'adaptation', 'modification', or 'adjustment' of technology 
may technically mean making technology introduced by the TNCs 
coincident with the particular conditions of the recipient developing 
countries. Such a coincidence might extend to include factors of 
production and production products as well. In this way, it could 
be easier for locals to absorb, use, develop, and reproduce such a 
technology in response to their particular environment. This is in 
addition to the appropriateness of products to the basic needs of 
the population in these economies. 
As a matter of fact, the adaptation process to a large extent needs 
well-prepared engineers, sCientists, a high level of technical skills, 
and an effective organisation that supports them. These requirements, 
as well as the required cost are within the reach of the 
transnationals, while, they are, mostly, or at least for some of them, 
especially organisation, out of the reach of most of the developing 
countries. Consequently, the TNCs as the main vehicle of the 
introduction of technology into these countries could playa 
significant part in adapting technology to suit the recipient 
economies, if they have the will to do so. 
In this connection, Lall has noted two types of adaptation. First, 
• peripheral , , or 'ancillary' that could take place in processes such 
as handling, storage, and transport. Secondly, 'Core' on 'essential' 
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adaptation such as in machinery in a way that might result in more 
absorption of labour or using of local inputs and materials (Lall, 
1978: 217-38). In this respect, the TNCs have a poor record. These 
companies are guided by their self-interest, hence, it is not expected 
to see them behaving always as the interests of the developing 
countries require. They have no definite policy regarding adaptation 
of their technologies, so they are introducing their intangible assets 
into the developing countries intact, and, often, without real 
modification (Gerimidis, 1977: 26). Not only have they performed 
in such a way, but also, they have deprived the recipient firms in 
developing countries of the right to adapt their own technologies 
supposing they are able to do that (Cooper & Sercovich, 1971: 47). 
With regard to this issue there is an ample evidence that supports 
the previous argument. In Brazil, for example, Morley & Smith 
concluded that American firms do not tend to adapt their technologies. 
The Ford Company's reply to Morley & Smith stated that it would use the 
same assembly methods as they have been using in advanced European 
markets. This was so, despite that fact that the cost of labour was 
only one-fifth of that prevailing in the home country (1976/1977: 254, 
261). Many other cases could be found in other developing countries in 
Latin America and Africa. (See West, 1979, Gerimidis, 1977). 
However, some cases in which some sort of modification has taken place 
can be found, albeit very rare and not necessarily reflecting 
essential adaptation. The transnationals in a few cases might scale 
down their products in order to be suitable for local markets 
(Michalet, 1977: 53). In other cases it was reported that the TNCs 
might embark upon adaptation that could lead to more use of local 
materials or inputs. In the Philippines car industry, for instance, 
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it was found that the foreign manufacturers used such local materials 
as bamboo and wood in making car bodies as a result of the adaptation 
process (Singer, 1978: 54). 
Such examples are in general exceptional. But how can this behaviour 
be interpreted? The answer perhaps lies in the weak technological 
situation of the developing countries and the rationale of the 
transnationals to invest in foreign markets. At a time when the 
developing countries have invited in OF! in order to, inter alia, 
transfer technology to their countries, they have, mostly, no strategic 
policy regarding this issue and not enough experts capable of 
absorbing, imitating or adapting the introduced technology, supposing 
they have the chance to get access to it. And countries which have 
relatively capable staff, suffer from the lack of organisation that 
could link the productive sector with the technological one. Probably, 
they invited or encouraged OF! because of that situation. But, as 
we have seen, foreign investors and TNCs are guided by their policies 
and interests. Thus they take the decision to invest in foreign 
markets in order to capitalize on their monopolistic advantages. 
Such advantages, especially related to the technology to acheive their 
purposes, must be applied abroad intact or if necessary with some 
slight modifications. So, it is not in the interests of the 
transnationals to embark upon genuine adaptation that necessarily 
would result in wasting time, money and personnel for them at a time 
when they have their reservoir of already tested and proved technology. 
This is in addition to other reasons that will be mentioned below. 
In brief, despite the ability of the TNCs to adapt their technology 
for developing countries they are often reluctant to embark on such 
a process genuinely. More importantly, they are backed by the weakness 
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and policies of recipient developing economies. Apart from the 
weakness, seen above, these countries mostly, adopt policies that 
do not encourage the adaptation process. Policies such as the 
insistence on the introduction of advanced technology and exemption 
from duties on advanced and modern machinery, equipment and other 
production requirements. By and large, the developing countries need, 
in fact, to have second thoughts about their policies in this regard, 
especially local technological capability. 
B) Training 
The shortages of well-trained skills able to cope with the process 
of technology transfer is one of the most serious problems that face 
developing countries. In consequence, the issue of practical training 
is of crucial importance insofar as the transfer of technology is 
concerned. The local trainees' existence is a basic requirement for 
not only the effective usage of foreign induced technology by the 
TNCs, but also for its absorption, understanding, assimilation, and 
hence adaptation coincident with the particular conditions of the 
recipient economies. The growing complexity of technology and its 
mastery requires skilled, and semi-skilled staff in the process of 
production (Inzemtsev, 1974: 46). 
In this respect, the TNCs bear some sort of responsibility in training 
staff capable of tackling the previous tasks. Such a contribution 
could take place via employing and training locals as technicians 
and engineers in a way that might lead to a real transfer or implanting 
of technology. In doing so, it can be said that the new technology 
is transferred and established in the host country(Kojima, 1981: 13}. 
In fact, for such a transfer to spillover into other sectors, it 
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requires that the DFI works as an integrated part of the domestic 
economy. This question will be discussed below. 
In contrast, the transnationals pay hardly any significant attention 
to the question of genuine training. These companies tend to employ 
few qualified locals and do very little training for the un-skilled 
labourers (UNCTAD, 1972: 35, 38). (1) In addition, the type of 
training provided by the TNCs is mostly confined to the formation 
of craftsmen, operatives and supervisory skills (Chen, 1981: 586). 
Thus, the vital skills necessary for a genuine transfer of technology 
could not be traced in most developing countries. They are often 
designated to personnel from the developed markets (Kaplinsky, 1976: 
207). In Iran, for instance, it was found that TNe partners in joint-
ventures were not interested in either training the locals or getting 
them involved at the design stage or in production techniques 
(Alizadeh, 1976: 29). 
Moreover, what makes the situation abortive is that in the few cases 
where local people get trained by the TNC's facilities, they are not 
allowed to move to other firms either locals or foreigners. In Brazil, 
Michalet found that trained locals are prevented from moving to other 
companies. The locals have to sign a contract stating that they will 
only work for the company that trained them (Michalet, 1977: 20-21, 
65-68). Similar situations could be found in other developing 
countries such as Nigeria (Tuner, 1974: 11). Egypt's case offers 
a clear example in this regard as will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6. 
(1) For mor~detail see Gerimidis, 1977: 21; Michalet, 1977: 63; 
West, 1~8: 348. 
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This element of the transnationals' performance is not unexpected in 
the light of understanding their unified style of behaviour, in 
addition to their keenness in perpetuating the technological dependency 
of the recipient economies. Their technological superiority is the 
main justification of their existence in these economies. Thus, it 
is not in their interest to leak their secrets to locals of these 
countries. Rather important is why should they incur the training 
burden at a time when they have the personnel needed to undertake 
the same job and who would guard their interests. 
Furthermore, to be fair, the situation in developing countries 
regarding education and training adds to the problem of these 
countries. These countries, mostly, pay no significant attention 
to the question of training via the process of technology transfer 
by the TNCs. The training process needs some basic or fundamental 
information that could be provided by the educational system or by 
'learning by doing'. In these countries, the educational process has 
been suffering from a variety of problems, including a lack of finance. 
Therefore, about 60~ of children in these countries do not attend 
schools. Education has been confined to the theoretical aspects of 
information. Equally worse, there are no links between the former 
system and the productive sector. Consequently, as a result of this 
local disintegration, the productive sector has become more integrated 
with foreign economies {Dunn, 1978: 159-171}. In addition, the 
industrial sector in these countries is relatively limited so that 
it might not be able to provide the opportunity for learning by doing. 
The TNCs, as seen above, instead of remedying the situation, aggravate 
it. Thus, these companies on their own would not undertake the 
required training, unless the developing countries would take the 
necessary measures to enforce them to do so. {Ibid, 1978}. 
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c. Research and Develop!ent (R & D) 
UNESCO~ has defined R&D in general as: 
"Any creative systemati c activi ty undertaken in order to 
increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, 
culture and society, and the use of this knowledge to devise 
new applications". 
In connection with such a definition, UNESCO classifies three kinds 
of R&D as follows:-
(A) Fundamental Research: 'experimental or theoretical work 
undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying 
foundations of phenomena and observable facts, without any 
particular or specific practical aim or object; 
(B) Applied Research: 'original investigation undertaken in order 
to acquire new knowledge, directed, however primarily, towards 
a specific aim or object'. 
(C) Experimental Development: ~systematic work, drawing on existing 
knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience 
that is directed to producing new materials, products and 
devices and to improving substantially those already produced 
or installed' (1) (UNESCO, 1983: V. 2, Sec. 5). 
The issue of R&D, especially in the last definitional areas has 
acquired a great deal of attention as far as economic development 
is concerned. In this respect, it has been recognised by UNIDD as 
one of the vital pre-requisites for industrial and economic development 
(1969: 7). Employing R&D in developing economies might help to 
bring in new production methods and/or products that would be 
(1) For a similar definition by DECO see Gerimidis, 1977: 24). 
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coincident with the needs of the majority of the population. In 
addition, it is important for increasing productivity via the effective 
use of new techniques (Awojinrin, 1974: 265). 
Moreover, so far as the transfer of technology is concerned, the 
existence of a reliable local R&D infrastructure in developing 
countries is of crucial importance. It is essential for adapting, 
modifying and hence reproducing the imported technology according to 
the requirements of their particular milieu. It reinforces the 
bargaining power of the recipient countries in technology markets. 
They might be in a relatively good position to select alternatives, 
and hence bargain about the price, conditions, and types of 
technology. 
In consequence, the potential role that the transnationals could play 
is critical in this respect. They could set up R&D units in their 
production facilities to design and adapt their technologies in order 
to fit the new environment. In these units, they could employ local 
engineers and technicians in tasks that give them genuine practical 
skills and which would enable them to carry out an indigenous R & 
D on the basis of self-reliance. Thus, these units might be in a 
position to supply technologists to other economic sectors. Not only 
are they capable of that, but also they could support local R&D 
units in different ways, for example, providing financial assistance, 
which is the greatest problem that faces local units. Equally 
important is technical, scientific and organizational assistance 
that shifts R&D efforts in developing countries toward applied and 
experimental research in the way that responds to productive sector 
needs. 
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On the contrary, these presumptions about the potential role that 
the TNCs could play in this respect seemed to be confronted with 
hindrances. These companies, continue to work according to their 
global strategies in that their behaviour tends to produce some sort 
of a division between head offices and subordinate plants in developing 
countries which according to this strategy should be confined to lower 
levels of activities (Hymer, 1975: 38). Such a policy has been 
manifested in the distribution of R&D activities within the 
transnational organisation. 
Correspondingly, it was found that the greatest and most significant 
R&D activities of the TNCs are centred in home and developed markets. 
These corporations' subsidiaries used to depend on the R&D facilities 
of their parents. American firms which still represent the main single 
source in foreign direct investment carried out only about lOt of 
their R&D in overseas laboratories in 1974. This figure rose to 
some 12t in 1980 (1) (Cheng, 1984: 183). 
Moreover, though the American R&D abroad is limited, it was found 
that the largest part is channelled into the industrialized countries. 
It is, further, concentrated in a few of them with Canada, the U.K., 
the FRG and France accounting for some 75t of total R&D efforts 
by American firms in sectors such as chemicals, electrical machinery, 
non-electrical machinery and transportation equipment in 1972 (Fortner, 
1977: 39). A similar notice was concluded in a study undertaken by 
Fisher & Behrman in the late 1970's concerning 31 U.S. TNCs' R&D 
abroad. They found that the vast majority of these companies' efforts 
in this field have taken place in the U.K., Australia, Canada, Japan 
(1) For more detail see Hewitt, 1980: 308. 
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the FRG and France. Moreover, an identical situation was found for 
the European transnationals, where most of their R&D has been 
undertaken in other developed markets like the U.S.A., France and 
the FRG. Meanwhile, the share of developing countries was not 
significant in any sense (1) (Fisher & Behrman, 1980: 11-12). 
Such findings support the proposition by the UNClAD that the TNCs are 
transferring ready-made innovations to developing countries. This 
is regardless of the new atmosphere in which such companies are going 
to operate (UNCTAD, 1972: 38). Even worse, the transnationals are, 
often, reluctant to establish units necessary for modifying imported 
technology, if necessary. In the tyre industries of some Latin 
American countries, it was found that: 
"TNCs' subsidiaries R&D required for the adaptation of tyre 
designs to local conditions was found to be undertaken in the 
central research laboratories' (West, 1978: 336). 
Nonetheless, the TNCs' subsidiaries might embark on R&D activities 
in some developing economies. But, in fact, their purpose was found 
to be a strictly commercial one and occurred when the required inputs 
or materials were not available in home markets. In Kenya, for 
example, these companies were obliged to do some experimental attempts 
on local materials in tea processing, since the materials needed do 
not exist at home (Gerimidis, 1977: 24). In addition, such experiments 
might take place to make their products more suitable for the local 
market 
(1) For more detail about TNCs, R&D see: Lall, 1974: 159; 
Alizadeh, 1976: 30, UNCTAD, 1976: 154; Servant & Lavipour, 1976: 
29-38; Biersteker, 1978: 9; Aydin & Terpstra, 1981: 37-38; 
Fisher & Behrman, 1980 where the whole book is important in 
this respect. 
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such as has been done by Unilever and by Johnson & Johnson in Brazil 
(Fisher & Behrman, 1980: Chapter 4). Thus, it is self-evident that 
developing countries markets are the ultimate aim of the TNCs rather 
than the handicaps that curb the development of these countries. 
In a parallel line with the previous one, the transnationals have kept 
their links with local scientific units to a minimum. They, actually, 
work as organisations divorced from the host economy and completely 
integrated in their parent companies' structure. So, there has been 
no significant evidence that these companies have had an effective 
financial or technical and scientific co-operation with local 
institutions (Michalet, 1977: 52-56). 
The previous situation raises a question: why does this happen in 
developing countries? In fact the answer to this question could be 
found in factors related partly to the TNCs and partly to the recipient 
developing economies. 
On the side of the TNCs, Kaplinsky argued that these companies tend 
to concentrate their R&D facilities in the head-quarters countries 
in order to tighten control over the subsidiaries (Kaplinsky, 1976: 
20). In fact, this behaviour might be understood in the light of 
the rationale of these companies to invest in foreign countries. 
As seen in the previous chapter, there is an argument that they invest 
in these countries as a result of market imperfection and hence, to 
get benefits of that. So, it is not in their interests to transfer 
the advantage that grants them the superiority over other countries, 
otherwise they would lose the justification of being in the host 
economies. In addition, it was argued above that the TNCs invest abroad 
to spread their R&D costs over more markets. So, it is not expected 
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of them to re-incur similar costs just in the interests of host 
economies. 
Turning to the situation of developing countries, (1) adds to the 
problem. Some of their deficiencies have been mentioned above. But 
those that are related to R&D in particular could be mentioned here. 
Up to now R&D is mostly concentrated in the developed countries. 
In the meantime developing countries' commitments in this field are 
uncomparable. But, the situation within these countries as a category 
is not the same, since it differs from one country to another. UNESCO 
concluded that: 
(i) R&D expenditures by developing countries accounted for 6~ 
in 1980 of the World total. 
(ii) R&D scientists and engineers in these countries approached 
about 10.6~ in the same year. 
(iii) While there were 2954 scientists and engineers per million 
of population in developed countries in 1980, the figure for 
developing countries was only 0.125. 
(iv) Expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GNP was 2.24~ for 
developed countries, and 0.43~ for the developing ones (UNESCO, 
1983: v. 18, 22). 
From a cursory glimpse at the above figures one can see that developing 
countries play an insignificant part in World R&D both in terms 
of expenditures and personnel. 
(1) Regarding R&D links with production sector see Cooper, 1972, 
1-8, For Africa see Wad, 1984; Chen, 1981: 586. 
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lhere has been a slight improvement in the situation of these countries 
in R&D expenditures from 2% in 1963, 4% in 1974 to 6% in 1980 of 
World totals. (Poznanski, 1984: 136). But, according to UNClAD, 
such a limited proportion of the World's share is confined to no more 
than a dozen countries, mostly in South East Asia (UNClAD, 1983: 19). 
Furthermore, as seen above, the share of developing countries 
expenditures on R&D has not yet reached 0.5% of their GNP. In 
addition, it has been misallocated, a significant part of it going 
to prestigious civilian and military sectors which have very little 
to do with the satisfaction of the basic needs of the ordinary people. 
In India, for instance, about 60% of its R&D expenditures is devoted 
to atomic energy, defence, and space exploration. In China, the 
defence field employs some 20% of research scientists and 15% of the 
research budget (Poznanski, 1984: 143-144). 
Nevertheless, there is an argument that military expenditures might 
have positive spin-offs for economic development in developing 
countries. A highly skilled labour force trained in this sector could 
benefit the civilian one, when they move to the civilian sector. 
In addition, military expenditures may increase demand for the existing 
industries' inputs or create new ones such as an iron and steel 
industry in Argentina. Military firms in India have provided the 
market with many products for civilian consumption such as radio 
components, transmitters and receivers, earth moving equipment, ships 
and railway coaches. (Ball, 1983: 84-92). 
lhe scientific and economic organisation in developing countries is 
suffering from some deficiencies. Such a character which results 
the waste of the limited resources devoted to R&D activities. In 
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this regard it is well known that the links that must exist 
between R & 0 institutions and the productive sectors are often missed. 
And, in the best cases, it has been kept to the minimum (Pesmazoglou, 
1977: 93). Not only is this so but also, R & 0 activities have, often, 
been concentrated on pure research which has had no economic 
significance. 
Such a situation results in the alienation of local research units 
from the productive sector. Thus, this sector, especially, the modern 
one, gets integrated into foreign economies. In this case it reflects 
their interests more than local ones. In consequence and over-time, 
local R&D units themselves become devalued, and tend just to imitate 
those in developed countries, producing irrelevant and poor copies 
of them (UNIOO, 1981: 4) and hence the perpetuation of technological 
dependency (Akpakpan, 1983: 263). 
Ultimately, developing countries are in a position in which they are 
not only unable to get significant benefits from the technological 
development in the world, but also, the gap between them and the 
developed countries is getting wider. And the TNCs, again, are 
aggravating the problem, rather than contributing to solve it. They 
exploit the situation in developing countries to apply their global 
strategies by incorporating countries' economies into their division 
of labour within their organisations. This is especially the case 
in the absence of well determined policies of most of the developing 
counties regarding technology transfer in general and local technol-
ogical capabilities in particular. Therefore, UNIOO, commented that: 
liThe transfer of technology might lead to the increase of 
economic output in the developing countries, but it would leave 
the necessary capacity to adapt, develop or produce more 
appropriate technology". (UNIOO, 1981: 10) 
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o Inter-Sector Relations 
TNCs operating in developing countries might seek to establish 
interdependent linkages with sectors of the local economy. These 
kinds of linkages could take a variety of forms as Lall has listed: 
I Establishment: in this type, the subsidiary provides 
assistance to potential suppliers to create competition among 
suppliers and avoid dependence on monopolies. 
II Locational: in such a case, assistance would be offered to 
suppliers to set up their facilities near the subsidiary in 
order to provide cheaper inputs. 
III Informational: providing firm orders at specified intervals 
to facilitate current production planning and communication 
of long-term plans to facilitate investment planning. 
IV Technical: in this case the foreign firms either W.F.O.S. 
or joint-ventures supply the technical assistance to ensure 
the precise matching of needs with supplies, to provide for 
adequate quality and to facilitate 1nnovation. 
V Financial: this includes the provision of grants and 
concessionary loans to ensure that the suppliers have adequate 
finance that would enable them to meet present and future 
commitments. 
VI Raw mater1als Procurement: assistance to prov1de requ1red 
materials either directly or buy1ng them in order to avoid 
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the uncertainty about availability and to ensure that they 
are of the appropriate quality. 
VII Managerial: the provision of managerial and organisational 
assistance aimed at improving the suppliers' perfonmance. 
VIII Diversification: this case includes the offer of help to find 
outlets either at home or abroad which might secure more 
financial stability. 
IX These are in addition to pricing and distributional assistance 
in tenms of setting up a negotiation procedure to detenmine 
prices and to distribute revenue in cases where the market 
does not give prices. This is in addition to the allocation 
of inventory and product development costs, and the sharing 
of replacement markets to distribute revenues in different 
ways. (Lall, 1980: 208-209). 
The utmost shape of co-operation might include the establishment of 
new sources of inputs or of raw materials. It means, then, the 
provision of technical, financial and managerial assistance, and, 
above all, tests the seriousness of the foreign investor to get rooted 
in the host economy. In addition co-operation might include one or 
some of the previous fonms depending on factors that could be ascribed 
to the TNCs and the host economies. 
In this respect, inter-sectoral relations could be determined by 
contracts, subcontracts and/or could take the fonm of free 
transactions. In the latter case the foreign investor might purchase 
his requirements as ready made parts or materials, from any of the 
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local suppliers while in the former, the obligations of both 
contractors are determined in a contract. Such pre-determined 
relations might be commercial or industrial. In the commercial form 
the local supplier should manufacture finished end-products to be 
collected and sold by the foreign investor. This issue is beyond the 
scope of this study. What matters is the industrial subcontracting 
where there is some sort of specialization and division of labour 
between the subcontracts and the foreign firms. The latter asks the 
former to manufacture certain parts or components that represent a part 
of their final product. The industrial subcontracting could be for 
making finished products, components such as accessories, mirrors, 
electric bulbs, glass for an automobile for example, or half-finished 
parts such as engines and regulators; or other parts such as bearings, 
nuts and bolts. (Watanabe, 1971: 54). 
In fact, the TNCs have the capacity to get integrated in host economies 
via involvement in such relations. They, in this way, could mobilize 
local resources by making use of those available and establishing or 
developing other potential suppliers. In doing so, and in supplying 
them with technical assistance and information underlying the 
manufacturing process in the way that enables them to undertake the 
process themselves, these companies may be in a position to create an 
entrepreneurial class able to bear the responsibility of development in 
the future. 
However, in spite of the great potential that the TNCs could achieve 
in this regard, the linkages that might lead to it are yet to 
materialize on a sizeable and effective scale in most of developing 
countries. In this respect, it has been argued that the TNCs are 
dominated by commercial objectives. Thus, they consider the 
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technology transfer process as a commercial transaction. So, the 
first priority of these companies is to remove the trade barriers 
in order to keep markets open in the face of their products in a hidden 
way, for instance: the TNCs are biased towards imports from their 
parents under the cover of meeting their investment requirements 
(UNCTAD 1975: 10, 20). This tendency, in fact, could be deduced from 
first, the reluctance of these companies to work as integrated units 
in host economies and get involved deeply in an interdependent 
relationship as we have discussed above. In the Philippines, it was 
found that the foreign partner did not allow, even the test of local 
material either by himself or by the local counterpart. This was 
despite the fact that locally produced material, according to the 
local manager, could produce the same product with the same quality 
(Constantino, 1977: 49). In Kenya, in addition, Langdon has noted 
that: 
IINo MNC subsidiary had made a direct investment to develop 
local new material sources for soap production ll • (1981:70) 
Secondly, the transnationals are meanwhile more integrated in their 
home economies for their requirements of inputs of components and 
raw materials. One study concluded that American firms tend to import 
most of their inputs from the U.S.A. or Europe. In the meantime local 
firms have the proclivities to diversify their sources of inputs, 
including home markets (Mason 1973: 353). 
Such a performance by the TNCs could be interpreted in the light of 
what has been seen above that they tend to transfer more or less the 
same sort of technology used in the advanced markets without 
significant adaptation, the sort of technology that needs a high 
quality and particular inputs that might not exist except in these 
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markets. These companies, additionally, tend to capitalize on their 
technology and use their financial tactics, for example transfer 
pricing, as seen in the previous chapter. More importantly, the TNCs' 
subsidiaries constitute an organisation that works in a unified way 
according to a global strategy, albeit different in details. So, 
they are reluctant to get deeply committed to host economies. 
In connection with this, the developing countries share the 
responsibility with the TNCS. These countries' markets might be narrow 
to the extent that they do not justify the establishment of new 
production facilities or the development of existing ones. Also, 
they are suffering from problems such as their lack of experience 
and the ignorance of manufacturing requirements; loose quality 
controls; red tape; uncertainty about delivery at the convenient times, 
which make close inter-sector relations more remote. (Watanabe, 1972: 
437). But still, these hindrances or problems in economic development 
and organisation are among the reasons for inviting foreign investment 
in the hope that some of them might be overcome. 
2.3.2 Licensing MechanlS1s and the Transfer of Technology by the TNCs 
Licensing might be considered one of the most widespread mechanisms 
used for the transfer of technology from the developed to the 
developing countries. In the case of these latter countries, as a 
result of their weak position and their terrible need for technology, 
they tend to use all that they could get at their disposal. Licensing 
is in fact one of the major channels that appeals to these countries. 
This mechanism has been defined as 
"A contract under which the licensee is granted certain rights 
to manufacture and sell products utilizing inventions, 
process techniques and other industrial property rights 
of the licensor". (Cooper & Sercovich, 1971: 23) 
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In this respect such a mechanism might be a pure licence, i.e. without 
equity participation by licensor or licensing with equity participation 
at different levels. It might extend in some cases to wholly foreign 
owned subsidiaries. It is worth noting that the first form has been 
observed more in countries that attained a fairly well-established 
industrial and technological base. Hence, these countries have the 
capability to shop around the technology market, select, choose, and 
negotiate from a relatively strong position. Thus, they might get 
their requirements on more favourable terms. In addition, this way 
grants them some sort of flexibility by avoiding the tight control, 
often concommitant with the OFI mechanism (UN, 1974: 31-32). 
With regard to the TNCs, they might prefer to give licences as a way 
of entry to markets that impose heavy restrictions on OFI. In 
addition licensing prevails in the cases where TNCs production 
technology gets older and more standardized and hence becomes the 
subject of wide-use in producing products with a short-life cycle 
such as pharmaceuticals and foods (1) (Singer & Ansari; 1978: 205). 
This mechanism, also, might operate in cases when the transnationals 
have not enough financial and personnel skills or managerial staff 
that could enable them to embark on setting up production facilities 
in foreign markets or undertake them at a relatively high cost (Cary, 
1979: 52). 
Licensing either pure or with equity participation, takes place in 
a highly imperfect market. Thus, the extent and range of elements 
that could be included in the transaction depend on the terms of the 
(1) See also, Mansfield & Romeo, 1980, 739; UN, 1974: 31; Cheng, 
1984: 182. 
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licences, such terms reflecting the position of both counterparts 
on technology market. It has been argued that most licensing 
agreements. are made in the consumer goods sector such as food and 
tobacco. This is additionally to the use of trade marks, and brand-
names in the markets of developing countries. Meanwhile, capital 
goods and intermediate industries are suffering from the lack of such 
contracts either with or without some degree of equity participation. 
(Od1e, 1979: 193). 
Moreover, one of the features of licensing is that the licenses tend 
to be of long duration lasting often, over five years and sometimes 
approaching 50 years. The suppliers are paying great concern to 
maximize their returns for as long as possible. So the longer the 
duration of the licence, the greater are the rewards to the 
techno10gy's supplier (Girvan, 1979: 13). 
It has been noted that in manufacturing industries most licences are of 
an assembly kind. This means that technology added locally in the host 
or the recipient economy is marginal (Cary, 1979: 45). In addition 
the dominance of the package form hinders the process of acquiring 
the real information which is fundamental for introduced technology 
(UNCTC, 1982: 126). 
The main and most common feature of the licensing mechanism is that 
technology transfer agreements embrace conditions and obligations 
that represent a great hindrance to a genuine transfer of technology. 
These conditions, in fact, have held the attention of a great deal 
of technology transfer literature. There are conditions that prohibit 
the transmission of imported technology to a third party in the same 
country. This obligation might continue even after the expiry of 
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the agreement. Furthermore, there are cases where the agreement 
requires the licencee to return all technical information after its 
expiry. These and other similar conditions aim at obliging the 
licensee to seek new agreements which increase their returns from 
the same sort of technology and from the same country. 
Even further, there are many other conditions that limit to a great 
extent the freedom of the licensee in the use of its technology. 
In some cases, the licensor prevents the licensee from moving to other 
lines of production. Some agreements prohibit the introduction of 
any local improvement on the imported technology. In the meantime, 
the opposite could be found, where the licensor obliged the recipients 
to incorporate changes introduced in the technology by the parent 
company irrespective of their suitability to the particular milieu 
of developing countries. These changes could be found in quality 
restriction and/or product differentiation. These conditions, inter 
alia, curb the possibility of adaptation, even supposing that the 
recipient has the capability to undertake it. And, hence, they make 
the acquisition of the imported elements unlikely (Odle, 1979: 190-
217) • 
Agreements of technology transfer, are often concomitant with what is 
widely known as 'tie-in clauses' and export restrictions. These 
restrictions throw, in fact, some doubt about the real intention of 
the TNCs, that is whether they really aim to transfer technology to 
developing countries or just to circumvent trade barriers imposed 
in these countries' markets. The restrictions connect the recipient 
to particular sources for its requirements of raw materials, spare 
parts, machinery and other technical elements. Such behaviour grants 
the licensor a monopoly situation over these elements that might 
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not exist without such restrictions, a position that could result 
in transfer pricing, as has been found in Spain, Columbia, Chile and 
many other countries. (Barnet & Muller, 1975: 157-160). 
From the data at hand, it is of interest to mention that tie-in clauses 
were observed to be more frequent in pure licences than in WFOS or 
joint-ventures. For example, according to an UNCTAD study, these 
sorts of restrictions occurred in WFOS in 10% of agreements in India 
and 9% in the Philippines compared to 10% and 20% in India and 25% 
and 58% in the Philippines for JVs and pure licenses respectively. 
This does not mean that WFOS are less restrictive than the other forms, 
but as seen above, the WFOSs do not need to write agreements and even 
in the case of writing they still do not need to include such 
conditions in them. They could dictate whatever they want to via 
their own internal system of information or communication (1) (UNCTAD, 
1975: 18-20). 
In this connection, it might be argued that the previous restrictions 
are imposed in order to achieve some objectives such as the assurance 
of certain levels of product quality for technical reasons, since 
the importing of a particular sort of technology might determine the 
source of the supply of production requirements. But as seen above, 
the UNCTAD study deduced that, the main objective underlying such 
activity is the desire to maximize the suppliers' returns in hidden 
ways (1) (UNCTAD, 1975: 14-18-20). Such an aim could be deduced from 
the reluctance of the TNCs to use or even to test local materials 
that could produce the same product with the same quality as we have 
noted above. 
(1) See also, Barnet & Muller, 1974: 163, UNCTAD, 1972: 23; 1975: 
14-23. 
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Moreover, in addition to restricting imports the transnationals tend 
to restrict exports as well. They impose restrictions on exports of 
products produced under their licences. Such restrictions range 
from: 
A) total prohibition of exports or the necessity of prior approval 
to do exporting. 
to 
B) the permission for exports to certain markets and of certain 
products (1) UNCTAD, 1975: 18). 
This type of activity on the side of the TNCs could be interpreted 
in the light of what has been seen in the previous chapter, that these 
companies are interested in most cases in developing countries' 
markets. And in section two of that chapter it was clear that these 
companies exports are concentrated in a few countries, which these 
companies use in order to enter other markets. In addition, even 
in the few and limited cases in which the TNCs warrant exports they 
insist that goods are to be marketed by a wholly owned marketing 
company (Cooper & Sercovich, 1971: 21). They are clearly concerned 
to avoid competition between their subsidiaries and adverse competition 
by other producers using their licences (Barnet & Muller 1974: 32-37). 
Among export restrictions, it was found that total prohibition 
restrictions are the most frequent ones. In a study of 2,000 transfer 
of technology contracts between global corporations and their 
subsidiaries, it was found that in countries such as Bolivia, Columbia, 
(1) See also Vaitsos, 1970: 5,8, 14; 1973: 375; 1975: 192. Lall 
& Streeten 1977: 68. 
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Ecuador and Israel, this was the case. And it was the dominant 
condition in many other countries, such as Peru (90%), the Philippines 
(81%) and Mexico (62%) (UNCTAD, 1975: 18). In fact, the same tendency 
was emphasized in many other countries. (See Barnet & Muller, 1974: 
163). 
Nevertheless, evidence of the intervention of the State resulting 
in strengthening the bargaining position of the domestic enterprises 
is well documented. In Colombia the establishment of a 'Comite de 
Regalias' to monitor the process of transfer of technology resulted 
during the latter part of 1970 and the beginning of 1971, in: 
(i) the reduction of tied-in-purchases by 90% with respect to 
intermediate inputs. 
(ii) the elimination of all restrictions on exports. 
(iii) the abolition of about 80% of the clauses on minimum royalty 
payments. On the contrary, it established maximum rates of 
royalty by sectors. 
(iv) the prohibition of payments of taxes paid by the licensee on 
royalties remitted to the licensor. 
Also, similar results were found in India as a result of introducing 
some screening measures by the Government (UNCTAD, 1975: 18). 
In Korea, there was insistence on the part of the recipient to receive 
not only training for the efficient operation and maintenance of the 
plant, but rather, it was laid down: 
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"that the Korean engineers would be trained by (suppliers' 
name), in the application of all aspects of ••• current 
technology, basic process design, detailed equipment design 
and procurement, construction, testing, start up, operation 
and maintenance and in the techniques employed in securing 
improvements to any petrochemical technology". 
This was in addition to many other similar examples in other industries 
like steel for instance (Bell, M. 1984: 196). 
The purpose of quoting this example is that the strong bargaining 
position could lead, partly, to a genuine transfer of technology. 
It clarifies, in addition, that the Korean side was aware that the 
genuine transfer is by, mainly, real training on the fundamental 
aspects related to technology starting from the design and ending 
with the maintenance and operation. The other face of this fact is 
that the TNCs under a 'laissez-faire, laissez passez' approach would 
not end with tangible results in the technology transfer field. 
Additionally, their performance would really cost the countries which 
follow such an approach dear. 
2.3.3 Patents and Transfer of Technology 
The potential role of patents as a vehicle of the transfer of 
technology to developing countries has been hotly debated in the 
economic literature. But before proceeding to the heart of the issue, 
it is worth noting some of the basic features of patents. 
Patents have been defined by the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) as: 
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"A legally enforceable right granted by virtue of a law to a 
person to exclude for a limited time others from certain acts 
in relation to a described new invention; the privilege is 
granted by a government authority as a matter of right to the 
person who is entitled to apply for it and also fulfils the 
prescribed conditions". (UNCTAD, 1975: 1) (1). 
According to this definition, patents grant the patentee, either a 
natural person or a legal one like a company, the privilege of 
an exclusive right that precludes others from manufacturing, using, 
or selling patented products. These are in addition to the prohibition 
of making use of patented methods or processes, for a limited time. 
It has been argued that these privileges have been given to the 
patentee on the grounds that they are necessary to encourage inventions 
and innovations at national and international levels. Thus, the 
patentee, acting true to this aim, must be given the opportunity of 
gaining returns in order to compensate him for investment of money 
and time spent on R&D (Taylor, 1973: 27). 
As far as the international market of technology is concerned, it may 
be noted that, the structural distribution by holders of patents 
reveals that they contribute effectively to the imperfection of that 
market. This emerges from the striking phenomenon that patents are 
concentrated in developed countries. The developed market-economy 
countries are responsible for the bulk of World patents. Their share 
accounted for 80% of patents granted in 1970 (UNCTAD, 1975: 37). 
Moreover, six of these industrialized countries accounted for about 
78.7% of all World patents granted by foreign countries in 1972. 
These countries were the USA (33.25~); the FRG (20.45~); Japan 
(1) Patents were not defined in the Paris convention for the 
protection of industrial property of 1883. 
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(7.27%); the U.K. (7.2%); France (6.85%) and the Netherlands (3.2%) 
(Fortner, 1977: 42-43). 
In contrast, the share of the developing countries clearly reveals 
their weak position on that market. Their share of the World total 
accounted for 6% in 1970. Even worse, patents held 
by their nationals in their own countries amounted to no more than 
1% of the World stock of patents in 1972 (UNCTAD, 1975: 38). The 
situation of some of these countries is deteriorating over time rather 
than improving. In Chile, for instance, in 1937 the percentage of 
nationally owned patents to foreign ones was 34.5% to 65%. Such a 
ratio declined, since in 1967 it accounted for 5.5% to 94.5% in the 
same order (Vaitsos, 1972: 74). 
Practically, these patents held by nationals from developing countries 
seem to be insignificant economically. Penrose has noted in this 
respect that most of these patents are granted to individuals who 
are, often, unable to put them into work (Penrose, 1973: 769). 
At the international level, both in developed and developing countries 
the TNCs hold by far the greatest amount of patents. These companies 
by the virtue of their sizeable resources are active in taking out 
patents following the policy of tightening control over their 
important assets as seen above. In Chile, for example, in 1967, about 
90% of the patents granted were in hands of foreign domiciled 
corporations (UNCTAD, 1975: 39). A similar position was found in 
Colombia, as well, in industries with a high rate of change, since: 
"in pharmaceuticals, synthetic fibres, and chemicals 10% of 
all patent holders own 60% of all patents and those 10% are 
all foreign TNCs (Fortner, 1977: 43). 
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But what is the purpose behind concentrating patents in their hands? 
What are these companies going to do with patents? Are they going 
to use them for the transfer of technology to developing countries? 
Or are they going to achieve other purposes? If the answer is in 
the affirmative, what exactly will they seek to achieve? 
In this regard, there is a contention that the elimination of 
discrimination against foreign holders of patents might lead to the 
disclosure of new technology sources (Parker, 1973: 149). Such a 
practice, in addition, encourages the corporations to provide the 
granting countries with information and know-how crucial for an 
effective exploitation of patents and hence transfer of technology. 
They go on, further to argue that patents by creating a good reputation 
to the granting country, might lead to the inflow of DFI which means, 
in their view, new injections of technology (Penrose, 1973: 771, 
773,775; Singer, 1977: 44). However, this argument so far lacks 
the empirical evidence to substantiate it. 
Indeed, there is a contrasting contention supported by plenty of 
empirical evidence. The core of it is that the patents per se have 
transferred no significant technology to developing countries. The 
TNCs are not keen or interested in using their patents in developing 
economies' markets. They allocate their use according to their own 
interests. So, they might use some of them in one or two profitable 
markets and hence attempt to serve the reserved markets from such 
locations (Vaitsos, 1972: 76). 
Moreover, very few patents granted to foreigners by the developing 
countries are utilized by them or via licensing to locals who have 
the capability to exploit them. Penrose commented on this situation 
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by sayi ng that: 
"Patents that are neither exploited by the foreigner nor 
licensed to domestic producers cannot transfer techno1 0gy". 
(1973: 772) 
As suggested above, there is ample evidence to support the latter 
argument. In a study done by the Peruivian Ministry of Industries and 
Commerce, it was found that only 54 out of 4,872 patents granted over 
the period 1960-1970 were exploited in that country, i.e. about 1.1% of 
the total (Vaitsos, 1972: 78). Similar resu1 ts have been found by' 
Grundmann's study in 17 African countries. He found that only 1.7% of 
all patents held by 34 TNCs were exploited in the countries studied 
(1976: 192-193). (1) The same trend has been noted for many other 
developing countries such as Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Columbia 
(UNCTAD, 1975: 40-41). 
Rather important, the TNCs deliberately chose not to embody full 
knowledge in their patents. Hence, the embodied elements per se are 
not sufficient for effective use by potential users. Therefore, the 
latter must appeal to the patentee for further know-how, in order to be 
able to utilize the patents. In such a case the user would deal under 
the technology market condition as seen above. Taylor & Silberston 
have noted that: 
lilt happens quite frequently that technical information which 
is essential to the most efficient operation of an invention 
on a large industrial scale is not designed 1n a patent 
specifications. This may be ••• , to avoid disclosing a vital 
pi ece of knowl edge" • (1973: 95) 
So, the TNCs are keen to guard their technological superiority and 
do not waste any effort to close potential outlets that might erode 
(I) The 34 reporting companies own: Algeria 264 patent; Libya 238; 
Morocco 834; Tanzania 242; and OAMPI state 810 patents. In 
general, these companies own about 27% of total foreign owned 
patents in the considered countries. (Grundmann, 1976: 186, 
188) • 
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such advantage. In addition, this case threw grave doubts on the 
validity of the compulsory licensing provision contained in article 
5 (A) of the Paris convention. 
On account of these arguments and evidence, it is clear that the direct 
contribution of patents if any to the transfer of technology is 
marginal, So the question remains do the patents represent an impulse 
for any other mechanism, such as DFI or licensing, to take place in 
developing countries? 
With regard to licensing, from the material at hand, no evidence that 
patents caused licensing could be found. On the contrary it has 
been noted that contractual arrangements for the sale of technology 
are not connected to patents, i.e. patents are not a precondition 
for licensing (Penrose, 1973: 776). Indeed, patents are very rarely 
licensed themselves in host countries. They often constitute a part 
of combined technical property rights in addition to know-how and 
brand-names (Cooper & Sercovich, 1971: 17). 
Turning to the issue of DFI, the same argument stands. No evidence 
has been found to suggest that patents are behind or among the major 
factors that represent the rationale for the TNCs to invest in foreign 
developing markets. In an independent stuQy done for the committee 
of the judiciary of the U.S.A. Senate, Vernon concluded that: 
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II ••• , it would seem ... that although investors and their 
patent attorneys may wish for patent protection if it 
can be had, the nature of that protection is rarely a 
significant factor in the ultimate decision whether to 
investll • (1) (U.S. Senate, 1975: 17) 
Thus, the contribution of patents to transfer the technology to 
developing countries could not be traced either directly or indirectly 
as seen above. So, what are the other purposes they might achieve? 
In this connection, there is an argument that the TNCs are in a 
position to protect their innovations without legal procedures. These 
companies, mostly, do not take out patents on technology that is 
considered to be highly secret (Singer, 1978: 43). In addition, the 
space of time between the process of innovation and that of imitation 
should be taken into consideration. Such a time might grant the 
transnationals enough opportunity to capture proportionate returns, 
using no legal proctection (Parker, 1973: 162, 175). Furthermore, 
there are other means that could result in a reasonable return to 
innovations without the sacrifice of states' interests such as 
certificates for innovators, utility models, etc. (UNCTAD, 1975: 2-5). 
Correspondingly, the patents encourage neither transfer of technology 
nor innovation at both international and national levels. This holds, 
especially true for the developing countries, as seen above (Vaitsos, 
1975: 75). However, they offer much protection to the TNCs. They 
enable them to preempt the competition from their rivals in foreign 
markets and keep these markets open for their products. They thus 
strengthen the monopolistic position of these companies in the 
technology market. They raise the prices of patented products to 
an extraordinary degree. The pharmaceutical industry offers the 
ideal example in this regard. It was found that drug companies sell 
(1) It has been quoted from Vaitsos, 1972: 77 and Penrose, 1973: 
774) 
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their drugs in bulk for five times the cost of production. This 
is while some 86% of all international patents in pharmaceuticals 
have required no more research than simple modifications to chemicals 
already known and patented (The Economist, 1974: 88). There are in 
fact many examples of the extent of protection that patents offer 
the drug companies. But we shall mention the most recent one at hand 
which shows the effect of the expiry of patents for some companies 
in the U.S.A. The president of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry 
Association mentioned that: 
"When Librium came off patent, prices dropped from $15 to $1". 
(Int., Herald Tribune, July, 26, 1984: 7,9). 
For many other examples see, Parker, 1973: 166). 
In conclusion, the patents role in the transfer of technology either 
directly or indirectly in negligible. In addition, their role in 
encouraging innovation is limited and not unique, since there are some 
other ways that could play the desired role. The significant 
contribution of patents is, in fact, to the imperfection of the 
technology market and hence the strengthening of the monopolistic 
position of the TNCs that results in over-pricing their products. 
So, one might agree with Penrose that: 
". ", the lOCs gai n 1i ttl e or nothi ng, and may even lose, 
from granting patents on inventions developed, published and 
primarily worked abroad". (Penrose, 1973: 783) 
2.4 Major issues arising fral the transfer of technology to 
developing countries via the TNCs 
As a matter of fact the process of technology transfer 1n general and 
via the TNCs in particular affects nearly all the aspects of socio-
economic and political development in the recipient countries. It 
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leaves an impact on the economic structure, balance of payments, income 
distribution, and employment. It even affects the pattern of daily 
life of people in these countries. But how does transferred technology 
leave its impression in such a broad way? This can be illustrated 
by a discussion of such questions as suitability, technology costs, 
and patterns of economic development. 
2.4.1 Suitability: 
The issue of 'appropriateness', 'inappropriateness' or 'suitability' 
of TNCs' technology to the Third World countries has been one of the 
most extensively discussed issues in the literature. (UNCTAD, 1975; 
Lall & Streeten, 1977; Muller, 1973; Barnet & Muller, 1974; Helleiner, 
1979, Langdon, 1981; Solomon & Forsyth, 1977). 
This issue is for the developing countries a matter of great 
complexity. These countries' economies do not all have the same 
characteristics, and differ among themselves in a variety of ways. 
Some of them are rich with natural resources, and capital finance. 
Some others, might have a huge population, but lack some of the other 
elements. Nevertheless, all of them are, though to different degrees, 
technologically undeveloped. Therefore, they often depend on the 
advanced countries for their technological needs. 
Thus it is hard to find a definition of 'suitability' valid to all 
these countries as one group. As a consequence, a general rather 
than a specific definition may be more appropriate. For analytical 
purposes, suitable technology can be described as those technological 
elements that: first, are easy to absorb and adapt by local personnel 
in developing countries, secondly, that optimally use available local 
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resources thirdly, that respond effectively to the need of the mass 
of the population and satisfy them. (Morawetz, 1974: 517; Manser & 
Webley, 1979: 1). The convergence among these elements may represent, 
inter alia, the right start for a self-reliant development in the 
long-run. In any case the determination of appropriate technology 
should take into consideration, not only the peculiar conditions, 
but also the needs of the recipient countries for self-sustained 
development. 
As for the technology which the TNCs introduce into developing 
economies, it may be of interest to note that it has been created 
and developed in what are known as the developed countries, countries 
which are characterised by conditions quite different from those 
prevailing in developing ones. Thus, technology as a social product 
comes to reflect such conditions. In the developed market economies, 
the capitalist stands in the saddle of economic organisation. So, 
in a society of a relative scarcity of labour; high labour cost, well 
organized trade unions, relative abundance of capital, a high rate 
of savings, high rates of incomes, soph1sticated patterns of demand 
and a high proportion of skilled labour, it is expected that technology 
reflects these conditions. Consequently, developed countr1es' 
technology tends to be capital and skill-intensive. Rosenberg, noted 
that in America: 
II ••• , the relative scarcity of labour in the U.S. has led 
to the development of our well-known, much admired labour-
savi ng technol 091 11 • (1) (1977: 141) 
(1) See: Rosenberg, 1977,60-63; Merhav, 1969: 34; Inozemtsev, 
1974: 32, 44; Stewart, 1974: 20; 1978: 66-105. 
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In contrast, the situation in developing countries is very different. 
These countries mostly have a sizeable reservoir of unskilled labour 
and suffer from shortages of capital and skilled labour. The majority 
of them have been experiencing low levels of incomes, a low rate of 
savings and a relatively limited market. In such a situation they 
imperatively need a different kind of technology from that which is 
used in the developed markets. 
What is the contribution of the transnationals in this regard? There 
is a semi-consensus that these corporations transfer inappropriate 
technology to the developing countries. In this respect 
inappropriateness could be perceived according to Cooper in different 
ways. There is inappropriateness that could be ascribed to production 
techniques and technology and that might be attached to products 
(Cooper, 1972: 13). 
Taking the first kind as the starting point, the heart of argument is 
that the TNCs introduce capital-intensive and labour-saving technology 
in developing economies. In addition, these companies as seen above 
have no interest in adapting their technological elements to fit these 
countries' milieu. This has led them to leave idle the abundant 
factors like unskilled labour, and lower quality of inputs, at a time 
when they aggravate the problems of scarce resources such as capital 
and highly-skilled labour etc. (1) (UNCTAD, 1972: 6). 
This argument, actually has a great deal of evidence in its favour. 
In Kenya, for example, Langdon has noted that foreign companies are 
more capital-intensive than local firms working in the same industry. 
(1) See especially Streeten, 1981: 398. 
- 104 -
Capital employed per work place in the subsidiaries exceeded K. sh 
140,000, while it was K. sh 94,500 and 28,400 in local mechanized 
and non-mechanized ones respectively, i.e. the ratio was one and half 
times, and about five times more than of two local sorts respectively 
(1981: 67). In India, Agarwal found the same tendency. In his survey 
on 34 firms, he concluded that 22 out of 34 foreign firms used more 
capital per employee than domestic firms. Foreign firms employed 
some 17% fewer workers and as much as 70% less supervisory staff than 
domestic firms to produce the same amount of gross output (1) (1979: 
117) • 
However, there are some economists who contend that TNCs use more 
appropri ate technology than do domesti c fi rms. ··~lhe manageri al staff 
of these companies are capable of choosing and combining the most 
effective production techniques that might achieve the interests of 
their companies. Thus, Pack has suggested that: 
"TNCs are able to identify and use somewhat more labour 
intensive technologies than do the domestic firms". 
(1976: 53) 
The suitability issue, although it appears to be controversial the 
dominate argument biases the first one. (2) Also, it might be of 
interest to note that the measurement of intensities is a complicated 
issue and there is no consensuel view concerning it. (Shalla, A. 
1981: Chapter One). 
(1) See Mason, 1973: 353; Barnet & Muller, 1975: 169; Radhu, 1973: 
71; Adheghian, 1982; Solomon & Forsyth, 1977: 284. 
(2) Biersteker, 1978: 38. 
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Having behaved in such a way, these companies might add to the problems 
of host countries rather than alleviate them. In this respect they 
contribute in no significant way to solve the unemployment problem, 
and they, in addition, aggravate it especially in the long-run. 
Stewart commented in this respect that: 
liThe transfer of advanced technology is in large part 
responsible for the growing unemployment problem". 
(1974: 28). (1) 
In addition, this sort of technology leads to many other unfavourable 
repercussions on host developing economies, such as the widening of 
the income distribution gap between the haves and the have nots; 
unequal pattern of development, and the worsening of the position 
of the balance of payments as seen above (2) (Barnet & Muller 1975: 
162-172). 
However, the appropriate technology might lead to favourable outcomes 
for the developing countries. In a recent study undertaken by the 
World Bank on some industries (3) in certain L.O.Cs it was found that 
an investment of $900 mn using capital-intensive technology produces 
$374 mn of value-added and generates about 60,000 jobs. In contrast, 
the same amount of investment, if used with an appropriate technology 
might provide 300,000 jobs and produce some $800 mn in value added 
(Goshal, 1982: 36). A similar case was found, in Venezuela in 1972 
(Morawetz, 1974: 524). 
(1) See Muller, 1979: 249; Lall & Streeten, 1977: 71; Kenne~, 1981: 
344. 
(2) Dos Santos, 1970: 234; McRobie, 1971: 71. The case of Egypt 
below may provide a clear example. 
(3) Studied industries were beer, bricks, cornmeal, cotton cloth, 
cotton yarn, fertilizer, leather, shoes, and sugar. 
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These examples clarify the fact that capital intensive technology 
introduced into developing countries not only aggravates the 
unemployment situation, but also produces less in a different 
environment. 
Furthermore the inappropriate technology yields naturally, 
inappropriate products which represent the other face of the whole 
issue as suggested by Cooper above. In fact, the causal relationship 
between the two faces is difficult to be determined. There are 
arguments which contend that the choice of the products determines 
the production techniques and hence the technology that is going to 
produce them. Thus, if the product is a luxury and requires some 
sort of sophistication and differentiation, then they would need 
the relevant technological elements. This is especially the case 
in industries or products where: 
" •••• the technology shelf consists of only very few 
techniques. each with a narrow range of substitution 
possibilities". (Siggel, 1984: 232) 
In another dimension, it has been argued that the transfer of products 
produced to satisfy the needs of developed countries imperatively 
accompany the introduction of their technology into the developing 
countries (Stewart, 1978: 78). Thus. the introduction of consumption 
technology results in the concentration on unnecessary and artificial 
elements of products i.e. on the luxury elements (Helleiner, 1975, 
172-73). So, the transnationals' insistence on producing the same 
line of products produced at home, creates over-differentiated, over-
packaged, over-specified. different coloured and smelling products, 
other than the essential elements (Lall & Streeten, 1977: 70-71). 
What could be deduced, here, is that the existence of both luxury 
goods and the TNCs in developing countries markets is correlated. 
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Correspondingly, the introduction of such luxury goods into these 
markets, on the part of the TNCs goes, usually, hand in hand with 
intensive promotion campaigns. These companies do not spare any effort 
to take advantage of the most effective media means such as daily 
newspapers, radio and television. Therefore, it has been noted that 
they often, dominate advertising activities in host markets. In 
Indonesia, it was found that only large foreign companies and joint-
ventures like Uni1ever, Toyota and Berjer monopolize local television 
advertising. The TNCs have been found to spend on advertising as 
much as four times the television budget provided by the government 
(Reiffers et a1, 1982: 146, 149). The same phenomenon of heavy 
advertising was found in Kenya by Langdon, (1981: 58,63). 
Such activity reveals how far the transnationa1s are keen to reshape 
the way of life in host countries by imprinting their brands and goods 
in the minds of people and trying to convince the clients that their 
way of life is inferior to that dominating in the Western World. 
Thus Reiffers, suggested that: 
II ••• , TNCs are conducive to the introduction into the 
developing countries of a 'consumer logic' such as 
already prevails in Western societies". (1982: 154, 158) 
So, these companies, instead of satisfying the needs of the population 
in the countries in question, are creating new needs the satisfaction 
of which would be at the expense of essentials. (Lall & Streten, 1977: 
70-71). 
Moreover, in doing so, the new products would replace the old local 
ones. The introduction of new goods is likely to raise the cost for 
the existing ones, since both might compete for some scarce factors 
of production such as labour, capital, or even raw materials. In 
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the meantime, the new goods might contain the essential and non-
essential characteristics. So the consumer in a situation like this 
would prefer the latter ones. Thus the consumers' welfare will be 
decreased (1) (James & Stewart, 1982: 228-229). In India, Unilever, 
relying on heavy advertising, wanted to substitute its own products 
(like margarine and Vanapasti, for the local product, Ghee (Reiffers, 
1982). Naturally, this situation would benefit the tiny portion of 
the population that enjoys high income and consumes the new luxury 
products, while the majority of the population who cannot afford them 
would be the losers. 
The other consequence is that, in this way these companies, are making 
technological dependence imperative. Once they succeed in their plans 
it would become impossible for the developing countries to get rid 
of such sort of technology and look for alternatives (2) (Ikonicoff, 
1979: 281). This is especially so since introduced products come 
to occupy an essential part of the daily life of the influential 
people, insofar as the interests of those people get connected with 
the interests of the TNCs. So, a change would cause unrest, a 
situation that governments in developing countries are keen to avoid. 
Such behaviour results from the technological dependency of these 
countries, a situation that gives the transnationals the upper hand 
to decide and apply their strategies, which, as we have seen, aim 
(1) Helleiner, 1975: 175. 
(2) See Evans, 1971: 332-335; Nagafbogy, 1984: 20. 
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at maximizing their returns from exploiting their monopolistic assets, 
especially technological monopoly in the markets in question. In 
this connection it has been argued that these companies have no 
interest in producing products appropriate to the mass market, as 
it currently stands, such products are not profitable compared to 
the production of luxury goods, which are usually consumed by those 
who have the effective demand (Langdon, 1977: 99). In addition, 
products of mass consumption are simple and easy to be imitated. 
Hence, the companies' position might be vulnerable. Streeten in this 
connection suggested that: 
liThe sophistication of the products and the complexity of the 
technology ••• , are ••. , not only a response to the high incomes 
and high savings in the mass markets of the developed countries, 
but are of the very essence of the TNCs. (1). (Streeten, 1981: 
399) • 
Also, some international factors have contributed to this phenomenon. 
It has been noted by UNIDO that just a little over 1~ of total R&D 
expenditures in developed countries is directed towards the problems of 
the Third World countries. In the meantime about 50~ of that total are 
diverted to the production and development of sophisticated weapons and 
armaments while two-thirds of the rest is designated for producing non-
essential goods (UNIDO, 1981: 7). According to Singer, if the R&D 
machinery has proceeded in such a way, in the advanced countries, 
thereby it is not expected to produce more suitable products to answer 
the developing countries' problems (Singer, 1975: 192-197). 
2.4.2 Pattern of Devel0p!ent 
One of the major impressions that results from the introduction of 
foreign technology via the TNCs is their effect on the pattern of 
(1) In the same meaning see Lall & Streeten, 1977: 71. 
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development in the developing countries. Such effects include 
geographical structure, e.g. urban against rural development; 
production structure, e.g. consumption vs. capital goods; production 
structures e.g. internal vs external viz, whether the production 
machinery is integrated with the rest of the economy or with foreign 
economies. 
Capital YS Consumption Goods of the TNCs in Developing Countries. 
It may be useful to determine what capital and consumption goods mean. 
For analytical purposes capital goods mean machines manufacturing 
industries, while consumption goods industries means the industries 
that produce, for final consumption purposes, either durable or non 
durable goods. 
Capital goods are studied here for several reasons: 
First, machinery itself is labelled as 'hard technology'. These 
machines contain information and know-how underlying their 
manufacturing and design. The mastery of such information generates 
the capability to master other sorts of technology. Secondly, so far 
as technology transfer is concerned, the capital goods industry is of 
vital importance. This industry has important forward and backward 
linkages and thereby could diffuse technology to other economic 
sectors. Thirdly there is the insignificant role played by the TNCs in 
capital-goods manufacturing in developing countries. 
It has been argued that the capital goods industries have been a source 
of many innovations. The production of new goods, services, and other 
processes needs new machines, and thus requires designs, modification 
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or maybe innovations in the sectors concerned. So, it is not 
surprising that some remarkable innovations in Western technology 
have emerged from these industries (Rosenberg, 1977: 142, 146). 
In addition to a capital goods industry, a variety of skills could 
be trained and developed on the original ideas of the dynamics of 
designing and manufacturing. The growth of a stock of skills of that 
kind is of crucial importance for absorbing, adapting, and developing 
imported technology in accordance with the host countries needs. 
Furthermore, they could work as transmitters of technology to other 
industries by moving to them. Thus, here, the capital goods industry 
may playa two faceted role. First, new skills are learned, trained 
and developed in coincidence with specific requirements prevailing 
in host economics. Secondly, these skills, after their preparation, 
would be in a position to move to other sectors in the economy (1) 
(Rosenberg, 1978: 18). 
The great potential that the capital goods sector has is its 
multiplier effect on the whole economy via its forward and backward 
linkages with the other sectors of the economy. Regarding backward 
linkages, this industry, being in the local economy and working 
according to its conditions may depend to a significant extent on 
local suppliers for raw materials, intermediate inputs or components. 
Such a linkage could take, as seen above, the form of buying ready-made 
parts or subcontracting. In doing so, the industry mobilize local 
resources, create more specialization within narrow lines of production 
and thereby more flexibility and accuracy in responding to the 
(1) See Stewart, 1981: 152. 
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particular needs of both machinery manufacturers and other producers 
(UNCTC, 1982: 20). Ultimately, these two together could soften the 
constraints on the balance of payments, unemployment and hence on 
economic development. 
Turning to the issue of forward linkages, it is related to the previous 
one, in the sense that it is not enough just to mobilize local 
resources, but it is also important to look forward to the market 
for which it is going to cater i.e. this market as is explained in 
the previous section is characterised by low average income, 
widespread poverty and hence inability to satisfy the basic needs 
of the majority of the population. In this case, a capital goods 
industry would provide the producers of goods with the machines that 
are required for manufacturing consumption goods for which there is 
a demand in the market. Thus, the demand for machinery is derived 
from the consumption function in the local market. Hence, a sort 
of linkage between the pattern of demand in a developing market and 
that for capital goods might be created. The consumers' pattern of 
demand might playa role in the machinery's specification and in 
turn the capital goods sector would provide the producers with the 
machinery necessary to meet such a demand. So, some sort of circle 
could be created between the consumption pattern and capital goods 
industry. A 'virtuous' circle could develop as a result of the change 
of factors that affect it, especially the pattern of consumption. 
Supposing that the developing countries have succeeded in achieving 
a reasonable level of manufacturing in the capital goods industry. 
They could lessen their absolute dependence on developed countries' 
markets for technology a technology which is, as seen above, in most 
cases inappropriate. This is in addition to many other favourable 
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repercussions on the whole economy. In this respect UNCTAO, suggested 
that: 
"If the continuation of technological dependence is to be 
overcome and if the developing economies are not to be mirror 
images of the developed countries the creation of a national 
capital goods sector is of vital importance". (UNCTAO, 1983: 15) 
So, what is the role of the TNC in stimulating such a crucial sector? 
As a matter of fact, the creation of a reliable capital goods industry 
in developing countries needs, inter alia, the existence of fundamental 
skills in engineering, design, manufacturing, R & ° and trained 
intermediate personnel. As a matter of fact, most developing countries 
are suffereing from shortages of most of these elements. And above all 
they lack the organisation necessary for linking this sector with the 
rest of the economy. In this respect the TNCs can playa significant 
role via adapting and simplifying their technologies, training local 
personnel in the key elements underlying the design and manufacturing 
of machinery, undertaking R & ° for those tasks, employing local 
personnel among their staff and more importantly working as an 
integrated part of the local host economy. 
However, the contribution of the TNCs in this sector has been kept 
to the minimum. Even more they are trying to integrate the host 
economies into the economies of developed countries. Such a tendency 
could be deduced from exports/imports, R & 0, inter-sector relations, 
their bias towards consumption goods and heavy advertisement campaigns. 
In addition, at a time when they prefer the consumption sector, they 
are reluctant to invest in the capital goods industry. In a study 
undertaken by the UNCTC on TNCs transfer of technology in capital 
goods industry in selected developing countries, it was found that 
their investment in this sector was limited. In South Korea, for 
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instance, over the period from 1967-1981, OFI directed into machinery 
industries accounted for 10~ of the total OFI in the manufacturing 
sector. Even worse results were found in countries such as Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Kenya, and Egypt. Nonetheless, their role was more 
significant in Brazil, and India, albeit the latter depended on getting 
licences from the TNCs (UNCTC, 1982: parts II: III). 
Moreover, within the limited proportion channelled into this sector 
in certain countries, it was found that the TNCs tend towards an 
assembly pattern of investment. This means that technology added 
in host economies is insignificant. These companies have not 
established or undertaken R & 0 in order to adapt or design machinery 
that fits developing countries. In Brazil, for example, the largest 
single developing country that receives OFI, R & 0 facilities in 
the capital goods industry are very minor and the subsidiaries of 
the TNCs are dependent on their parents for designs and manufacturing 
drawings (UNCTC, 1982: part 1: 13, 243, 255). 
The same trend was noted for licences. Most of contractual agreements 
have been directed to consumption industries (Odle, 1979: 193). In 
the Philippines, for instance, the percentage of contracts entered 
into in the manufacture of electrical motors, engines, machinery and 
distribution transformers accounted for 7~ of the total in this country 
(UNCTC, 1982: 131-132). Nevertheless, such a mechanism played a 
significant part in countries such as South Korea, and India. This 
difference could be attributed to the relatively strong bargaining 
position of these countries which emerges from having the skills and 
entrepreneurs capable of adaptation, assimilation and imitation and 
to the role of the state's policy as in India (UNCTC, 1982: part 111: 
253-54). 
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Consequently, the developing countries' share of the World production 
of capital goods was negligible (4%) in the late 1970s. In the 
meantime their imports of machinery and equipment rose from $7 b in 
1963 to $62.3 b in 1976 and is estimated to have reached over $80 
b in 1981. These imports included durable goods such as automobiles 
and household electrical equipment (UNCTC, 1982: part 1: 49, 66). 
These figures, illustrate in fact, that the developing countries are 
getting dependent more and more on developed markets. This dependence 
might have bad repercussions on the economy. The technological 
dependence, means not only imports of machinery, but also, other sorts 
of know-how inputs, and raw materials that fit in. Equally worse, 
is the disintegration of the local economy and the alienation of the 
masses of the population out of the integrated circle between the 
modern sector in developing economies and developed economies. 
The TNCs , in this regard might find it easier and more profitable 
to create markets for their technology and products rather than to 
create technology that suits existing markets in developing countries. 
Thus, their interference in the circle between the capital goods 
industry and the consumers might shift it towards their capital goods 
and hence, alienate the local capital-goods industry if there is any. 
This could be deduced from their efforts in adaptation, R & 0, and 
advertising. So, in the end, the technological dependency gets 
perpetuated as long as possible. The end that is in harmony with 
the global strategy of the organisation of the TNC, and if, the 
establishment of an efficient capital goods sector in these countries 
would put an end to the technological dependence, as UNCTAO suggested, 
how could we expect the transnationals to help in a situation like 
this! 
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In this respect however, one should not gloss over the the limitations 
of some developing countries' markets that might adversely affect 
this industry. The capital goods sector needs an effective demand 
in order to be efficient. This is a requirement that most of 
developing countries' markets cannot offer (Rosenberg 1977: 145). 
In addition, these markets mostly suffer from over-diversification; 
the reluctance of local producers to use local capital goods because 
of lower quality, high risk, and high cost. And this sector needs 
a significant amount of investment in countries with high risk and 
instability (Colman & Nixson, 1978: 234-35). These limitations, as 
suggested above, might not encourage the transnationa1s to get involved 
in the capital goods sector. 
2.4.3 Technology Cost 
The process of transfer of tehcno10gy via the TNCs raises two questions 
related to cost. The first is related to the cost for the suppliers 
of technology while the second, is related to the cost for the 
recipient of technology. 
The first question is in fact a controversial one. Some argue that 
technology transfer is a costly task. Every new application of 
technology requires some sort of adaptation which might be expensive 
especially in the case of developing countries. This is since these 
countries' environment as seen above, is so different from the 
environment where such a technology has been created (La11, 1984: 
8). Thus, the TNCs as a profit-seeking organisation, albeit globally, 
should be compensated for such a transfer and for their investment 
in creating or innovating new knowledge (Johnson, 1975: 59). 
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In contrast, there are some others who contend that the transfer of 
technology is in some cases costless and it might be costly in some 
others. The first case takes place when the TNCs introduce a given 
innovation in recipient countries to produce the same line of products 
without adaptation. In the second case (where it is costly), the 
TNCs might bear minor costs on occasions where only a few adaptations 
take place. In a situation like this Vaitsos estimated the cost as 
tens of thousands of dollars (Vaitsos, 1973: 371; Teece, 1977: 260). 
With regard to developing countries, technology costs might take two 
forms. The first, is direct costs, and the second is indirect costs. 
Direct costs, consists of payments that the recipient should pay for 
the use of technological elements either soft or hard. Soft elements 
are such as know-how and technical assistance, while hard elements 
are such as machinery and equipment, where costs should be paid, 
almost, during the first stages of the establishment and which tend 
to be exaggerated. As for the soft elements' price, it differs from 
one transaction to another and could be lump sums, royalties, equity 
participation, or a combination of two or all of these. Such a kind 
of cost is very difficult to estimate accurately. Wholly foreign 
owned subsidiaries, as seen above, do not, of ten ,enter into contracts 
with their parents. Even in cases, where they do so, the price has 
no meaning beyond being an accounting requirement to satisfy the 
developing country government. Hence, the written price does not 
reflect the real value of the flow of technology from the parent firm 
to its subsidiaries (Cooper & Sercovich, 1971: 27). In some other 
cases WFOS do not include the price in their contracts (Patel, 1974: 
9). 
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As for the other forms of DFI, in general there are some factors that 
affect the real price. Among them are the strong monopolistic position 
of the TNCs and the weakness of their counterpart developing countries, 
as seen in the technology market above. We should therefore expect 
that the developing countries have over paying for their technological 
needs. Vaitsos, has mentioned many examples (1973: 315-319; 1973: 
370-376). According to UNCTAD estimations, the cost of payments 
connected directly with the transfer of technology to developing 
countries were equal to 5t of their total exports (excluding oil) 
and 8t of their imports of machinery and equipment (excluding passenger 
vehicles) and chemicals. In addition, it was estimated 
that the cost of technology was growing at 20% annually until the 
end of the 1970s. (Patel, 1974: 9-10; UNCTAD, 1975: 27). 
Despite the fact that the direct costs seem to be increasing at a 
high rate, they, as Patel described them, represent the 'tip of the 
iceberg', inasmuch as the indirect costs resulting from restrictions, 
transfer pricing and some other devices are a serious source of 
foreign exchange drainage from the developing countries. One striking 
example emerges from Colombia, where costs arising from over-pricing 
intermediate products accounted for some six times the declared profits 
(Patel, Ibid, 11). See also, UNCTAD, 1975: 25-30). 
Thus, it is clear that the weak position of recipients of technology 
from developing countries, and the previously described policies of 
some of them towards DFI and transfer of techno~ogy would put serious 
constraints on the development of these countries. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter the purpose was an attempt to throw some light on 
the nature and structure of technology markets. In addition, it aimed 
to discuss the main mechanisms through which the TNCs might introduce 
foreign technology into developing countries, and the issues that 
such mechanisms and performances might raise. Characteristically, 
the technology market is concentrated in developed countries. It 
is also dominated by the TNCs. These companies hold the majority 
of patents especially in developing countries. They by virtue of 
their enormous capabilities, undertake the majority of R & 0, and 
of innovations and hence take the lead in the transfer to technology 
process. 
In contrast, the technological situation in developing countries 
suffers from many deficiencies. These countries hardly pay significant 
attention to R & 0 in terms of expenditures, equipment, and required 
personnel and their educational systems tend to be biased towards 
the theoretical aspects rather than empirical or practical ones. 
In a word, these countries mostly lack the necessary technological 
infrastructure. 
It was natural that such a situation, involving both dealers, would 
be mirrored in technology transactions. It has been noted that the 
TNCs do not transfer technology in a genuine way. They do not embark 
upon training, undertake R & 0, adapt core technology, or integrate 
in host economies. Thus they are behaving as if they are 'enclaves ' 
in host economies. Moreover, the suitability of technology introduced 
by the transnationals has been under question. There is semi-consensus 
that it is inappropriate to recipient countries conditions. It tends 
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to be capital-intensive technology that is concentrated in the consumer 
goods' sector to produce luxury goods, goods which satisfy the needs 
of only a small proportion of the population. It also deepens the 
unbalanced economic development especially between capital and 
consumption goods. 
Consequently such activity could not be expected to produce anything 
but unfavourable results for the recipient economies, such as 
increasing unemployment and widening income inequality, adding more 
constraints on the balance of payments and hence on the process of 
economic development. Above all this does not lead to the creation 
of an indigenous technological capability. 
The responsibility for this lies on both the TNCs and the developing 
countries. The first tend to work as a global organisation in an 
unified way irrespective of the differences between markets in which 
they operate, while the looseness of developing countries' policies 
and their technological weak position has encouraged the TNCS. 
So, these countries badly need to rethink their policies on local 
R&D, education, industry, legislation, training, and organisation 
to work in harmony and lead in the end to a technological and economic 
independence. 
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QlAPTER 3 
Industrial Developlent and Direct Foreign 
Inves1:llent in the Egyptian Econ~ 
Having discussed in the last chapter the major issues that might arise 
from the TNCs' foreign direct investment in general and transfer of 
technology in particular, this chapter describes the industrialization 
process in Egypt as a backdrop to the later analysis of the effects 
of OFI in Egypt on the transfer of technology. 
The Egyptian economy has witnessed many distinct changes over its 
recent history. However, the main part of this chapter will be mainly 
confined to the changes that took place over the last three decades 
since the 1952 Revolution. 1952 marked the beginning of a new page 
in the economic, social and political life of the Egyptians. The 
leaders of the revolution realised the crucial importance of state 
intervention in the economic policy in order to rectify the poor 
economic and social situation that prevailed before that time. This 
attitude took different characteristics at different stages and 
witnessed some changes - so, it thereby resulted in different outcomes 
for the economy as a whole. Thus, the analysis of this chapter will 
be divided into two distinct stages. 
The first stage which is the concern of the first part of this chapter, 
starts from 1952 and extends until the early 1970s. It will be in 
its turn divided into two phases from 1952 to 1956 and from 1957 to 
the early 1970s. The second main stage began in the early 1970s 
the Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP) was adopted and is the subject 
of the second part of the chapter. 
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Section 1. The Industrial Development of the Egyptian Economy 
(1952-1973). 
Industrialisation has been of vital importance for Egypt. This country 
is not sufficiently well endowed with natural resources such as oil 
and other materials to match the increasing rate of population growth. 
Since 1927, this growth rate has been rising by 1.09~ over the period 
1917-1927, 1.78~ between 1937 to 1947 and 2.54~ in the period 1960-
1965. The latter rate was much the same for 1970s (UNCTAD, 1980:1). 
There has therefore been some attempt to industrialize this country 
during the last and present centuries. 
Characteristically, the conditions under which such attempts have taken 
place changed from one period to another. The first genuine attempt 
was started by the founder of modern Egypt, Mohammad Ali (1805-1849). 
During that time Ali tried to build up a strong economy based on a 
modern industry. He established many industries which produced a 
variety of products such as woven silk, linen, cotton clothes, 
sulphuric acid and other chemicals. The striking achievement was 
in the establishment of a capital - goods industry that contributed 
significantly to satisfy the needs of local factories for machinery 
and equipment, especially in textiles (1) (Issawi, 1961:2; 1963:22). 
Ali also sent some missions to Europe, especially France, for training 
and studying in order to keep abreast with the last developments in 
other countries. (Issawi, 1954: 23). In addition, there was emphasis 
on training and technical education resulting in the establishment 
(1) See: Mabro & Radwan, 1976:13. 
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of a school for engineering. These efforts resulted in improving 
the local skills to a level comparable with that which was prevailing 
in Europe at that time (Carr, 1979:12). 
In order to encourage industry locally, Ali followed an administrative 
protection policy against imports of competitive products. Moreover 
he monopolized both the industrial sector, exports and large parts 
of imports. In addition, some sectors such as the military, were 
closed in the face of foreign competition. These measures, inter 
alia, helped local industry to flourish. However, such a situation 
was to be halted at the hands of France and Britain. Thus Egypt's 
market was forced to open its doors to foreign products under the 
Anglo-Turkish convention in 1838 which resulted in turning Egypt as 
an integrated unit into the international economy. 
The French and British goods penetrated the local market competing 
fiercely with the infant domestic ones. In this way the domestic 
products lost their market, a loss that was aggravated after the defeat 
of Ali in 1840 by the superpowers at that time, since the military 
sector was a significant market for local production (Mabro & Radwan, 
1976: 11-17). Many infant industries lost the battle with foreign 
goods. The cotton trade was the backbone of the economy until very 
recently. Such a situation continued from bad to worse until the 
1920s. In this decade, under the British occupation, there were some 
notional attempts to establish a local industry. Although these 
attempts succeeded in their efforts, especially after the restoration 
of tariff and fiscal autonomy after 92 years, the established 
industries suffered from problems because of the rise in the price 
of raw materials after the second World War and, accordingly the rising 
cost of its products. In addition, Egyptian industry at that time 
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used old machinery which produced goods of poor quality by 
international standards, hence it was not able to compete either in 
the internal market or on the international one having advantages 
in terms of neither cost nor quality. The goods were simple and 
concentrated in food and textiles without connection with a global 
strategy for the development of the econ~ as a whole. (O'Brien, 
1966: 19-20). In addition, these attempts lacked the tangible support 
from the government. This situation continued until the break-out 
of the Free Officers Revolution in 1952. That date marks the beginning 
of phase one. 
Stage I: Phase One 1952 - 1956. 
The beginning of this phase coincides with the most drastic change 
by which Egypt came to identify itself as an independent country. 
The government of that time embarked upon the adoption of a double-
sided policy. First, it encouraged private investment, both local 
and foreign. Secondly. there was a direct participation of the state 
in the industrial process, especially in heavy industries. 
As far as the first side is concerned, the authorities did not spare 
effort or time to encourage foreign and local investment. Thus there 
were a series of laws promulgated in order to achieve this purpose. 
In this regard. Law No. 156 of 1953, amended by Law No. 475 of 1954 
offered foreign capital incentives such as unlimited transfer of 
profits in full and the repatriation of imported capital only one year 
from its importation. It relaxed the regulations that restricted 
foreign ownership to allow majority foreign ownership 51t instead 
of the 49t maximum allowed under the 1947 Law. Moreover. foreign 
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investors were invited to enter most of the major economic sectors 
and industries such as trade, energy, mining, transport and tourism. 
Parallel with this tendency many incentives were also given to the 
mining and petroleum industries by the promulgation of law No. 430 
of 1953. Among the incentives was the exemption of profits from taxes 
for 5 to 7 years for existing and new projects respectively. Thus 
in 1954 petroleum concessions were granted to four companies (Issawi, 
1963:53). 
Nevertheless, despite the previous generosity, the outcome of foreign 
investment came to be an insignificant proportion (0.7~) of total 
investment (Driscoll, 1978:6). This investment was mostly channelled 
into the oil sector (Carr, 1979:20). This might be due to the 
reluctance of foreign investors to enter into a country with a high 
degree of political instability, especially in the wake of the 
revolution. In addition, the government declared its firm intention 
to intervene in the economy from the beginning. 
With regard to the second characteristic, the government recognised 
the urgent need on the part of the industrial sector for a strong 
push and for diversification. In order to carry out this objective, 
Law No. 213 of 1952 was announced for establishing the Permanent 
Council for the Development of the National Production (PCDNP). Its 
aim was to study and promote new projects in parallel with the 
development of the national econ~. Thus the government participated 
directly in the establishment, promotion and running of several pioneer 
industrial projects (Radwan, 1973:227). 
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The PCDNP realising that the heavy industries were of crucial 
importance for a reliable development sought the participation of West 
Germany in establishing the Helwan Complex for iron and steel in May 
1954. Meanwhile, it contributed to the setting up of companies for 
rubber tyres, fertilizers, railway equipment, electric power stations, 
hydroelectric power stations, and oil exploration in different parts of 
the country. Therefore, this council organised the direct 
participation of the state (Girgis, 1977:20). 
Such efforts in addition to the tendency to diversify the economy to 
include other basic industries such as chemicals and petroleum resulted 
in an increase in the capital/labour ratio (K/L). Thus this ratio 
became relatively high compared to that prevailing in the preceding 
years. Over the period between 1952 and 1958, capital intensity in 
the modern sector in establishments of 10 workers and more increased 
by 40%. This resulted in an increase in labour productivity by about 
4% (Mabro, 1974:151). Nevertheless, such intensity did not dominate 
the largest part of the industry. Only over half of domestic 
manufacturing output in 1957 was produced by factories that used 
capital/intensive techniques (Mab~o, 1967:343). 
Furthermore, the industrial sector had no significant forward linkages 
with other economic sectors. In 1954 such linkages were so weak that 
some 20% of the total supplies to other industries came from local 
sources. In the meantime, backward linkages were stronger than ever, 
and agricultural raw materials amounted to about 50% of total domestic 
inputs supplied to the industrial sector at that time. These economic 
phenomena could be interpreted in the light of the very limited share 
of capital goods in the economy (2%) of value added in the industrial 
sector (Mabro & O'Brien, 1970:418). This sector was in no position 
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to supply industries with their needs for machinery, equipment, and 
spare parts. In addition, the intermediate industries' role was also 
limited since food processing and textiles dominated the industrial 
sector, despite the PCONP efforts to diversify the industrial base. 
So, this sector badly needed a strong impetus in order to take off. 
Stage I Phase Two: 1957 - 1974. 
It could be deduced from the previous section that government 
intervention in the economy was as described by Mabro & O'Brien a 
'gentle one' (1970:413). But the 1956 war came to represent a turning 
pOint in this respect. Following this war a strong belief was 
generated that the country ought to depend on itself economically 
after the measures taken by the British and the French to boycott 
Egypt. The greater the dependence on the outside world, the more 
vulnerable the country would be. Thus, state intervention in order 
to lessen such a dependence on consumer and manufactured goods was 
imperative at that time. 
The role that the state had to play was extended both in range and 
intensity to take further dimensions. So, there was a sequence of 
steps in order to achieve that end. There was the creation of the 
Ministry of Industry in 1956, and the Economic Organisation (E.O.) 
in 1957. To this organisation many industrial and trade establishments 
were affiliated such as the Egyptianised French, Belgian and British 
ones, after the Suez War. This was in addition to newer corporations 
ranging from petroleum to banking and insurance. These affiliated 
companies accounted for 30~ of total output and 20% of employment in 
the organised sector at that time. Thus, the government was able 
to control about 50% of total credits via commercial banks and some 
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68% of the insurance business and was therefore in a position 
effectively to affect the financial activities (Radwan, 1973:230-31). 
Moreover, a remarkable manifestation of bold and firm intervention 
was the creation of the National Planning Committee in 1957 (N.P.C.). 
Its task was to put forward a path for industrial development. 
Maintaining that aim, in the same year, the committee prepared a 
programme for mobilizing both public and private efforts towards 
economic and industrial development. This program was to be carried 
out with the help of the USSR and West Germany, both financially and 
technologically (Issawi, 1961:19). 
The programme was to run from 1957 to 1961. It aimed at a total 
investment of £330mn over five years to increase employment by 120,000 
and net output by £84mn. Industrial production as a percentage of 
GNP was targeted to increase from 11% to 19% over the same period 
(Radwan, 1973:228). Thus the total investment was allocated among 
the three major sectors, industry, agriculture, and services. The 
industrial sector was allocated the largest single part, about 40% 
of that total, divided as follows: 30% for consumer goods industries, 
41% for intermediate goods and 29% for capital good industries 
including durable consumption goods. (Agwa, 1978:305). It is clear 
from this allocation pattern that there was some emphasis on both 
the capital and intermediate goods industries. This emphasis coincided 
with the declared policy of reducing the dependence on foreign sources 
for requirements of such goods. 
This programme, in fact, represented the first step in building a plan-
ned econ~. Nevertheless, it fell short of achieving its goals. It 
was prepared in so short a time that there was no specification of its 
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sources of finance. In addition there was the reluctance of the 
private sector to invest in industry preferring investment in real 
estate (Mabro & O'Brien, 1970:416). Such a tendency on the side of 
this sector had adverse repercussions on industry, since private 
investment was estimated to reach 79% of suggested total investment 
in this field and the government's share was 21% of the total (Mabro 
& Radwan, 1976:67). Consequently, the general structure of the 
Egyptian economy did not demonstrate significant change. Thus, until 
1959, the industrial sector remained dominated by simple industries 
which need simple production techniques as it was over the previous 
phase (Agwa, 1975:48; Shafik, 1983:16). 
Correspondingly, as a result of the shortcomings of the 1957 programme 
coinCidental with the objective of speeding up social and economic 
development, there was a comprehensive five year plan 1960-65 which 
represented the first stage of the ten year plan 1960-1970. 
The general philosophy that underlined this plan was import -
substitution, the industrialisation philosophy that prevailed in most 
developing countries at that time. Accordingly, there was a 
concentration on producing the products that the country used to import 
in order to meet local needs from local sources. In line with this, 
there was an increase in tariffs and other measures to protect local 
infant industries from foreign competition and accelerate the 
industrialisation process. 
Moreover, the plan had some other ambitious aims. It aimed to raise 
national income by 40%, increase employment by one million over the 
5 years, decrease imports by 6%, speed up the industrial growth by 
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15% per annum and agricultural sector growth by 5% compared to 6% 
and 25% over 1952-1960 respectively (Radwan, 1973:231). 
In line with these aims, the plan laid down a total investment 
amounting to £1636mn over the plan period. This amount implied an 
increase in the investment to GNP ratio from 12.5~ in the base year 
to about 20%. This target was based on the presumption that domestic 
savings would increase to a similar ratio of GNP. Hence, it would 
be possible to allocate the industrial sector some 27% of the total. 
Yet, the actual investment fell short by 25% of the target in the 
first year of the plan. 
So a belief was generated at that time that it is impossible to 
aChieve inclusive planning in an economy where about two-thirds of 
output was produced out of the control of the state. By the same 
token, the competent authorities were convinced that for successful 
planning the allocation of resources and output must be in the hands 
of the people represented by the state. On these grounds, there were 
the striking and intense nationalization waves of large firms operating 
in the industrial and commercial sectors in 1961-1963. The Egyptian 
economy, thereby, became dominated by the public sector, nearly a 
decade after the 1952 Revolution (Mabro & Radwan, 1976:98). 
The share of this new sector in total output rose from 15~ to 35~ 
between 1953 and 1963/64. The share of investment by the public sector 
in total investment amounted to 90% of the total investment over the 
years of the plan and its share in local saving reached about 46% 
of the total (Ministry of Planning, 1960:108-118). On the other hand, 
by 1963 the private sector was confined mainly to small scale 
industries such as leather and furniture. In addition, it dominated 
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the retail trade, housing, professional services and land property 
as a whole (Girgis, 1977:27). 
However, comprehensive planning in a developing country with 
limitations of available resources, was naturally to face some 
challenges on its way. Such challenges, either internal or external, 
caused setbacks against the achievement of the planned targets. Still, 
the private sector remained unwilling to take an active role in the 
plan; and there was a harvest failure in the cotton crop which 
represented a disaster for the country, since cotton exports were 
the main source of exports and hence foreign exchange. The share 
of raw cotton and agriculture products in total exports amounted to 
over 78%, 71% of which was raw cotton alone (Habro, 1974:179). Another 
factor that added to the burden on the available resources was the 
increase in consumption expenditures owing to the ambitious social 
objectives that the plan traced to achieve such as the employment 
push-up policy, where the government was obliged to employ all the 
graduates from universities or secondary schools and increasing the 
minimum level of wages. Thus, both public and private consumption 
expenditures increased by 17.8% and 7.3% per annum respectively. 
Hence, there was a shortage of capital finance for investment. 
(N.B.E.,1969:25). 
Furthermore, there was a difficulty emerging from the policy of lSI 
which was adopted at that time not only by Egypt but also by most of 
the developing countries. Such a difficulty resulted from the 
increasing dependence of these countries on developed markets for their 
requirements of capital goods, equipment and capital finance either 
in OFI, loans or even grants. The developing countries, by and large, 
became more linked to external sources for their development process 
- 132 -
to go ahead. Such a position makes the whole process vulnerable and 
sensitive to any changes that might happen and affect these sources. 
So, if these external sources for one reason or another cut the 
developing countries from their aid, they would affect the whole 
development effort adversely. This is since as Nixson pOinted out: 
"a decline in the availability of foreign exchange will 
lead to forced import curtailments and industrial 
recession"(Nixson, 1982:45). 
Regarding the case of Egypt, it was noted that imports were increasing 
over the plan years rapidly. The average annual rate of increase 
amounted to 15.5%. This increase took place even though imports of 
consumption goods (excluding food) witnessed a sharp decline from 
28.7% over 1953-59 to 16.0% over 1960-1965 of total imports (Mabro 
& O'Brien, 1970:424). This phenomenon might be explained in the light 
of a structural shift in imports. At a time when consumer goods 
imports declined as a result of tariff and non-tariff measures, the 
imports of capital goods, inputs, raw materials, and spare parts, 
increased so rapidly that it offset the decline in output of the former 
goods. Such a shift could be deduced from Table 3.1. 
TABLE 3.1. 
Composition of Manufactured imports over the period 1945-1968 as a 
% of the total. 
I 
1945 1952 1957 1960 I 1965 1968 
I 
I 
Consumer Goods 43.3 34.9 54.3 22.1 I 24.8 14.7 
Intermediate Goods 40.7 36.7 27.7 44.3 I 41.6 45.6 
Capital Goods 16.0 28.4 18.0 33.6 I 33.6 35.3 
Others I 4.4 
TOTAL 100 100 100 
I 
I 100 100 
I 
SOURCE: Radwan, S. 1973 245. 
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Table 3.1 outlines clearly the structural changes in imports from 
1952-1968. Imports of consumption goods witnessed a sharp reduction 
from over half of the total imports in 1957 to less than one-quarter 
in 1960-1965 and continued to decline to 14.7% in 1968, while imports 
of intermediate goods represented the most significant increase over 
1960-1965 compared to the previous period. As for capital goods 
they witnessed a significant change. Although imports of durable 
consumption goods such as cars, electric fans and refrigerators, were 
restricted, imports of machinery and capital equipment steadily 
increased in order to meet the industrialisation process requirements. 
In addition, imports from foodstuffs nearly doubled. Thus, the 
deficits of the balance of payments reached about 5% of GNP during 
the plan period (Radwan, 1973:234; Agwa, 1978:381). 
What made the situation even worse, was that exports were falling 
behind imports as shown in Table 3.2. 
TABLE 3.2 
Balance of Trade situation over the periods 1960-1964 and 
1965-1969 
.t:EMN 
I I (1) (2) I (3) I 2-1 
Year Exports Imports I (~)% I Balance 
I I 
I I 
1960 - 1964 986 1,590 I 62 I -604 
I I 
1965 - 1969 1,367 1,782 I 76 I -415 
I I 
TOTAL 2,353 3,372 I 69.7 I -1 , 019 
I I 
SOURCE: N.B.L 1969, No.1 :61; 1973 No. 1:37. 
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This table, summarizes the situation of both exports and imports over 
these periods. It is clear that export value fell short of paying 
for imports by 38% over the period 1960-1964. So, such a gap had 
to be bridged by loans. Meanwhile, there was another choice to the 
government which was to rationalise imports. In fact the government 
used both means. The authorities imposed heavy restrictions on imports 
of consumer goods which resulted in decreasing imports of these goods 
and hence, balance of payments deficits dropped to about 1% of GNP 
in 1968/69 (Mabro & Radwan 1976:46). 
In addition, the government anticipated a higher level of foreign 
resources to finance the ambitious 5 year plan projects. The share of 
foreign capital as a source of finance then rose from 8.8% over the 
period 1952 of 1960 to reach about 23.6% in 1961-1967/68. The Egyptian 
economy, therefore, became increasingly vulnerable to changes that 
might come from external factors. Such vulnerability was manifested 
when the Americans cut off their aid to Egypt in 1964. At that time, a 
severe shortage in foreign exchange tangibly constrained industrial 
development. The country was not able to afford imports of necessary 
spare parts, machinery, raw materials. So there was an increase in 
under utilization of potential capacity. (Radwan, 1973:234) Such a 
situation represented the common complaint of firms with idle capacity 
in their response to questions from the Treasury. They specified that 
shortages of imported inputs and spare parts the outcome of foreign 
exchan~e dearth were responsible for their idle situation. (Mabro & 
Radwan, 1976:163) This idle capacity was estimated to reach in some 
industries up to 70% of the total capacity (Matar, 1981:23). 
In brief, the lack of foreign exchange was the biggest obstacle in 
the path of success for the five year plan. Nevertheless, despite 
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the previous challenges, this plan was described by some economists 
as one of the most successful and sustained economic development plans 
relative to other developing countries (Makki & Qayum, 1975:158). 
Over the years of the plan, national income rose by 37%, the increase 
that was close to the planned target (40%). In percentage terms 
the compound rate of increase was 6.5% compared to the 4.8% to what 
prevailing over the previous five years. During the years of the 
plan, employment recorded an unprecedented increase which exceeded 
the target, increasing from 6mn in 1959/60 to about 7.3mn. 
Nevertheless most of the increase was channeled into the services 
sector (Abdel-Fadil, 1980:9). These changes are be summarised in 
Table 3.3. 
TABLE 3.3. 
General Indicators of the Egyptian Economy over the period 
1955-1965. 
1955/56-1959/60 1960/61-1964/65 
Total growth rate during period: 
Output 
Demand 
Investment 
Consumption 
Private 
Publi c 
Annual compound growth rate: 
Population 
Output I 
Output per capital 
Real private consumption per capital 
Real public consumption per capita I 
SOURCE: Gerakis, 1967:458. 
I 
I 
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26.3 
32.0 
17.1 
34.4 
29.1 
67.9 
2.3 
4.8 
2.5 
1.7 
6.1 
37.1 
55.1 
112.9 
46.8 
36.9 
89.0 
2.8 
6.5 
3.6 
1.7 
8.8 
Having outlined the general changes that took place in the Egyptian 
economy over the 1960-1965 plan, it might be of interest to concentrate 
on the process of industrialization at that time. 
In industry, there were many industries introduced over the years of 
the plan in addition to the expansion of the existing ones. The new 
industries included the production of electric bulbs, radios, cables 
and tubes, medical preparations, automobiles, spare parts, railway 
cars, rubber tyres and steel. The expanded industries included 
for instance, batteries, assembly of refrigerators, petroleum refining, 
and textiles manufacturing. (El-Kummash, 1968:213). In the meantime 
there was a tangible focus on capital intensive and heavy industries 
such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, petroleum, iron and steel. Such 
a focus increased the absolute capital investment in the projects. 
Nevertheless the K/L ratio remained relatively constant, because of 
the driving-up employment policy that made the increase in labour 
offset the increase of capital investment (Mabro & Radwan, 1976:169). 
So compared to some developed countries, capital intensity in Egypt 
remained how. It was in 1965, for instance one-fifth of that which 
existed in Sweden (Mabro, 1967:342). 
The common feature at that time was the dependence on Eastern and 
Western technology. both in its hard and soft forms. Eastern 
technology dominated the new projects and some of the existing ones, 
and the Western technology was almost in the nationalized and 
Egyptianized projects that were established with the West's assistance 
over the 1950s. As a result the absolute dependence on foreign 
technology at that time deprived the country of maximizing the backward 
and forward linkages among the economic sectors that might result 
from the big push policy towards industrialization. (Abdel Fadil, 
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1980:9). Thus employment in industry rose only by 6% and the rest 
of the increase was poured into other sectors, especially the service 
sector. 
However, there was an increase in industrial inputs provided for other 
sectors from 20% in the previous period to 33% in 1967/68 (Agwa, 1978: 
308). For example domestic production as a percentage of total supply 
in metallic products was 42.5%, non-metallic machinery 0.4%, electrical 
machinery 0% and transport equipment 8.3% in 1947. The comparable 
figures were 80.9%, 14.3%, 46.0% and 43% respectively in 1967 (Mabro, 
1967:196). These figures prove that the emphasis put on industry 
in general and capital and intermediate goods industries in particular 
was promising. Regarding industry, it achieved at that time a 
remarkable contribution to the GOP by the yardstick of developing 
countries. Its share in GOP increased from 15% in 1945 to 26.6% in 
1966/67. This is while the other sectors share were declining with 
the exception of the services sector that whose share rose from 39% 
to 41.4% over the same period (Radwan, 1973:242). Such an emphasis 
has led, in addition, to the increase of intermediate and capital 
goods in terms of value added. On the other hand the share of 
consumption goods was declining as shown in Table 3.4. 
TABLE 3.4 
Consumer, Intermediate and Capital Goods Industries 1n terms of 
percentages of value added over 1947-1967. 
I 
Sector I 1947 1950 1956 1961 1967 
I 
I 
Consumer Goods I 81.7 75.1 70.4 64.2 59.9 
Intermediate Goods I 14.4 20.9 25.4 29.0 30.5 
Capital Goods I 3.9 4.0 4.2 6.8 9.6 
I 
SOURCE: Girgis, 1977 42 Table 1-16. 
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This table outlines the fact that at a time when there was a steady 
decline in the share of consumption goods, there was an increase in 
the shares of both capital and intermediate good sectors. Nevertheless 
the share of consumer goods remained to dominate the economy, while 
the share of capital goods remained to represent a very tiny proportion 
of the value added. This situation confirms that the Egyptian economy 
was suffering from an imbalance between the two sectors, and it might 
partly explain the absolute dependence of the country on foreign 
sources for technology in all its forms. 
In addition to the features seen above, one may draw the conclusion 
here that there was over the first half of the 1960s, in Egypt a 
serious attempt to rectify the unbalanced situation in the econ~, 
but the outcome was slow and relatively insignificant for the capital 
goods sector. But, these attempts, as seen above, increased the 
contribution of industry to the economy. Further, industry became 
more diversified, and hence its share in exports increased as shown 
i n Tab 1 e 3.5. 
TABLE 3.5 
Commodity composition of Exports in terms of percentages 
1 1952 1960 1965 
1 
1 
Agricultural Products 1 3.3 12.6 14.6 
1 
Raw Materials 1 85.4 66.5 57.2 
1 
Fuels 1 1.0 3.1 8.0 
1 
Finished & Semi Fi ni shed Goodsl 5.1 14.5 17.5 
1 
Others 1 5.2 3.3 2.8 
1 
TOTAL I 100 100 100 
I 
SOURCE: Radwan, 1973 245. 
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It is apparent from this table that raw materials came far up at the 
top of the list of exports with more than four-fifths of the total 
in 1952. But after that time and as a result of the attempts to 
industrialize raw materials internally and export them as manufactured 
goods, their share declined by 50~ in 1965. In contrast, there was 
an increase in the exports of other sources such as fuels, agriculture 
products, and industrial finished and semi-finished goods, where the 
share of latter goods in exports increased by 3.5 times than it was 
in 1952 and by 20~ than it was in 1960. 
In this respect, in a study undertaken on exports by certain developing 
countries over the period 1953-1968, O'Brien concluded that: 
"At the beginning of the period (1953) the U.A.R.(Egypt) was 
the least diversified exporter, with exports of raw cotton 
alone accounting for more than 85~ of the total, but by 1968 
that country occupied a middle position in the ranking and the 
share of raw cotton in the total had fallen to about 45%" 
(O'Brien, 1972:703). (1) 
From the list of countries studied below, it is clear that it included 
some of the major semi-industrialized countries. And for Egypt to 
change its place to the middle means that there was a remarkable change 
in the structure of the country's exports. 
Yet the challenges that faced this country, as seen above, accumulated 
to squeeze the process of economic development. So, the government 
of that time was obliged to reduce the investment rate from 19.7% 
to 11.9% of GNP. The rate of growth diminished to 0.7% in 1966/67. 
Even worse, it accounted for a negative rate given the rate of 
(1) The countries studied were in alphabetical order, Argentina, 
Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Dominican Republic, Ghana, India, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Trinidad, Tobago and 
U.A.R. (Egypt). 
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population growth of 2.8%, to reach about 2.2% in the same year, and 
the share of industrial investment decreased by 24% over the same 
time (Ministry of Planning, 1968:66-71; CAPMS, 1970:10). Meanwhile, 
the country to some extent depended on the excess capacity in some 
sectors such as industry, and electricity. (Mabro, 1974:231). 
But the 1967 war came to aggravate the country·s problems. 
In the wake of that war, the country and the economy were to work under 
war time conditions, which imposed severe constraints on economic 
development, the steady and rapid increase in military expenditures 
from 5.5% of GNP in 1966 to over 25% in 1973, the loss of Sinai oil 
with about 70% of total oil production; the loss of £E 30mn as a result 
of the destruction of refineries in the Suez Zone; the loss of tourism 
revenue; and the loss of Suez Canal revenue. These were in addition 
to the indirect problems that emerged from the immigration from the 
Canal Zone and the stoppage of the production in this area, and many 
other repercussions that wars have on any economy. In addition Egypt 
was engaged in a war of attrition with Israel from 1969 to 1973 (Matar, 
1981:39). 
Consequently, the second half of the 10 year plan was cancelled and 
replaced by yearly programmes and decisions (Girgis, 1977:27). Hence, 
the Egyptian economy was burdened by many problems, a situation that 
continued up to the 1973 war and the start of a new page in Egyptian 
economic policy, as will be seen below. 
Section 2: Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP) 
Foreign capital has been playing a role in the Egyptian economy 
especially since the integration of the country into the international 
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capitalist system in the last century. Yet, this role did not take a 
unified form. It was sometimes dominated by portfolio investment and 
sometimes by direct investment and in most cases it was mixed, 
especially during the occupation era that started since 1882, foreign 
capital was playing its role without a comprehensive law to organise 
it; a situation that remained until the early 1950s. By this date 
legislation was promulgated to organize and attract foreign investment. 
But the response of foreign investors was limited (fE 0.8mn) over the 
period 1954-1960 (Dabbous, 1974:18). During the 1960s and especially 
after the nationa1isation and Egyptianization waves, the role of 
foreign capital confined mostly to the establishment of turn-key proj-
ects, loans and technical assistance from both the West and the East, 
especially the USSR, which played the major part over that decade. 
Since the early 1970s and the assumption of office by President Sadat, 
there has been a shift in the economic policy of the country. Some 
sort of liberalization of the economy has taken place. Private 
investment both foreign and local has been invited to playa 
significant role in the machinery of the econ~. Such a tendency 
was evident in the passage of Law No. 65 of 1971. This law represented 
a precursor to what followed after then. Again the response of foreign 
investors was so cool that just 46 projects were approved. And only 
five out of this total have reached the production stage (Carr, 
1979:41-43). 
Hence, this law was replaced by the most decisive step to redirect 
Egyptian economic policy, by the adoption of what is called ODEP. 
The main instrument of this major change was the Law No. 43 of 1974 
amended by Law No. 32 of 1977. This law has opened nearly all fields 
of the Egyptian economy for private investment both local and foreign, 
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though it was designed primarily to woo OFI. It was made a condition 
that foreign investment must take the form of jOint-ventures with 
local capital either private or public. Nonetheless wholly foreign 
subsidiaries were permitted in certain cases. In order to achieve 
its purpose the foreign investment law has granted foreign investors 
a package of privileges to work as incentives, such as tax holidays, 
duties and tariff exemptions, no confiscations, relaxed repatriation 
of profits etc. (Law 43 of 1974, articles 4-8, 12, 15-18)). In 
addition there was some new legislation accompanying the open door 
policy concerns the relaxation of foreign exchange regulations, exports 
and imports, the property system, and the tax system. These policies 
will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
This section is concerned to ask the following two questions: 
First are these policies and the concomitant measures crucial to the 
Egyptian economy? Secondly have they been beneficial to the country 
in overcoming some of its problems of unemployment and in foreign 
exchange shortages? 
In fact the answer to these questions will constitute the main theme of 
this section. Its importance in addition emerges from providing the 
background necessary for understanding the role of foreign capital in 
general and the TNCs in particular in the economy of this country. So, 
this section will consider the theoretical debate about the rationale 
of this policy and empirical analysis of the inflow of foreign capital 
and its sectoral and geographical allocation. 
3.2.1 The Theoretfcal Debate: 
In the early 1970s as noted above, there were some preliminary actions 
taken with the objective opening-up the Egyptian econ~. 
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In this sense, the October 1973 paper issued by President Sadat and 
approved in a national referendum in May 1974, represented the decisive 
step toward achieving this goal. This paper was followed in the 
following month, by Law 43. Since then, the ODEP has been the subject 
of continuous debate at all levels. Such a debate extended to include 
not only the reasons and justifications of the policy but also its 
potential outcome. 
In this respect, there is an argument that is representing the 
government's view for which the General Authority for Foreign 
Investment and Free Zones (GAFI) has been standing. The ODEP was 
justified in the October paper by the claim that it would bring in 
hard currency, and hence fill the gap between local savings and 
required investment, the deficiency in know-how, and in hardware 
technology. Such injections into the econ~ would lead to the 
restoration of the growth rate prevailing over the first five year 
plan 1960-65 (October paper, 1974:37-39). This claim in the October 
paper left its echo on the debate that took place in the people's 
assembly about this policy. So, the new policy was justified on the 
grounds that: 
" •••• in order for us to march with the times and in 
order for us to benefit from advanced technology, which 
in fact develops from one day to the next, it's 
inevitable that we make use of the existing relations 
between capital and technology by attracting it here 
to invest in projects l (Peoples Assembly debate, 
1974:80). 
In addition to these aspirations the GAFI added that OFI would generate 
positive multiplier effects on the Egyptian economy as a whole. It 
would increase production, create employment, and ease the chronic 
difficulties if the balance of payments has been suffering. (Atif, 
1981:263). Some economists claimed that the OOEP would extricate 
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the country from the accumulated problems of the 1960s (Sherif, 
1975:32). 
Against this view of the ODEP, it has been argued that the rationale· 
behind the adoption of the new policy was more political than economic. 
There was evidence of the continuing influence of the feudalist and 
capitalist interests nationalized in the early 1960s. The arrival 
of Sadat, who was regarded as pro-western, encouraged the learning 
towards the ODEP. (Dessouki, 1981: 413). Similarly, it has been 
argued that those in charge of the management of the public sector 
educated in the superiority of a flourishing capitalism played a key 
part in pushing towards the new policy. (Ayubi, 1982: 280). 
On the other hand, the international factors played a more major role 
than that of the internal ones. In this respect, it has been argued 
that these factors have had the upper hand in the shift of the Egyptian 
economic policy (Abdel-Khalek, 1981:394). Among the international 
factors are the interest of the Americans and their allies (1) the 
international financial institutions especially the IMF which has 
been exercising a continuous pressure on the government to follow 
a free economy principles and to give the decisive role to the market 
(Dessouki, 1981:413).(2) 
As a matter of fact the adoption of the new policy could not be 
explained in the light of one of these arguments 1n isolation from the 
others. The view that justifies the new policy on the grounds of 
(1) 
(2) 
This was clear from visits of William Simon, U.S. Secretary 
of Treasury; Rockefeller, Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, 
Robert MacNamara, President of the World Bank in 1974, etc. 
For more details about these factors, See: Abdel-Khalek 1982; 
Ayubi, 1982, and Dessouki, 1981. 
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internal socio-economic factors, claiming that the economy needed 
a new and external blood, did not study or expose itself to other 
potential alternatives. And it did not specify why the' infitah' 
towards the North-West was imperative and the sole panacea for Egypt's 
problems. The other view, that ascribes the new policy to external 
factors, although right in some elements, relatively neglected the 
effect of internal problems mentioned above. So, one tends to contend 
that the new policy was a combined result of all the above factors. 
The economic problems accumulated by the end of the 1960s and the 
early 1970s represented the appropriate atmosphere for both the 
internal and external factors to emerge on the surface and reshape 
the economic policy of the country. This has taken place irrespective 
or whether it is going to solve the country's crisis or aggravate 
it. 
The new policy, has existed for more than ten years now. In 
consequence, it has had some effects on foreign exchange flows, 
technology, employment, production, exports/imports, and balance 
of payments. In the following pages we will take a general look 
at some of these aspects, delaying some others to the next chapters: 
3.2.2 Capital Approved to Work Under Law No. 43 of 1974: 
A) Capital Approved in Inland Projects. 
Responding to the new foreign investment policy and its concomitant 
measures, capital has begun to flow into Egypt. According to the 
GAFI, the number of projects approved to work in both inland and free 
zones amounted to 1634 by the end of 1982. These projects· are 
distributed as shown in Table 3.6. 
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• 
It is obvious that projects approved to operate inside the country 
represent the majority of the total approved. They account for 78%, 
74% and 78% of the total approved number, capital and investment costs 
respectively. They are followed by projects in public free zones 
in terms of numtl·er and finally projects in private free zones in 
number. But, considering capital the latter category jumps to occupy 
the second rank in both capital and investment costs whilst the public 
free zones projects come in the third place for both capital and 
investment costs. As far as inland (as opposed to Free Zones projects) 
approved projects are concerned, it has been noticed that they are 
of a fluctuating nature, their number and hence their capital were 
varying sharply from one year to another as is indicated in Table 
3.7. 
In this Table, these fluctuations are very clear in all sectors: 
financial and service projects, construction and agriculture and 
industry. Thus the projects number accepted in 1976 represented some 
32.5% of those accepted in 1975. This proportion increased in 1977 
to 262% of 1976, but again declined in the following year to 94.5% 
and so on. This unsteady development was accompanied in most cases 
by the same tendency in capital. By the same tOken, the striking 
irregularity was in industry. In the last two years, for example, 
apart from number, capital approved in in the industrial projects 
increased in 1981 by 260% relative to 1980, but in 1982 it decreased 
by about 700% or seven times the 1981 figures. This feature over 
the years 1974-1982 makes,the dependence on the foreign investment 
sector to revlve the economy a myth rather than a reality. 
Characteristically, the structural distribution of approved projects 
reveals that they are biased towards service and finance projects. 
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TABLE 3.6 
Total Approved Project Until 31-12-1982 
(000) 
I I 
Number of I Total Capital Total Investment Costsl 
Projects I I 
(~) I (~) (~) I 
I I I I I 
A) Projects inside the country 1273 I 78 15 012 011 I 74 9 503 279 J 78 J 
I I I I I 
B) Projects in the Public Free Zones 301 118.410 249 632 I 4 342 878 I 3 I 
I I I J I 
C) Projects in the Private Free Zones 60 I 3.611 502 451 I 22 2 281 928 J 19 J 
I I I I I 
I I I I J 
TOTAL 1634 1100 16 764 094 1100 12 128 085 J 100 I 
I I I I I 
SOURCE: G.A.F.I., 1983, table 1. 
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TABLE 3.7 
Develo~ment of a~~roved ~rojects inside the countrl until 31-12-1982 
(000) 
- ---- -- - --
I I I I 
SECTOR I YEAR I 1975 1976 I 1977 1978 I 1979 1980 1981 I 1982 
INo. C. No. C. INo. C. No. C. No. C. No. C. No. C. INo. C. 
I I I I I I I I 
Financing & I I I I I I I I 
service I 55 345 492 32 138 195 I 68 586 084 491 169 803 611 261 048 81 422 195 1021 326 698 481 782 066 
projects I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
Construction & I I I I I I 
Agricultural I 16 11 112 8 29 202 1 32 107 274 401 49 691 531 80 373 53 97 911 721 114 805 241 94 299 
projects I 1 1 1 1 I 
1 1 I I I 1 
I ndustri a 1 1 I I I 1 I I 
Projects 1 98 146 641 15 85 676 I 44 117 782 471 78 554 671 156 391 57 207 311 1231 536 163 281 67 255 I 
I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I 
1 I I I , , , 
TOTAL I 169 503 245 55 253 073 1 144 811 130 1361 218 048 1811 497 812 191 727 417 297, 977 666 1001 943 620 , 
1 I I I , , , 
SOURCE: G.A.F.I., 1983, Table 2. 
No. = Number 
C. = Capital 
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These projects captured as shown in Table 3.8 some 60.5% of total 
approved capital. The break-down of this category suggests that capital 
employing projects occupied the first rank with 43% of this category's 
approved capital, followed by tourism projects with 21.5% of the 
category capital. The remaining projects are in the banking services, 
transportation and health sectors. 
As regards the construction projects, they take the third ranked place 
with 16.6% and 7.5% of both number and capital in order. While in the 
agricultural sector it is self-evident from the previous table that 
private capital is reluctant to invest in it. Hence its share of 
projects number and capital totalled to 7% and 4% respectively. This 
means that this sector comes in the fourth place in investors' 
priorities. 
The industrial sector held the second priority of the investors' 
preference ladder, both in capital and number. However, though this 
position seems to be a healthy sign, the share of this sector's capital 
is less than one-third of the total approved capital. Further, 
compared to accepted capital in the financing and service projects, 
its share accounted for less than half. It might, therefore, be of 
interest to illustrate the allocation of projects according to main 
industry and category of industries in order to see the relative weight 
of this sector's projects by industry. 
More specifically the structure of projects approved within the 
industrial sector, as made clear in Table 3.9, indicates that the 
intermediate goods industries occupy the first place in terms of 
capital number and investment costs. In this category chemical 
industries take the first position with over one-fifth of total 
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TABLE 3.8 
Distribution of Capital and Number of Projects Approved up to the End 
of 1982 
- Financial & service projects 
- Industrial projects 
- Construction projects 
- Agricultural projects 
TOTAL 
NUMBER 
No. 
496 
479 
210 
88 
(000) 
CAPITAL 
Val ue 
39 3 031 6 60.5 
37.5 1 395 8 28.0 
16.5 372.0 7.5 
7.0 212.5 4.0 
1273 100.0 5 012.1 100.0 
SOURCE: Calculated from data provided by the G.A.F.I., 1983. 
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approved projects, albeit less than one-third of approved capital 
in all the industrial sector. It is followed by building materials, 
metallurgical and mining industries. 
With regard to the consumption industries category,it is ranked in the 
second position. And this category is still dominated by food-
processing and textile manufacturing industries. These two industries 
in fact represent some 84.5t of total capital approved in the same 
category. 
The Engineering industries category comes in the third place relative 
to the previous categories and as the fifth among the five major 
industries such as chemicals 30t, building materials 18t, food 
processing 18t, textiles 13t and engineering industries with 10.5t 
of total capital in all these industries. These industries altogether 
represent about 84.5t of total capital approved to work inside the 
country. In this respect, it might be of interest to note that 
engineering industries are dominated by consumer durable goods like 
cars, refrigerators and the like. Nothing significant was traceable 
to be directed towards machine-making industries as will be illustrated 
in Chapter 6. 
Moreover, the approved projects tend to be concentrated in big towns 
near large markets. Cairo governorate for instance, has had the lion1s 
share of projects in terms of both capital (48.5t) and number (35t). It 
is followed by Giza, Alexandria, lower Egypt, Suez Canal Zones and 
upper Egypt governorates as represented in Table 3.10. Such a bias, 
in fact, adds to the problems of the big towns extra pressure on 
infrastructure and services in transportation, communications and 
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TABLE 3.9 
Distribution of Total Approved Industrial Projects Until 31-12-1982 
(000) 
Projects Capital Investment Costs 
N ~ V ~ V ~ 
Spinning and Weaving Industry 62 13.0 180 556 13 743 003 17.3 
Food Industries 92 19.0 183 765 13 481 468 11.2 
Wood Industries 17 3.5 27 519 2 49 707 1.0 
Pharmaceuticals 13 2.7 39 306 3 77 250 2.0 
Total of Consumption Industries 184 38.4 431 146 31 1 351 428 31.5 
Chemicals 108 22.5 417 238 30 1 275 311 30.0 
Building Materials 77 16.0 254 402 18 672 107 16.0 
Metallurgical 39 8.0 99 716 7 507 517 12.0 
Mining Industries 7 1.5 29 808 2 82 929 2.0 
Total of Intermediate Industries 231 48.0 801 164 57 2 537 764 60.0 
Engineering Industries 59 12.0 149 129 10.5 358 144 8.0 
Petroleum Industries 5 1.0 14 334 1.0 29 874 0.7 
Total 479 100.0 1 395 773 100.0 4 277 859 100.0 
----
SOURCE: Calculated from data provided by the G.A.F.!., 1983. 
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I 
traffic and the unbalanced pattern of development between urban and 
rural areas. 
Having described the type of projects and the capital allocation. 
we now move on to detailed consideration of the projects implementation 
rates and determinants. 
3.2.2.1 Implementation Ratio: 
The ratio of implementation as a matter of fact depends upon many 
variables among which are: the total number of approved projects, 
the number of projects per category and industry, total approved 
capital, approved capital per project, and type of product. It depends 
in addition on the extent of the pressure the government is ready 
to exercise in this regard. In general, 552 projects started 
production inside the country by the end of 1982. i.e. 43% of the 
total. They are distributed by category as follows in Table 3.11. 
The table illustrates that first of all, while the ratio of 
implementation in terms of number is reasonable at 43%, it is less 
good in terms of capital (31.5%) Secondly, the annual average rate 
of capital actually invested is, indeed, insubstantial. It accounted 
for some fE 176mn per annum, and of this more than 60% is invested 
by Egyptians. (See below). 
In this respect, it will be interesting to break down this general 
position about implementation into sectors. Capital financing and 
service projects represent by far the most sizeable amount of capital 
implemented, capturing more than two-thirds of the total. 
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TABlE 3.10 
Geographical Distribution of Pr<ijects Approved to Work in Egypt up to 31-12-1982 in Tenns of Percentage 
cairo Giza Alexandria Suez canal LOttEr Egypt Upper Egypt The 10th Other Areas Total 
Area Ranadan 
Sector Ci1(y 
" 
\" 
" 
U 1'\1 \" 1'( ~ 1'\1 U III I" N \" 11 I" 1'( \,; 
A) Finances & Services 
60 00 13 ~lqriRJ ~ Co. 5.5 3 1 3 1 3 0.6 2 0.8 - - 16 16.5 100 100 
Bai1<~ 64 78 6 3 2.5 4 6 3 10 8 9 4 - - ~ 0.2 100 100 Tounsn 44 44 24 18 10 14.5 3 3 - - 11 19 - - 2 100 100 
Tranmtion 28.5 57 9.5 7 33 13 19 20 - - - - - - 9.5 2 100 100 Heal & Hospitals 60 00 28 18 12 2 - - - - - - - - - - 100 100 Services 33 22 20 7 18 66 9 3 9 1 2 0.2 - - 9 0.8 100 100 
-
IUI"- 0.;) 00 J.O 0 0 :7 .. ~ .. ~ 0 ':) - - ~v 0 J.uu J.uu 
! 
Bj ~ & _1 Wea11t1 Co. 2 4 20 10 15 10 10 19 33 40 15 15 - - 4.5 2 100 100' CHoosing 7.5 83.5 17 11 6 4 1.5 1 - - - - - - - - 100 100' 
o ConstrUcti (J'1 Co. - - - - - - - - - - - - 100 100 100 100 
E Consul~ 76 81 17 16 - - - - 3 2 - - - - 3 0.7 100 100 
.-' 
- - - -IVI"- c."t .,7<J.o .U 0 u ~ .oJ 7 .LV ~o "t ;,) - - .. .L ~~.o .LVV .LVV 
F) InclJstrial Projects 
29 11 24 Textiles 6 11 43 3 15 19 11.5 - - 9.5 10.5 3 10.5 100 100 
Food 12 12 17 9 16 12.5 4 4 35 23 3 2 5 17.5 6.5 19.5 100 100 
Olanicals 29.5 19 23 10 7 2.5 1 34 19 9 1 23 14 8.5 4.5 2.5 100 100 \tbod 35 12 6 17.5 24 - - 12 19 - - 17.5 36 6 2.5 100 100 
E ineeri 22 17 20 9 10 4.5 S·5 7 8 2 - - 22 41 15 19 100 100 8u~ldiOO ~teria 1 s 18 12 17 8 9 6.5 6 14 11 6 3.5 18 22 9 29 100 100 
fet!tal IfIdu$tries 28 8 ~ 6 5 50 7.5 4 l~ 19 - - 1~ 6 ~.5 6 100 100 Phannaceutl cal s 23 12 10 15 9.5 7.5 :1).5 4 7.5 2.5 .5 18 .5 13 100 100 Mi· 14 0.6 - - - - - - - - 43 9 - - 43 8 100 100 OifRJ 40 66 - - - - - - - - 20 4.5 - - 40 29 100 100 
-.- -
,- .. 
-
II>. .~ 
IVlr c...J ~c. ~:7 v ~v ~"t "t ~o ~:7 ~~ .oJ -w .L.J ~o 0 ~c. .LUU J.w 
-
~~ r . 
-
. ~ 
\2V'IWJ I V 1"- .JJ "to.o -.10 0 0 ~v .. 'O~"O ~~ u .. u.;,) -0- "t.0I I~U.OI :7 ~vv .LVV 
, -
saRCE: calculated fran Tci>le 12 of G.A.F.1. Arrual Report 1983. 
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TABLE 3.11 
Total Approved Projects Which Started Operation up to 31-12-82 
Number Capital Investment Costs 
% % % %%- 1 ---% 
N I (l) (2) V {3} {4} V {5} 1 (6) 
1 
A) Industrial Projects 1 220 46 1 40 310 524 22 19.5 598 751 14 24.5 
B) Financial and Service Projects 214 44.51 39 1 087 554 36 68.5 1 389 166 36 57.5 
C) Agricultural Projects 29 33 5 107 976 51 7 221 550 46 9 
D) Construction Projects 89 42 16 76 448 20 5 206 588 24 8.5 
SOURCE: G.A.F.I., 1983 
r 
TOTAL I 552 I 43 I 100 I 1 582 502 I 31.51 100 1 2 416 055 1 25 100 
1 
(I, 3, 5,) represent a percentage of total approved projects in terms of 
number, capital and investment costs in order in the same category. 
(2, 4, 6) represent a percentage of total implemented projects in the same 
order. . 
N = Number of Projects 
V = Value of Capital and of investment costs 
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Industrial sector projects' capital accounted for less than one-fifth 
of total capital invested and was equivalent to 28% of the capital 
invested in the finance and service sector. As for agricultural 
projects, their share of capital invested (7%) was rather insignificant 
as was that of construction (5%). 
This structure of capital invested, biased towards the finance and 
service sector, reveals in fact, the conflict between the interests 
of foreign investment sector projects and the priorities of the 
country. The priorities of this sector, in this way, did not satisfy 
the aspirations of the Egyptians and fell short of the expectations 
of the government. A country like Egypt, as emphasized many times 
by the authorities, has followed the new policy in order to 
industrialize the country and overcome its major crises which have 
been mentioned above. In this respect the striking example of the 
conflict between the interests is that about 68.5% of total implemented 
capital biased finance and service projects whilst the industrial 
sector captured a small ratio. 
It is self-evident then that foreign investors favour fields that 
generate high and quick profits without significant risks. American 
Express Bank, for instance, started operation in 1975 with $2,500 
mn and by the end of 1981 it transmitted about $7mn as net profits. 
This means that this bank was able in such a limited time to repatriate 
nearly three times its capital. The same behaviour was traced more 
or less for other foreign banks operating under Law 43 (1) (Al-Ahali, 
1984:8). This raises three issues. First of all, the nature of these 
(1) See: Atif, 1981:217. 
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banks' transactions, i.e. financing industrial projects and long or 
short-term loans; secondly, sources of these banks' finance i.e. 
foreign sources from the home country, from international markets 
or from internal sources, thirdly, that these foreign banks, instead 
of financing domestic development, are siphoning the capital out of 
the country to finance their operations elsewhere. 
In brief, it was noted that foreign and joint-venture banks preferred 
to give credit to short-run commercial transactions that generate 
quick profits. In addition, they concentrated on financing imports. 
As a result, they contributed partially to the large increase of the 
number of commercial agencies to about a one-thousand representing 
about 2600 giant companies in Western Europe and the U.S.A. (Abdel-
Khalek, 1981:407; Shafik, 1983:26). 
This behaviour might find some explanation in the theoretical argument 
that foreign investors are usually keen to maximize their returns 
from their involvement in foreign markets. 
Turning in more detail to the industrial sector in particular it may 
be worth noting the structure of implemented projects in this sector. 
Within it, the ratio of implementation varies from one industry to 
another according to the factors mentioned above. In this connection, 
as indicated in Table 3.12 the petroleum industry occupies first place 
in both number and capital in the percentage of total approved projects 
in the industry, with 100% of approved projects implemented. This 
high ratio in fact could be ascribed to the relatively limited number 
of projects approved in the petroleum industry. In addition, there 
has been a continuous encouragement on the side of the governments 
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towards projects in this field in order to extract more oil, and hence 
increase exports and foreign exchange. 
As for the consumption industries, shown in the same table, their 
rate of implementation within the category is high to rank the second. 
Such a position is mainly owing to the low average amount of capital 
per project fE 1,574.0 in textiles and other industries such as food. 
Therefore the highest ratio of implementation was to be found in wood, 
textiles, food and pharmaceuticals in that order. 
The striking phenomenon is the high ratio of completed projects that 
started production in the chemical industries. Projects in this field 
represent 28% and 25% of total implemented number and capital 
respectively in all the industrial sectors. Such a unique situation 
could be explained by the fact that chemical products are of increasing 
importance as inputs in many other industries. It could be attributed, 
further, to the urgent need for fertilizers and pesticides, for 
agriculture. Again, in the intermediate category of industries, it 
was found that their implementation ratio within the same category 
is relatively low. This is because that implemented projects are 
those with limited capital needs compared to the other ones. This 
might be deduced from Table 3.12 where the percentage of implemented 
projects in terms of number was 57.6% while in terms of capital it 
was 0.18%. 
In the engineering industries, the share of actual invested capital 
is low taken either as a percentage of total approved capital within 
this category or as a percentage of total implemented capital. 
Moreover, engineering implemented projects are characterized mostly 
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TABLE 3.12 
Implemented Industrial Projects by Sector and Industry up to 31-12-1982 
(000) 
No. of Proj ects Capital Investment Cost 
11 10 
(1) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5) (6 ) (7) 
1) Spinning and Weaving Industries 37 59.6 16.8 58 238 32.2 18.7 122 120 
2) Food industries 37 40.2 16.8 58 314 31.7 18.7 142 139 
3) Wood Industries 8 47 3.6 9 447 34.3 3 17 089 
4) Phanmaceutical Industries 3 23 1.3 3 943 10 1.2 5 221 
Total of Consumption Industries 65 46.2 38.6 129 942 30.1 41.8 286 569 
1) Chemical Industries 62 57.4 28.1 77 324 0.18 24.9 131 806 
2) Building Material 20 25.9 9.0 31 554 12.4 10.1 63 512 
3) Metalurgical Industries 21 53.8 9.5 27 962 28.0 9.0 43 480 
4) Mining Industries 2 28.5 0.9 1 444 4.8 0.5 3 024 
Total of Intenmediate Industries 105 45.4 47.7 138 284 17.2 44.5 241 822 
Engineering Industries 25 42.3 11.3 27 964 18.7 9.0 40 486 
Petroleum Industries 5 100 2.3 14 334 100 4.6 29 874 
Total 220 46 100 310 524 19.5 100 59 875 
-
Calculated from date provided by the Authority of foreign investment and free zones. 
III the proportion of implemented projects to the total approved projects within the same industry. the proportion of implemented proJects to the total implemented projects in the industrial sector. the proportion of implemented proJects capital to the total withln the same industry. the proportlon of imDlement1ed p'rOJ~cts caplt~l to the total implemented capital in Lhe industrial 
sector and the same for (8 an~ (9) for the lnvestment costs. 
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/0 
(8 ) (9 ) I 
16.4 20.3 
29.5 23.7 
34.3 2.8 
6.7 0.8 I 
21.2 47.8 I 
10.3 22.0 
9.4 10.6 
8.5 7.2 
3.6 0.5 
24.8 40.3 
11.3 6.7 
100 4.9 
11.3 100 
by being relatively simple, for example razors, gear boxes, and 
refrigerators, as we shall illustrate in Chapters 5 and 6. 
3.2.2.2 E!ploy!ent and Production. 
It may be useful to note briefly the effects of the foreign investment 
sector on employment and production in the Egyptian economy. According 
to GAFI, total approved projects were supposed to provide some 200,820 
job opportunities up to the end of 1982. Nonetheless, the implemented 
projects created only about 72,495 jobs (GAFI, 1983: Table 3), 36~ 
of the targeted goal. Furthennore, this contribution amounted only 
to 0.6' of the total labour force of 12.5mn in Egypt (NBE, 1983:Table 
6/5). 
The industrial sector's share in this total accounted for about 29291 
opportunities i.e 41~ which appears to be poor compared to the actual 
labour force in this sector (1,514, 2). where the foreign investment 
projects contribution was only 1.9'. (NBE, 1983: Table 6/5a). The 
construction and agriculture projects besides the finance and service 
projects, provided the rest of the total of about 42,168 jobs i.e. 
58.91. This limited participation in solving unemployment raises 
some worries about the potential role that foreign sectors are going 
to pl~ in this economy in the future, especially as the tendency 
is to give the market mechanism the upper hand. These worries may 
be justified in the light of what is seen that firms working in the 
OFI sector are inclined to use capital-intensive technology as will 
be illustrated in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Such a limited contribution is not in fact confined to employment 
but it is also clear regarding production as indicated 1n Table 3.13. 
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This table maps the actual distribution of production and services 
by projects working under Law 43 of 1974. It reveals that the total 
output of goods and services was £E 1.316.084mn up to the end of 1982. 
This figure means that the actual addition to production and services 
by these projects fell short of the targeted goal by 76~, where it 
was expected that by this date that the contribution would be about 
£E 5.S00.423mn. Moreover, the actual production amounted to 6.7~ 
of GDP in the same period (GAFI, 1983:5). 
The industrial sector's contribution in this regard was about SO~ 
of the total, which represented about 7~ of the total national 
industrial production (£E 9.494.0mn) by 1981/82 (Ministry of Planning, 
1983:1-S). The question of the kind of production and the extent 
of its relevance to the needs of the masses of population will be 
the subject of a detailed analysis in Chapter 5.6. 
3.2.2.3 Net Foreign Capital Inflow Into the Egyptian Econ~. 
In the previous part we have presented the broad outline of direct 
foreign investment sector projects both foreign and local. But in 
this subsection, we shall concentrate the relative weight of foreign 
participation. The aim behind that is first, to see to what extent 
the inflow of foreign investment is coincident with the aspirations 
of the government. Secondly, such foreign capital especially from 
market economies represents the main source of technology. 
In this regard, the foreign capital contribution indicators are based 
on their share in total approved capital and not by the actual 
investment. This is owing to the absence of a distribution of 
implemented projects by source. So, the distributional structure 
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TABLE 3.13 
Estimated Production and Services by Operating Firms up to 31-12-1982 
Sector 
Financial and Service Projects 
Construction Projects 
Industrial Projects 
Agricultural and Animal Wealth Projects 
Total 
SOURCE: GAFI, 1983. 
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(000) 
Total 
Value of % of 
Production total 
300 002 23 
245 496 18.5 
663 939 50.5 
103 647 8 
1 316 084 100 
by country participation as represented in Table 3.14 shows that 
Egyptian capital dominates the foreign investment sector. This 
domination reaches its peak in sectors such as agriculture and animal 
husbandry with 4/5; construction with three-quarters; industrial 
projects little less three-quarters and financial and service projects 
with less over half of the total potential contribution. Regarding 
Egyptian capital, it might take the form of wholly local owned projects 
and/or jOint ventures with foreign firms at different degrees of 
ownership. 
In addition, according to Table (3.14) foreign sources of capital 
taken together amounted to fE 1,931,806 m by the end of 1982. Arab 
capital comprised 58.5~ of all the external sources and less than 
half of the foreign capital was divided between many sources such 
as E.E.C. countries with if 271,247 (14~); the U.S.A. fE 205,692 
(10.5%) and other countries with some fE 326,272 (17~) of the total. 
In fact this limited potential contribution could actually be smaller, 
taking into account the low rate of implementation as seen above. 
And, these findings coincide with what has been argued in the economic 
literature that the TNCs are keen to depend on local sources and 
reluctant to depend on their own finance for investment in developing 
countries: 
II MNCs, have rarely been great foreign investors 
of their own capital in developing countries ll • 
(Franko, 1977:19). 
As far as the foreign capital contribution by category is concerned, 
U.S. capital, as in Table 3.15, was found to be biased towards 
financial and service projects with a little less than three-quarters 
of the total American contribution while industry took second place. 
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TABlE 3.14 
Contribution by State in the Projects Approved to Work in Egypt up to 31-12-82 
(OO)) 
r I r---------~ ---- I - -T-- -. 
1 1 EGYPT 1 AAN3 STATES U.S.A. 1 LLC. 1 OTHERS 1 TarAL 
Sector 1 States 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 I I I I I I I I 
1 1.fE 1 % 1 .fE 1 % .fE 1 % 1.fE % 1 .fE 1 % I .fE % 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r------- Ir r--- ---- I T--~ -r I -~-l 
- Financial & 1 _ _ _ _ _ __ 
Service I 1 631 677 I 54 939 658 I 31 I 149 364 I 5 92 axi I 3 215 676 I 7 I 3 031 581 100 
PrQjects 1 
I 
- Industrial I _ 
PrQjects I 1 (Xl) a;a I 72 111251 8 46 601 3 147 630 11 89 423 6 1 395 773 100 
1 
- Agriwltural &1 _ 
Animal Wealth 1 170 128 I 00 17 878 8 6598 4 8507 4 9 472 4 212 583 100 
Projects I 
I 
- CoostnJctioo 1 _ 
PrQject 1 277 532 I 74.5 59aB 16 3129 1 19~ 3.5 11 701 3 372 074 100 
1 
I I I 1 1 1 I I I I 
TarAt. I 3 (B) ali I 61.5 I 1 128 595 I 22.5 I aJ5 692 I 4 271 247 I 5 326 272 I 7 I 5 012 011 I 100 
I I I I I I I I I I 
~: Galwlated fran IlBterial provided by G.A.F .1., 1!m. 
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TABLE 3.15 
Direction of Foreign Capital by Sector up to 31-12-1982 
(000) 
1 
1 EGYPT ARAB STATES U.S.A. LLC. OTHERS TOTAL 
Sector I States 1 
1 
1 iE ~ iE ~ £E ~ £E ~ £E ~ £E ~ 
1 
i 
- Financial & 1 
Servi ce 1 1 631 677 I 53 939 658 I 83 149 364 I 72.5 I 95 206 I 35 215 676 I 66 I 3 031 581 I 60.5 
Finns 1 
1 
- Construction &1 
H ousi ng 
Projects 277 532 9 59 808 5 3 129 1.5 19 904 7.5 I 11 701 I 3.6 I 372 074 I 7.5 
- Agricultural & 
Animal Wealth 170 128 5.5 17 878 1.5 6 598 3 8 507 3 9 472 I 3.0 I 212 583 I 4 
- Industrial 
Projects 1 000868 32.5 111 251 10.5 46 601 22.5 147 630 54.5 I 89 423 I 27.5 I 1 395 773 I 28 
TOTAL 3 080 205 100 1 128 595 100 205 692 100 271 247 100 326 272 I 100 5 012 011 I 100 
SOURCE: Calculated from material provided by G.A.F.I., 1983. 
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American capital might share other sources of capital this bias. 
Nonetheless the EEC capital tends to prefer industrial projects (54%) 
of its total approved capital. Such a general bias towards financial 
and service projects might find its explanation in the reasons 
mentioned above. 
The industrial sector, as shown in Table 3.16, is dominated by local 
capital with little less than three-quarters of the total capital 
approved in this sector. In this respect the Arab contribution was 
about 8% while the rest is from the EEC countries and the U.S.A. 
respectively. As indicated in the Table above, it was found that 
foreign capital's bias are different according to source. U.S. 
capital with its poor contribution to the industrial sector (3%) was 
found to be biased towards consumption industries' category. This 
is noticeable in textiles that captured about 71% of approved capital 
followed by pharmaceuticals with 18% and food and wood industries. 
This category is followed by intermediate industries which are 
dominated by building materials and chemicals with 55% and 40% of 
the total approved capital respectively in the same category. This 
is whilst the engineering industries category is ranked the third 
with a little less than one-quarter of American capital. 
As for the European capital, its priorities are different from the 
Americans. They prefer intermediate industries category that captured 
over 60% of their total approved capital. This category is dominated 
by chemicals with about half of all European capital. In addition 
the second difference from American capital is that engineering 
industries comes in the second place while the consumption industries' 
category ranks third with heavy emphasis on food and pharmaceuticals. 
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TABLE 3.16 
Participation of States In Projects Accepted to Operate as Inland Projects up the end of 1982, by Industry 
(000) 
EGYPT MN3 STATES U.S.A. E.E.C. OTI£RS TOTAL 
Sector States 
£E T T if T T fE T T fE T T if T 's' £E S 
Spinning & 
WeIlV I ng 116502 64.5 11.5 19 419 11 17.5 14250 8 30.5 2 325 1 1.5 28060 15 31 180 556 100 
Food Industries 144 988 79 14.5 15 038 8 1:5 .5 2 18' 1 4.5 9388 5 6.5 12 168 7 13.5 18' 765 100 
Wood Industries 20 902 76 2 4392 16 4 57 0.2 0.12 1 882 7 1 286 1 0.31 27 519 100 
Phllnllaceut I cal s 29 781 76 , 200 1 0.17 3 553 9 7.5 3004 7 2 2 768 7 3 39 306 100 
Total of 
Consumptions 312 173 72.5 31 39049 9.0 35 20 043 4.6 43 16599 4 11 43 282 10 48.5 431 146 100 
Chemical 
Industries 283 635 69.5 28 25 550 6 23 6 419 1.5 13.5 74033 18 50 27601 6.5 31 417 238 100 
.' BuIlding 
Materials 209 912 82.5 21 18558 7 16.5 8 849 3.5 19 12203 5 8 4 873 2 5.5 254 402 100 
Metallurgical 71 926 72 7 15 421 16 14 843 1 2 4 153 4 3 7 373 7 8 99 716 100 
Mining 29 125 98 3 442 1 0.4 
- - - - - -
241 1 0.25 29 808 100 
Total 
IntermedIates 594 605 74 59.5 59971 7.5 54 16 111 2.0 34.5 90 389 11 61 40088 5 45 801 164 100 
Eng I neer I ng 
Industries 92 003 62 9 12 231 8 11 10447 7 22.5 28 395 19 19 6053 4 6.5 149 129 100 
Petroleum 2 087 15 0.20 - - - - - - 12 247 85 8 - - - 14 334 100 
GRANO TOTAL 1 000 868 72 100 111 251 8 100 46601 3 100 147 630 11 100 89 423 6 100 1 395 773 100 
-- ---
SOURCE: Cal cu lated fran mater I al prov I ded by GAF " 1983 
(1 ) represents the percentll!Je share of each I ndustry by state. 
(2) represents the relative allocation of capital by state on different Industries. 
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Investment by other countries tends to be relatively balanced between 
the two main categories of consumer goods and intermediate industries. 
But its contributions to the engineering industries are limited. 
This broad issue will represent a subject of detailed analysis over 
the next chapters. 
3.2.2.4 P~ects Approved to Work 1n Free Zone Areas According to 
Law 43 of 1974: 
Egypt has established free zone areas in order to capitalize on its 
strategic geographical location. It, thus, can export to neighbouring 
Arab and Middle Eastern countries without high cost, and thus attract 
foreign capital, and skills and generate employment in such areas. 
In this respect, there are according to Law 43 of 1974 two types of 
free zones. The first is the so called 'Public Free Zone' (PFZ) 
which means 'the area decided by the Government which takes the 
responsibility of equipping it with the required infrastructure'. 
The second is the 'Private Free Zone' (PFZ), the area chosen freely 
by foreign investors who are responsible for equipping it with the 
necessary infrastructure (Atif, 1981:326). These latter areas might 
be created exclusively for a single project by a resolution of the 
competent board of the authority (Article 30 of Law 43). 
In order to achieve the previous objective, the Egyptian legislation 
granted projects operating in these areas many incentives such as 
exemption from custom duties on all instruments, machinery, equipment 
and transportation equipment necessary to the establishment of such 
projects. Goods or materials exported/imported into these areas should 
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not be subject to normal customs procedures. These are in addition 
to other incentives related to tax holidays, exemption of some other 
duties, income tax for expatriates and foreign exchange regulations 
(Law 43, Chapter 4, Articles 36,38,46,47,49). 
In consequence, there are some projects that have been approved to 
work within such areas as indicated in Table 3.17. It is clear from 
that table that these projects represented up to the end of 1982 about 
26% of the total approved capital and 22% of the whole number. In 
addition, the table outlines that despite the number of PFZ projects, 
their capital share declines to 16.6% of total approved capital in 
these areas. This contrasted pOSition might occur owing to what is 
mentioned above. that projects in the RFZ must provide the required 
infrastructure for their effective operations. 
As far as the implementation ratio is concerned, Table 3.17 clarifies 
the fact that projects in public free Zones have a higher ratio than 
those in private Zones. Although, there is a slight difference in 
implemented number, the ratio of implemented capital is much higher 
in the PFZ. This could be attributed to the relatively small amount 
of total capital approved to work in PFZ and the relatively large 
amount chanelled towards RFZ. 
Regarding the relative contribution by States as shown in Table 3.18, 
it is evident that the American and EEC positions have not shown 
significant change from what has been noted about their investment 
in inland projects. The significant change came just from the exchange 
of positions between Egyptian and Arab capital, where the Arab capital 
occupied the first place and the Egyptian second. 
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TABLE 3.17 
Total Projects Began to Work in Free Zones Areas u~ to 31-12-82 
(000) 
No. of Capital Investment Costs I Labour Wages 
Project 
Areas 
I 
N I ~ £E ~ if ~ N ~ iE ~ 
I 
i 
I 
Public Free Zones 207 I 69 159 149 64 208 679 80 6171 59 9 730 48 
I 
Private Free Zones 43 I 71.5 226 893 15 ~98 348 13 7 168 77.5 I 18 098 I 63 
I 
I 
i 
I 
TOTAL I 250 I 69 386 042 I 220 I 507 027 I 19 13 884 I 67 27 828 I 57 
I 
I 
SOURCE: Calculated from data provided by the G.A.F.I., 1983. 
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TABLE 3.18 
Approved Projects to Work In Free Zone Areas by States 31-12-82 
(000) 
1 
1 EGYPT ARABS U.S.A. E.E.C. OTHERS TOTAL 
1 I I 
1 1 1 1 I 1 
1 iE 1 % 1 iE 1 % iE 1 % N % I iE % iE % 
'-________ -'-___ _ L___ 1 L . I 
-I - 1--1 1-- 1 -----------T---I--~I 
I I I I I 1 I I 
Public Free Zones I 124 144 I 50 51 850 I 21 I 12 035 I 5 31 152 12 30 451 1 12 1 244 632 I 100 
1 I I I 1 1 1 1 I 
Private Free Zones 1 164 610 I 11 1 1 203 280 I 80 I 33 563 I 2 17 042 83 856 I 6 I 1 502 451 I 100 
I I 1 I 1 I I I I 
L_______ _ I t I I I I I I I l-l~-~I---~I--- - T r--- -- I I 
I I I I I I I I I I 
TOTAL 288 754 I 16 I 1 255 230 I 71 I 45 598 I 3 I 48 194 I 3 I 114 307 I 7 I 1 752 083 I 100 
I I I I I I I I I I I 
"----_~l _ __L_ I I I I ____ .J ______ J I I I 
SO~CE: G.A.F .1 •• 1983. 
-172 -
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was describe the characteristics of the 
industrial sector of the Egyptian economy. There have been many 
attempts to industrialize Egypt that emerged from necessity generated 
by population growth pressure and the relatively poor natural resources 
endowment of the country. Although, these attempts go back to the 
early years of the last century, the most significant push came with 
1952 Revolution. Successive governments since that date have given 
industry first priority, albeit under different policies. There was 
some mild intervention from 1952-1956, with government participation 
in some projects side by side with the encouragement of both foreign 
and local private capital. 
After 1956, the Egyptian government decided that it was of crucial 
importance to intervene more and plan for the country's industrial 
development in order to lessen the dependence on external sources 
for its industrial needs. So there was Egyptianization of some foreign 
interests, as a response to the 1956 war and so that the government 
could turn the economy away from the foreign influence. Moreover, 
there was the 1957 programme, that was followed by the First Five 
Year comprehensive plan from 1960-1965. This plan was characterised 
by: 
(i) the concentration on industry in general and within that section 
on heavy and capital-intensive industries such as chemicals, 
and iron and steel, 
(ii) the emphasis placed on both capital and intermediate goods. 
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(iii) the dependence on foreign sources not only for finance but 
also for technology. 
It was hoped that the country could diversify its economy in general 
and industry in particular. So, the share of industry in GOP was 
increased and the industrial exports rose. Yet, a lesson that should 
be learnt from this experience is that the more a country depends 
upon foreign sources, the more vulnerable it would be. This 
became apparent in Egypt's case when the U.S.A. cut off aid, which 
had a detrimental effect on the economy. Moreover, 1967 came to add 
to the problems of the country that of scarce foreign exchange. 
So, the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's the economy 
was in a critical situation. 
To some extent this situation became the reason for the adoption of 
the OOEP in 1974. This argument was based on the ground that OFI 
would bring in capital technology, skills, create employment, and 
ease the problems of the balance of p~nts. Still the rationale 
behind this policy is a matter of controversy. Nevertheless, the 
early impact of OFI under this new policy could be summarised as 
follows: 
(i) Foreign capitals' response to the OOEP has been really far 
from satisfactory. Foreign capital contribution was 4' by 
the U.S.A., 5' by the EEC countries and 7' by other countries 
of the total approved capital. And even worse was the situation 
in industry, especially for the American capital that 
represented about 3' of the total approved capital in this 
sector, and was biased towards financial and service projects. 
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(ii) As far as the implementation ratio is concerned it was modest. 
It was less than one-third of the total approved capital, 
and particularly evident in agriculture, construction and 
industry, where DFI accounted for less than one-fifth of the 
total implemented capital and slightly over the same proportion 
of capital accepted in this sector. 
(iii) The projects' structural distribution tended to be unbalanced 
geographically, favouring big urban markets. 
(iv) Finally, the impact of the DFI in Egypt up to December 1982 
in employment, capital inflow, and on the balance of payments 
is not encouraging. 
Given this perfonmance we are prompted to ask whether DFI in general 
and TNCs in particular will perfonm any differently in respect of 
technology transfer. This question will be the subject of study 
over the remainder of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The National Policy, Context and the Transfer of Technology to Egypt 
It has been noted in Chapter Two above, that the effective transfer 
of technology to developing countries depends on the transnational 
corporations' strategies and the policies adopted by these countries. 
In this respect, it is clear that countries which adopted definite 
policies related to the transfer of technology have achieved relative 
success compared with the others which have not. 
The existence of clear and determined policies is crucial. This 
emerges from the position of both TNCs and developing countries in 
the technology market as explained in Chapter Two. These companies 
monopolize the processes of innovation, R&D patents and hence 
technology commercialization. In the meantime, the recipient 
developing economies, mostly lack the primary technological 
infrastructure and hence need to import almost all their needs. 
In such a situation, these countries need policies that serve to 
capture the maximum benefits of technology transactions. These 
policies could be related to regulations, dealings with the suppliers, 
including the TNCs, for protecting local R&D. They could be policies 
related to the patent system, the invitation to foreign capital, the 
industrial dynamism as a whole, local skills and training (1). 
(1) For detail about the effectiveness of government intervention 
see Denison & Chung, 1976: 82-83; Lall, 1975: 63; 1979: 81; 
1980: 42; Kojima, 1978: 10; Pozanski, 1984: 144; UNIDO, 1981: 
20; Hope, 1983: 395; Hass, 1980: 542; Felix, 1974: 237; 
Newfarmer, 1984: 193; Sutcliffe, 1975: 190. 
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In the case of Egypt, the process of technology transfer is not a new 
phenomenon. In the first half of the last century the country aChieved 
relative success in this field, albeit unplanned. It experienced 
what the Japanese experienced more than 50 years later. Egypt sent 
missions to Europe and especially France in different scientific and 
engineering fields for training. Their number amounted during Alils 
era to about 321 (Issawi, 1954: 23). Egypt imported technology 
embodied in machinery and equipment and stripped it down in order 
to make copies and to acquire their informational secrets. In addition 
she established a capital-goods industry to manufacture spare parts 
and machinery especially in the textile industry. (Issawi, 1961: 
6). Moreover, the number of invited foreign experts totalled 10,000 
over the period 1805-1849 in different fields (El-Kholly, 1982: 10). 
These and similar efforts met almost all the needs of the local economy 
by that time. However, such efforts came to a halt because of foreign 
intervention as seen in Chapter Three. 
As we have already shown, Egypt after more than one hundred years, 
and especially by 1952, tried to industrialize its economy. It was, 
therefore, necessary to import foreign technology in addition to many 
other elements of production. Nevertheless the national attitude 
has not been consistent since then. It has changed according to the 
circumstances that the country witnessed over the 1950s, 1960s, and 
the 19705 as seen above in Chapter 3. The recent attitude is what 
is so called 'Infitah ' in which transfer of technology via OFI has 
been advocated as one of its two main pillars. 
Thus, it may be of interest to throw some light on some of the 
governmental policies and national contexts that might affect the 
ultimate outcome of OOEP in the technology transfer field. On the 
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national level, the concerned policies could be related to policies 
and strategy for technology transfer; development of human capital 
resources; national institutions for scientific and technological 
development; and legal frameworK, patent law, industrial development, 
and DFI policies. So, the analysis of this Chapter will deal with 
each of these issues in turn. 
4.2 Developient of Technology Transfer Policy 
Technological development in general and the transfer of technology 
in particular should ideally take place according to well established 
policies, that aim to achieve technological independence in the long 
run, minimize the costs incurred in the transfer of technology process. 
Egypt shares with most of the developing countries the absence of 
such policy or strategy. It has not in all its modern history laid 
down a long term strategy related to the technological development 
as an integrated part of economic and social development. As a result, 
Egypt has not experienced the mastery of technology, despite scattered 
efforts in some productive and scientific research units. 
Nevertheless, after realizing the losses suffered from such an approach 
the Government of Egypt has recently made tentative governments efforts 
to formulate a much desired policy. In 1983, the president of the 
Academy of Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT) promulgated decree 
No.lS in order to create working groups to achieve this end. These 
groups, as did many studies, embarked upon analysing and studying 
the experience of other developing countries such as India, the 
Philippines and Mexico. 
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Following these studies, they offered some recommendations that 
represent the basis for the suggested policy. These are: 
A) Organizing the transfer of technology from abroad. In this 
respect, the third group has put forward certain criteria 
concerned with the meaning of technology and the question of 
determining whether or not it has been transferred. It also, 
discussed the conditions of the process of transfer, in addition 
to the methods of settling conflicts that might arise. 
B) Strengthening the national technological capability. In 
connection with this point the group emphasized heavily the 
vital importance of the increase of the local technological 
participation side by side with the imported one; the support 
of local R&D efforts and the marketing of locally produced 
technology. 
C) In addition, the same group suggested the creation of a national 
agency whose main task would be to carry out the previous broad 
suggestions, harmonizing the different efforts by sub-committees 
working in this field and located in different ministries 
(ASRT, 1983: 48-61). 
However, despite what might be considered a positive step, and despite 
the expenditure of time, money and personnel, such recommendations 
have not yet materialized into a tangible, clear and well defined 
policy regarding the transfer of technology. Consequently, such a 
situation has cast some shadows over various elements of policies 
and attitudes that might affect the whole process in one way or 
another. 
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4.3 The Legal Fra.ework 
The existence of both a strategy and a legal framework to monitor the 
transfer of technology is crucial. The existence of policy without 
legislation to execute, results in merely theoretical slogans. 
However, the existence of legislation without strategy becomes of 
little importance, since the one often contradicts the other. In 
actual fact the second case is more likely to be found than the first. 
Moreover, the developing countries, almost lack both. Egypt's case 
offers no exception in this respect. 
This unfortunate condition prevails in Egypt despite the consensus that 
an effective transfer of technology depends, inter alia, on a definite 
and clear legal framework. Furthenmore, the nature of the technology 
market, as noted in Chapter 2, and the strong dominating position 
of the TNCs necessitates such legislation. It is important to avoid 
hindering restrictions on exports, tie-in clauses imposed on imports, 
excessive costs of personnel recruitment, and restrictions on the 
effective diffusion of imported technology, that might result in 
adverse effects on the economies of recipient countries. The existence 
of such legislation is important to protect the country against 
inappropriate technologies and products that lead to the misallocation 
of scarce resources. It is important to protect and strengthen local 
technological capabilities and to give them the chance to be improved 
and developed. 
In this respect UNCTAD suggested that: 
"Successful technological transfonmation in the long run depends 
crucially on the existence of an appropriate legal framework". 
(1983: 21) 
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Thus, the absence of such a legal framework in Egypt has resulted 
in what might be labelled 'technological chaos', since the process 
of importing technology has been left to be organised by the technology 
market mechanism noted above in chapter 2. So, it may be interesting 
to outline the situation in Egypt where the TNCs have been invited: 
(i) there is no technology registration system. 
(ii) restrictions have not received significant attention. 
Furthermore, tie-in clauses related to the supply of raw 
materials, intermediate products and capital goods have been 
generally warranted (UNCTAD, 1982: 51). 
(iii) the local investor is free to negotiate payment conditions with 
his foreign counterpart. In most cases the result is payment 
on a lump sum basis. In other cases, management fees and 
royalties are determined against agreed prices. This is, since 
some products are priced by the government. Nevertheless, 
this condition has been relaxed now under the ODEP (Al Shishini, 
1984: 108; UNCTAD, Ibid, 51). 
(iv) there is no systematic consultation between the relevant 
authorities and the local recipient of technology; in cases 
in which such consultation might take place, there is no 
scrutiny of imported technology in order to determine whether 
there is a local technology similar to it and hence there is 
a need to import or not; 
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(v) no serious attempts have taken place to adapt foreign imported 
technology in order to suit it to the local environment (UNCTAD, 
1980: 11, 13), 
(vi) agreements might cover patents, trademarks, or know-how singly 
or in a combination of these; 
(vii) the duration of such agreements has received little attention; 
they may last from 5 years to 10 years renewable year after 
year until terminated by either of the counterparts (Wahba, 
1983: 13). 
Such a situation would cost the country very dear bearing in mind the 
dynamics of the TNCs, the main supplier of technology. It might lead 
to the duplication of imported technology of the same kind; a long 
duration of agreements; the importing of obsolete know-how~ the mis-
allocation of local resources, and the suppression of potential local 
efforts to create similar technology. 
On the contrary, it is of interest to note that some developing 
countries have achieved a tangible relative success by intervening 
in the process of technology transfer. In Columbia, there was some 
40~ reduction in royalties as a result of such intervention (UNCTAD, 
1974: 29). In addition, it has been noted that countries that have 
achieved a relative success in the technology transfer field have 
practised some sort of organizing tough policy such as in Japan (Ohera, 
1981: 83-90). This does not mean that the legal framework is enough 
but it means that it is necessary. 
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Having realized this and in an attempt to catch up with these 
countries, Egypt's government in the last three years has formed some 
expert groups, as indicated above, in order to lay down the desired 
legislation. But despite the formulation of such a law, it has not 
yet been passed (Hilal, 1982: 5). 
4.4 The Patent System 
The question of patents in the process of teChnology transfer to 
developing countries has been thoroughly examined in the economic 
literature. (Vaitsos, 1976, 1974; Penrose, 1973, Fortner, 1977, 
UNCTAD, 1975). The common line of such studies is that patents in 
and of themselves are a poor mechanism in the transfer of technology. 
Egypt in common with many other developing countries signed the 
Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property in 1951. 
This initiative on the Egyptian government's part was made more 
for prestigious reasons and irrespective of the benefits that might 
accrue to the country from such adherence. It has also been a party 
to the Strasbourg agreement concerning patent classification since 
1977, and the Patent Co-operation Treaty. This is in addition to 
its membership of World Intellectual Property Organisation since 1975. 
(Wahba, 1982: 17). 
Thus, patents and industrial models in Egypt are regulated by Law 
No.132 of 1949 amended by Law No.65 of 1955. This law embraces some 
of the following relevant provisions. Invention patents are valid 
for 5 years following the application and renewable for another 5 
years. For chemical processes, including foodstuffs, medicines, 
pharmaceuticals they are renewable for longer. Patents or additions 
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are valid for the rest of the period granted to the main patent. 
The striking feature is that no examination of novelty is needed. It 
does not matter, therefore, if the invention has been used abroad for 
not more than fifty years. Such a Law indicates how far such law is 
compatible with the achievement of national interest! The passage of 
50 years or so on the application of an invention abroad makes it a 
free good. Thus, it might be commercially exploitable by locals 
without breaking the law and without the need for licensing and hence 
paying compensation for that. So, it is clear that the patentee in 
Egypt gets rights and privileges that he would not get if there was no 
such provision. There is thus no real opportunity for local capital to 
use the same processes, without being given a licence to do so by the 
owner of the process, i.e. by the competing TNC or TNC subsidiary. 
In addition to these features, the Egyptian law in article 30 validates 
compulsory licensing (1) in three cases: first of all, if the patent 
is not exploited for three years after its granting, secondly, if the 
patentee is not able to satisfy the needs of the country by using it, 
thirdly, and finally, if the patentee has not made use of the invention 
for two successive years. In fact this article is an application of 
article 5 (A) of the Paris convention (UNCTAD, 1975: 10-13). 
Moreover, Egyptian law warrants compulsory licensing in cases where 
there are strong relationships between the patents and the national 
interests such as in defence, public health, and national economy. 
This is where both the patentee and a potential exploiter fail to reach 
(1) Compulsory licensing means II ••• an authorization by an authority 
designed for this purpose (usually the competent administration 
or a court) to a person other than the patentee to do, without 
the authorization by the patentee, acts which would otherwise be 
excluded by the patent". (UNCTAD, 1975: 10). 
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an agreement for the exploitation of such patents. In this case, 
fair compensation is to be determined by the courts (Articles, 32, 
33). 
This law has resulted in a flow of applications for patents. Some 
of them have been approved and granted for both foreign and local 
applicants. Thus, the total number of granted patents as seen in 
table (4.1) amounted to about 11,279 out of 20,148 total applications 
over the period 1951 to 1981, i.e. about 56% of the total. 
Figures shown in this table, especially after 1969 when the 
classification of patents according to their sources took place, 
reveals that the average of granted patents for foreigners between 
1969 and 1980 is a relatively modest 347 a year; the average for locals 
over the same period was insignificiant. The behaviour of foreign 
patentee might find its interpretation partly in Egyptian laws, 
permitting registration of patents exploited abroad for about 50 years. 
Thus, the foreign inventor or innovator find it possible to come 
anytime within this period and take out patents. This means that 
foreign patentees appeal to the country often by the time in which 
their processes or products became standardized in order to monopolize 
the markets and achieve their other interests (see Chapter 2 above). 
The other feature that could be deduced from the previous table is 
that the rate of foreign requests has increased over the 1970s since 
the adoption of the OOEP. This might be explained by the fact that 
the local market has been opened not only for foreign investors but 
also for trade from different sources and of different types, 
especially from the North-West hemisphere of the globe. So, foreign 
firms in order to defend markets or to keep markets for their products 
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against competition from other sources are trying to take out patents 
as has occurred in the case of Egypt. 
Furthermore, the share of patents held by the Egyptians over the period 
1951-1981 represents a very tiny proportion of the total. Data 
provided by the ASRT indicates that the local patents accounted for 
(514) compared to (10,765) held by expatriates i.e. 4.5% and 95.5% 
of the total respectively. Such a situation makes it evident that 
the Egyptian patent law as in most of developing countries, protects 
the interests of foreign holders which are, almost always the TNCs. 
Worse still, the analysis of lists provided by the ASRT authorities 
shows that over the period 1951-1981 about 92% of local patents were 
held by individuals and only some 8% were held by companies (ASRT, 
1983: 109-119). Such a pattern, as noted by Penrose, in Chapter Two, 
throws serious doubts on the effective and beneficial use of these 
patents. 
In addition, the structural distribution of patents by field clarifies 
the fact that chemicals dominate the other types. Over the period 
1975-1982 about 1153 out of 3183 patents granted within this period 
were in the chemical field, with 36% of the total, followed by 
pharmaceuticals and cosmetics with 450 or 14%. Thus, chemical 
innovations in a broad sense represent about 50% of all patents during 
the same period. In contrast, the share of other important fields 
such as agriculture was negligible (1.4%) (ASRT, 1983: 47). So it 
is clear that patents are concentrated in fields and industrieswhere 
technologies are capital intensive and that enjoy a relatively high 
rate of change. Therefore, it is in the interests of innovators to 
perpetuate as long as they can their returns from their properties. 
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Ultimately, what is the contribution of patents and hence the patents 
law to the transfer of technology to Egypt? There are two sets of 
effects to assess: first, the direct effect of the exploitation of 
patents in Egypt by TNCs patentees; the second is the indirect effect 
of patents in generating information to local capital about the sources 
of the technology, the nature of the technologies with which they 
might be in competition. 
The first set of effects will be referred to in Chapter Five in the 
light of the findings of the survey. As for second set of effects 
the evidence is not favourable. 
In a study undertaken by the GOFI in 1982, it was found that: 
(i) The patent office did not contribute at all to providing 
surveyed public sector companies (30) with sources of technology 
or technological alternatives. 
(ii) In addition, all surveyed companies appealed to foreign sources 
for information and 33~ of them occasionally consulted local 
sources for this purpose, not including the patent office. 
(ASRT, 1983: 249). 
Furthermore, in an interview in the patent office, I was told that 
local businessmen did not bother to go to the office to use consultancy 
services. Even more there was a serious complaint that the local 
media do not recognize the office and has been invited many times 
to cover its conferences, but without response. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Reguests and Patents Granted in E9y~t Over the Period from 1951-1982 
(Nos. ) 
Year J Total Total Foreign Foreign Egypti an Egyptian 
Requests granted patents Requests Patents Requests Patents 
1951 1 196 
1952 408 9 
1953 421 79 
1954 444 143 
1955 471 75 
1956·; 49 249 
1957 435 28 
1958 476 157 
1959 586 240 
1960 664 196 
1961 1 382 245 
1962 606 508 
1963 754 71 
1964 792 1 111 
1965 770 857 
1966 766 817 
1967 743 920 
1968 657 610 
1969 697 249 632 236 65 13 
1970 551 249 494 239 57 1 
Cont'd ...• 
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TABLE 4.1 Cont'd 
Requests and Patents Granted in E9YEt Over the Period from 1951-1982 
(Nos. ) 
I 
I Year Total Total Foreign Foreign Egyptian Egyptian 
I Requests granted patents Requests Patents Requests Patents 
I 
I 
I 1971 556 159 490 157 66 I 2 
I 1972 549 253 485 242 64 I 11 
I 1973 490 373 433 364 57 I 9 
I 1974 592 398 538 376 58 I 22 
I 1975 775 397 714 381 61 I 16 
I 1976 805 527 757 511 48 I 16 
I 1977 728 513 670 490 58 I 23 
I 1978 752 515 675 495 77 I 2 
I 1979 784 376 723 370 61 I b 
I 1980 807 317 731 310 76 I 7 
I 1981 257 
I 1982 282 
I 
I 
I GRAND 
I TOTAL 20 148 11 279 7 342 4171 744 128 
I 
SOURCE: ASRT, 1983: 43. N.B. Statistics for 1981, 82 have been derived from separate paper without 
classification according to nationality which only started in 1969. 
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In conclusion it would seem that the patent law in Egypt in aiding 
the transfer of technology has no significant role to play. 
4.5 Developient of H~n Resources and Transfer of Technology 
A. Education 
Educational policy in developing countries is one of the most important 
determinants of the effectiveness of the transfer of technology. 
The adaptation, adjustment and reproduction of imported technology 
has implications for education and training (Callidos, 1984: 211). 
In addition as Solow noted, an effective exploitation and adaption 
of knowledge and information underlying advanced technology 
necessitates competent scientists, engineers and technicians who are 
familiar with the particular needs and circumstances of a low 
productivity society (1966: 92-93). See also, Callidos, Ibid, 216). 
In connection to this point Ranis argued further, that the Japanese 
exploitation of imported technology both in industry and agriculture 
would not take place without the existence of well-spread educational 
base, both general and technical. In addition, he extended this 
argument to include the case of the U.S.A. (1984: 99). In this respect 
one could argue that a broad educational base may, in general, reduce 
the social resistance to the introduction of new technology and make 
technology products more desired and tangible. 
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The contribution of education depends, inter alia, on certain variables 
that may differ according to the actual situation in each country. 
These major variables are educational opportunities for the mass of 
the population; and relative levels of expenditure on education. 
Much also depends on the nature of education, i.e. whether it is biased 
towards the academic and theoretical or towards the vocational and 
technical. Needless to say the way education is organized and how 
far it responds effectively to the requirements and priorities of 
the country's development has a significant part to play in this 
respect. 
Taking all these factors into account, one tends to deduce that 
developing countries, often, are in a weak situation. They, mostly, 
lack the majority of factors necessary for the development of human 
resources. Such a lack has had its effects on education and technology 
transfer. Tuma succinctly described the outcome of the educational 
process in these countries 
liThe university graduates and native technicians are trained 
simply to operate the imported machinery, to be caretakers and 
to depend on imports for spare parts and expertise to make sure 
the machines remain in operation (1983: 32). 
This situation, naturally, circumvents the desired contribution of 
education and isolates it from the actual needs of the country for 
absorption, adaptation and reproduction of imported technology, not 
to mention the innovation of production techniques that fit into 
the particular environment of these countries. 
Turning to Egypt, it was noted that the process of education hardly 
received any significant consideration during the occupation era. 
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So, by 1952, the number of illiterates amounted to over 81% of people 
of 15 years and above (UNESCO, 1963: 29). While this was the situation 
in Egypt in the early 1950s a country like Japan had achieved nearly 
universal literacy by 1935 (UNCTAD, 1983: 7). 
On the contrary, evidence in Egypt has been the subject of increasing 
concern since 1952. The government has adopted a philosophy based 
on broadening the educational base at all levels. Such a philosophy 
mirrors the desire to achieve equality and abolish class privilege. 
So, education was to be freed from the primary school to the 
university and to be expanded to rural areas. These tendencies 
resulted in the drop in the illiteracy rate from over 80% in the early 
1950s to 56% in 1976 (UNESCO, 1983: 1-16). Nevertheless, one m~ 
consider this percentage high, taking into account the aspirations 
of the country for technological and scientific transformation. 
Over the period from 1952 until the present there has been a 
significant transformation in the education system in Egypt. These 
changes are qualitative and quantitative as well. Regarding the latter 
aspect there is an increasing rate of enrolment at all levels. In 
the first level this ratio rose from 72~ in 1972 to 76% in 1980 for 
population aged 6-12 years. In the second level (12-18), the ratio 
increased from 55% to 64~ over the same period. In the meantime the 
ratio in the third level increased from 8~ in 1972 to 14.1% in 1980. 
(UNESCO, 1983: 111-112). 
These figures are of some Significance compared with figures from 
other developing countries. In Brazil, for instance, in 1980 the 
enrolment ratio at the third level accounted for 11.9%. In addition, 
the ratio of enrolment in Egypt is higher than that in Pakistan and 
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India at all levels. In contrast, compared with figures from the 
developed countries the Egyptian figures leave much to be desired. 
In the U.S.A. the enrolment ratio accounted for 99~ at 1st and 2nd 
levels and 57~ at the third level. 
The second main feature of Egypt's educational policy is that there 
has been a shift of emphasis away from general towards technical and 
vocational education in recent years. Since 1981, the emphasis has 
been put on providing technical culture and practice to students at 
the first level. Further this age group has been expanded to include 
children from 6 to 15 years instead of 6 to 12 years. 
As regards the second level, the bias towards technical and vocational 
education can be deduced from figures presented in Table 4.2. 
TABLE 4.2 
General and Vocational Education at the Second Level 
in Egypt in 1970 and 1980. 
I I 
YEAR T. NUMBER GENERAL I ~ VOCATIONAL I ~ (1) EDUCATION I 2/1 EDUCATION I 3/1 (2 ) I (3 ) I 
I 1 
I I 
1970 1 448 242 1 147 366 1 79 275 281 1 19 1 
1980 2 929 168 2 238 882 1 76 636 909 1 21.61 
I I I 
SOURCE: Calculated from UNESCO, 1983, table 1-16. 
N.B. the difference between the total numbers and the numbers in 
both general and vocational education has gone into teacher training. 
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The figures shown on the previous table outline the increasing shift 
in favour of technical and vocational education. At a time when 
there was a decreasing ratio of enrolment in general education, there 
was an increase in vocational training. This reveals that the 
absolute increase within the last category is higher than the similar 
rate in general education. It was 195% for the latter and 230~ for 
the former over the period 1970-80. 
With regard to the third level, as shown on table 4.3, it includes 
a sizeable number of students. It is clear also that it is dominated 
by the humanities such as social sCiences, education sciences, law, 
and commerce while the numbers of engineers, agriculturalists and 
other scientists have declined in recent years. Nevertheless, such 
figures compared with figures from some other developing countries 
are still encouraging. In India, for instance, the country that has 
the largest sizeable reservoir of engineers and technicians in the 
Third World, the ratio of engineers to the total number of students 
at the third level was 7.St in 1979, while it was about 10.5t in Egypt 
in 1980. In Egypt, in addition, there has been an increase in fields 
such as natural sCience, mathematics and computer science. 
Again, by comparison with developed countries, it becomes clear that 
there is a wide gap between what actually exists and what are the 
real development needs. For example, in Japan, the U.K. and the USSR, 
the proportion of engineers to the total number of students was 16.6t 
18.2t and 4S.6t respectively in 1980. 
In connection with education policy, there was for the first time 
a plan to send students abroad for training and in 1959/60 (Sabet, 
1978: 199-207). The purpose of such missions has always been to keep 
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TABLE 4.3 
Third Level Students by Field of Study in Egypt 
FIELD OF STUDY 
Education Science & Teacher Training 
Humanities, Religion & Theology 
Fine & Applied Arts 
Law 
Social & Behaviorial Science 
Commercial Business and Administration 
Mass Communication & Documentation 
Horne Econani cs 
Servi ce Trades 
Natural Science 
Mathematics & Computer Science 
Medical & Health Related Science 
Engineering 
Architecture & Town Planning 
Trade & Craft & Industrial Programmes 
Transport & Communications 
Argriculture, Forestry & Fishery 
Other and Not Specified 
TOTAL 
SOURCE: UNESCO, 1982, 11-334 for 1976 and 1978 figures and 
UNESCO, 1983, 11-282 for 1980 figures. 
-lq4- -
r-------r--------i 
I 1976 1978 1980 
I 
I 55 269 
55 265 
7 757 
45 479 
7 935 
10 285 
4 626 
2 025 
o 356 
16 687 
o 650 
52 193 
58 293 
46 596 
6 346 
462 328 
51 417 54 787 
61 560 72 903 
7 203 2 411 
55 642 64 123 
7 346 5 268 
112 563 120 887 
2 009 1 505 
1 850 1 553 
o 366 o 569 
18 979 22 990 
1 157 1 22b 
57 625 60 169 
18 979 22 990 
45 811 46 358 
5 543 4 796 1---
I 486 067 528 751 
I 
abreast of the latest developments in host countries in different 
fields. In so doing those who return might contribute to the transfer 
and diffusion of knowledge into their places of work either in 
universities or directly productive enterprises. 
This policy has contributed to the creation of a significant stock 
and of skills in this country. However, there is the accompanying 
problem of 'Brain Drain', a problem that represents a serious challenge 
to the efforts of the developing countries to transfer and develop 
technology. Its danger emerges from two sources. First, these 
countries lose gradually their best 'brains' which have the capability 
and the potentiality to assimilate, adapt, adjust and reproduce 
appropriate technology. Secondly, this problem has been increasing 
over time at an accelerating rate as in the case of Egypt below. 
In Egypt (1), the ratio of students who were officially sponsored and 
did not return over the period 1963-1972 amounted to 9~ (805 out of 
8,533). This ratio rose over the following six years to approach 
some 40~ (about 1.311 out of 3.284) (Ayubi, 1983: 436). 
In general, the rate of emigration accounted for some 3~ in the early 
1960s (Sabet, 1978: 210), it increased to its peak by the end of that 
decade to reach 51.5~. More serious is that needed scientists, 
engineers, physicians and university staff amounted to 70~ of all 
emigrants in the 1970s. Additionally, some 20~ of scientific personnel 
(1) It is in the case of Egypt difficult to estimate accurately 
the number of emigrants in tenms of permanent and temporary 
migration. This is since the statistics provided by official 
bodies are inadequate and inaccurate and tend to underestimate 
total number. So the figures above are a rough attempt 
to outline the size of problem in this country. 
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who work in research and supporting activities have left the country 
to work in European and Arab countries on both a permanent and 
temporary basis (2) (Ayubi, 1983: 436). 
In fact, this 'brain drain ' has been the outcome of a combination 
of factors: 
(i) The excess of graduates over the absorptive capacity of the 
local economy. In 1970 the number of engineers exceeded by 
three times the existing needs of the economy (Moore, 1980: 
46). This proportion was alleged to reach four times by 1980 
Ayubi 1983: 434). 
(ii) From the actual experiences, one could safely add the effect 
of recruitment policy. Many graduates get appointed in places 
or positions hardly related to what they have studied. In 
addition, the conditions of their work are relatively poor, in 
terms of low salaries, poor equipment and promotion system. 
(iii) One important point, often, overlooked by writers is the lack of 
moral and financial support and the recognition of the 
scientists class. The situation became clearer with the 
emergence of the new mercantile class accompanying the ODEP. 
Such factors have made the scientific class feel inferior and 
underestimated. 
(2) For detail see Kadhim, M., 1984, pp.21-53. 
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(iv) Finally, one of the streams that feed such a phenomenon is the 
absence of an organisational apparatus necessary to connect 
the requirements of social and economic development with other 
fields such as education. This throws serious doubt on the 
claim that the number of engineers exceeds the needs of the 
country, since the inability to use or employ the graduates 
properly and in appropriate jobs does not mean they are in 
excess of the country's requirements. 
So, the country, as a matter of fact, urgently needs to follow a 
coherent policy that links all national fields together. 
B. Vocational Training 
The emphasis put on training was in fact concomitant to that on 
education, especially in the late 1950s and the 1960s (1). With the 
big push policy for indusrialization, there has been a great tendency 
to set up training centres in order to provide the industrial sector 
with its requirements of skilled and semi-skilled workers (Shafik, 
1983: 15). Thus in September 1967, a central organization for 
training was established to organise the different activities of 
different institutes in co-operation with different ministries (Sabet, 
1978: 203). 
(1) Unfortunately, as a result of the lack of accurate figures 
or statistics and data about training schemes and their 
graduates by field, the above section will give merely a general 
idea. 
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In pursuance of this effort, the Plan of 1982-87 has come to revive 
the training process, especially after the serious shortage in some 
skills after the emigration to the Arab World. The plan referred 
to: 
(i) The adoption of modern technological applications via a widening 
education at all levels, giving special care to technical and 
industrial education and in particular, specialization in 
Engineering and technological science; 
(ii) The improvement in productivity by vocational training and 
through successive educational programmes for engineers and 
technicians (Ministry of Industry, 1983: 17). 
Thus, it is clear that the industrial programme of the 1982-1987 plan 
has clarified the close links between technological and industrial 
education. In addition it linked productivity and training, a 
tendency that coincides rightly with the aspirations of technological 
development of the country. Yet evidence on the actual application 
of such provisions has yet to be found. 
In brief, Egypt over the last 30 years or more has created a sizeable 
reservoir of qualified human resources both in qualitative and 
quantitative tenms. Nonetheless, although this reservoir is important 
it is not sufficient. it needs to be employed and its knowledge put 
into practice. 
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4.6 Research and Develo~nt 
The importance of R&D activities, in fact, emerges from their 
contribution to the establishment of a solid indigenous technological 
capability. This capability is crucial for the effective use, 
adjustment, adaptation, assimilation and hence the creation of 
appropriate technology for the specific economic and social environment 
in developing countries (Stewart, 1984: 81). In addition, the 
importance of such a capability emanates from the capacity of local 
skills to choose the suitable technology, since locally qualified 
experts might be able to know what the country·s particular conditions 
require and what they do not. In this connection they might be in 
a better position to negotiate for favourable terms, modest cost and 
effective transfer. Thus, in this respect, some have argued that 
scientific and technological institutions have a major effect on the 
process of technological change (Stewart, 1984: 90). These 
institutions, in addition to other research and development units, 
represent the natural base for upgrading the skills capable of 
accomplishing the previous tasks and which are able to master and 
diffuse imported technology to other undertakings and thereby reduce 
the absolute dependence on foreign sources for not only technological 
elements but also the ability to use them (Westphal, et al, 1984: 
295). 
The efficiency of such institutions and units depends, inter alia, 
on factors such as the nature of the research tackled within them, 
i.e. whether it is applied, experimental research or of a basic nature, 
as defined in Chapter Two; the size of resources devoted to this field 
in terms of qualified staff of engineers scientists and supporting 
tasks, equipment necessary for effective R&D and equally important 
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the financial expenditure. This efficiency depends heavily on the 
organization that links such activities to the requirements of the 
economic sectors and to harmony between the activities of different 
units to avoid duplication and waste of their resources. 
As far as Egypt is concerned in this regard, the government has not 
spared any efforts to set up scientific research units and 
institutions, since the middle of the 1950s. In 1956, the National 
Research Centre (NRC) was established. It has a relatively well 
qualified staff of some 1,600. A significant portion of the staff 
(40%) hold Ph.D Degrees and the rest have a bachelor degree at least. 
In 1961, a Ministry of scientific research was created in order to 
put into action a plan for scientific research over the period 1960-
1965. But, this plan was to come to a halt as a result of many 
obstacles, mainly the shortages of financial resources (Sabet, 1978: 
190-194). 
Nonetheless, many universities have started their own research units, 
in addition to many others in different Ministries. Thus, the 
apparatus of scientific and technological research in Egypt was large 
enough at the beginning of the 1970, to break down into 260 units. 
which are staffed with some 22,500 holders of Ph.D and M.Sc degrees 
(Wahba, 1982: 10). Moreover, in 1971, the presidential decree number 
2405 proclaimed the establishment of the Academy of SCientific Research 
and Technology (ASRT). It now stands as a nucleus to which most 
research institutions are affiliated. 
In addition, it includes about 16 specialised departments representing 
different fields, which are not affiliated to it. The Academy aims 
at bridging the gap between research units and the productive fields. 
- 200 -
So, it necessitates the shift from basic and laboratory research to 
the experimental type. Thus, in the early 1980s some 60% of research 
projects were customer oriented with a long-run objective of 
approaching 90% (UNCTAD, 1980:17). 
In the same time, the General Organisation for industrialisation (GOFI) 
has a promising potential in this respect. It has a sizable staff 
of engineers and technicians, in addition to the Engineering and 
Industrial Design Development Centre (EIDDC). This centre has great 
potential to offer regarding the transfer and adoption of technology. 
It employs some 400 staff of which one-third are engineers and 
draftsmen. This centre tackles some highly technical functions such 
as: 
(i) Product design and development such as plugs, switches, heaters 
and electric fans etc. 
(ii) Processing and capital goods equipment design such as machine 
tools and spare parts for textile machinery and so forth. 
(iii) Process design 
(iv) Training. (UNCTAD, 1980:20) 
Thus, is it clear that Egypt, over a relatively short time has 
established a sizeable apparatus of scientific research institutions 
and units. However, they have been working under conditions that 
make their outcome less tangible. These conditions are due, mainly 
to the fact that: 
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(i) These institutions have been suffering from the lack of co-
ordination between them, a situation that has resulted in a 
duplication of research and hence a waste of their rare 
financial resources, not to mention the time and personnel 
effort. 
(ii) Research at most of these institutions has been biased towards a 
basic kind of research, which is a poor copy of what had been 
done in the advanced countries and has little economic 
significance to the urgent needs of the local economy. In 
this connection Rosenberg commented that: 
"It is not ••• scientific knowledge which is ultimately 
valued in the economic sphere but, rather knowledge in 
a form which is directly applicable to the productive 
activity (1976:65).11 
(iii) Financial resources devoted to R&D activities in this country, 
as in most of the developing countries, are meagre. They 
accounted for O.8~ of GNP in 1977 compared to 2.4~, 2t and 2~ 
for the U.S.A., the U.K. and Japan respectively (UNESCO, 1977, 
tables 5-1,5-3 and ASRT, 1983: 27-28,51). So, provided that 
all the other conditions are well organized, it is beyond doubt 
that such resources in Egypt are far behind the needs of the 
country in its pursuit of technological and scientific 
development. 
(iv) In addition, the major problem comes from the non-existence 
of an efficient organisation necessary to make such apparatus 
respond effectively to the needs of the economy. There are 
no systematic relations between the two fields, since each 
has its own world. This situation makes one wonder how 
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the outcome, albeit limited, of R&D efforts would spillover 
into the economy. 
Charles Cooper has noted the likely results of the alienation of 
R&D units from the rest of the economy thus: 
(i) scientific and tehnological work is unlikely to be related 
to the practical needs of the economy; 
(ii) the organisation of these activities are likely to be obstacles 
to the development of local capabilities; 
(iii) scientists, and engineers have no definite and clear idea about 
what they have to produce; 
(iv) duplication of licences from abroad for the same sort of 
technology in the country will occur and thereby the 
marginalization of science and technology in the country 
(Cooper, 1980:10). 
This situation, in fact, could result in distrust between local 
businessmen and the local R&D units and might enhance the dependence 
on foreign supplies. This situation prevails in Egypt as we shall 
indicate in chapter 6, even for research that could be undertaken 
locally. Not only that, but such a situation throws serious and grave 
doubts on the possibility of co-operation between these units and 
the TNCs, in the field of technology transfer and its adaptations. 
In order to rectify this situation the ASRT has created a committee 
for the transfer and development of technology. The functions of this 
committee can be summarized as follows: 
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A) with the regard to the transfer of technology, it has to identify 
the technological requirements of the country and formulate an optimum 
contract for their transfer taking into account all aspects of 
transfer. 
B) As for the development of technology, it aims to strengthen 
R&D efforts, and to co-ordinate between R&D units and productive 
activities. It also aims at the diffusion of technology throughout 
the economy (UNCTAD, 1980:22). 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that a committee of this kind 
would work effectively in the absence of a definite strategy or policy, 
or even a law that put down the broad lines to be followed. So, its 
work has no practical base at all. The situation makes it just a 
new body to be added to the existing complex. 
In connection with this issue, the Egyptian government has made many 
scientific agreements with both developed and developing countries 
from the West and the East. But as Sabet noted, such agreements have 
very little to do with the transfer of technology, since they just 
express, in most cases, the friendly relations between the two 
countries (Sabet, 1978:216-17). In this respect, an agreement was 
held by the ASRT and the American Agency for International Development. 
This convention was to be implemented on two stages: the first from 
1977-80, and the second from 1980-83, with a total American finance 
of $24.4mn. Its main purpose is the concentration on the re-
orientation of research in favour of the applied kind and technological 
and vocational training (Ministry of Industry, 1983:19) 
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To conclude, although Egypt has built up an immense apparatus of 
scientific and technological institutions, significantly better than 
many other developing countries, their effect on the economy is still 
to be seen. 
4.7 Industrial Developlent Polisr 
Egyptian leaders have not spared time to industrialize the country. 
Thus many industries have taken place over the 1950s and the 1960s. 
The policy that experienced many crises, as above, that resulted in 
the establishment of many industries rather than an intergrated 
industrial system. So, the country over that time had to depend 
heavily on foreign sources for hard and soft technology elements, 
in addition to the critical requirements of raw materials and 
intermediate inputs. It is such a dependence that has made the 
dynamism of the industrialization process depend upon exogenous sources 
and hence become vulnerable to any changes that might be made outside 
the country. 
By 1974, a real shift in industrial policy took place as a part of 
the overall economic policy. So the main aim of industrial investment 
has shifted from the emphasis on heavy and basic industries in the 
1960s to consumption industries and infrastructure (GAFI, 1982:11). 
The natural corollary of such a shift is the reduction in the limited 
backward and forward linkage that existed throughout the 1960s. And 
it results in the economy turning to foreign sources for almost the 
largest part of its industrialization requirements. So, the industrial 
sector in Egypt has become, as we shall see in chapter 6, a consumption 
sector, and hence a burden on the econo~ as a whole. 
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In this regard the framework of the industrial programme of 1982-1987 
might give some indications of industrial policy under the ODEP. This 
programme has the following main features such as: 
(i) The emphasis on strengthening and deepening the tendency towards 
the ODEP with priority given to Egyptian private sector 
participation in joint-ventures. Therefore, the share of the 
private sector including foreign investment has increased from 
just under 20% in the 1977-82 plan to about 25% in the 1982-87 
plan. This is while the public sector used to capture some 
90% of total investment in earlier plans. 
(ii) The programme aims at increasing industrial output from LE 
9494mn in 1982 to LE 14949mn in 1987 at the 1981/82 constant 
prices. This means that the average annual composite rate 
of growth will be 9.5%. 
(iii) The analysis of the programme's investment shows that top 
priority is given to on-going projects followed by replacement 
and renewal projects and rehabilitation projects, together 
accounting for 92% of total investment of the programme's fE 
3750mn. Such a structure is depicted in the following Table 4.4 
TABLE 4.4 
Distribution of industrial investment by projects category in the 
1982/87 plan. 
r.Costs 
proJects 
1892 
432 
305 
TOTAL 3750 
SOURCE: Ministry of Industry, 1984:7. 
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(fE mn) 
'.f) of Total I 
I 
50 I 
12 I 
8 I 
I 
100 I 
This table points out that the vast majority of industrial investment 
has limited new additions to the industrial structure. Only some 
8% of this investment is going to new projects. In addition to the 
screening projects suggested in it, it can be deduced that nearly 
all of them are channeled into the consumption sector such as ready 
made clothes, and some durable goods like TV sets and fans. 
In consequence, from this programme it can be deduced that: 
(i) Such a bias coincides with the general aim of the plan of giving 
more support to the consumption industries, especially textiles 
and food processing which captured about 34% of total investment 
in the industrial sector. 
(ii) As for intermediate goods, the plan has envisaged increasing 
their share of total investment from 41% in 1975 to 45% over 
the programme duration. This is as stipulated in the plan 
in order to meet the expanding needs of manufacturing industries 
in other categories. 
(iii) Meanwhile the capital goods share of investment is targeted 
to reach 14% of the total over the same period. This category 
includes engineering industries in addition to projects that 
are mostly related to consumption. In the meantime, the 
machinery manufacturing share of investment is not referred 
to in this programme. 
(iv) Finally, it seems from this programme, as far as technology 
transfer is concerned, that most, if not all the projects 
planned have been studied and prepared by foreign consultant 
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companies without the significant participation of local firms 
or individuals. A striking example mentioned in the programme 
is the case of the Abu-Tartour Phosphate project. In this 
project a detailed feasibility study was carried out by: 
SOFREMINES (France) 
ALUSUISSE (Switzerland) 
Central technology (U.S.A.) studied the railway line to Safaga 
on the Red Sea. 
The office of Professor Lacker (Germany) prepared the 
engineering work at the port of Safaga. 
Thus, nearly all of the technical aspects of the project have been 
studied and prepared by expatriates without a serious attempt to make 
the local specialists or agencies take a part in order to absorb, 
and acquire the foreign experience. Such participation is of great 
importance, because the locals are more able to comprehend the domestic 
conditions of the country and will be able to diffuse their knowledge 
to other projects or industries. The situation becomes more impressive 
if one knows that phosphate rock reserves represent the second most 
important mineral wealth in Egypt, with crude petroleum coming first 
and iron ore reserves third (Ministry of Industry, 1983:1-22). 
The analysis of this framework in the light of technology transfer 
and development considerations reveals that there is an increasing gap 
between what should be and what does take place. At a time when the 
same paper emphasizes the process of training and increasing 
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technological capabilities of the country, the government surrenders 
the second largest mineral wealth to be exploited by foreign companies 
in the absence of a significant national participation. This 
illustrates that the alienation of local potential of technological 
capability and the productive sector is getting deeper. So, it is not 
just enough to write objectives on paper, but it is the actual practice 
which is the most significant. 
Moreover, the concentration on consumption industries and the related 
industries from both intermediate and durable goods, and the relative 
neglect of machinery manufacturing are among the origins of 
perpetuating the technological dependency phenomenon. The more the 
country wants to produce such goods, the more it should look outside 
for supplies not only for soft but also for hard technology. This 
deduction could be supported by the fact that at a time of increasing 
consumption industries under the ODEP, the rate of growth of capital 
goods including durable goods' could not match these increasing 
demands. The capital goods share in terms of value added improved 
slightly from 6% in 1945 to only 9% by the end of the 1970s (UNCTAD, 
1982:46). 
The shortcomings of this situation, in addition to what is noted above, 
becomes clear by comparison with the experience of a country like post-
war Japan, where about 70 to 80% of the imported foreign technology 
was directed towards the heavy and chemical industries and two-thirds 
of manufacturing investment was poured into those two sectors 
(Kitamura, 1977:43). Furthermore, it is in conflict with policies 
followed by some developing countries such as Brazil, where the 
government stepped forward and has taken major steps to encourage 
the capital goods sector at a time when it monitored the imports of 
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technology channelled into this field (Fransman & King, 1984:19). 
In India, the most striking phenomenon in industrial planning is the 
emphasis on the development of a capital goods sector (Patel, 
1971:116). This favourable tendency has resulted in an increase in 
the share of capital goods products in total industrial production 
from 8% in 1956 to 25% in 1979. Correspondingly, imports of machinery 
for domestic production decreased from 70% in 1950/51 to 15.3% by 
the end of the fifth plan period 1977/78 (UNCTC, 1982:64). 
4.8 Direct Foreign Invest.ent and the Transfer of Technology: 
Direct foreign investment has been envisaged in Egypt since the early 
1970s as the effective way for obtaining technology from abroad, 
especially the 'North-West'. President Sadat was keen to emphasize 
that in his different meetings especially with businessmen. 
In one of his meetings with American businessmen he said: 
"Water we have, 1 and we have, cl imate we have ••.• 
But we need technology, we need know-how. All this 
one can find in the U.S.A." (Journal of Conmerce, 1979). 
This statement of the president reveals that the prevailing 
orientation for technology at that time have been totally outward 
oriented especially from the U.S. Correspondingly, there has been 
the ODEP based particularly on the need for foreign technology. 
Correlatively, there was, also, the Law 43 of 1974, as the main 
instrument of the new policy. This law was promulgated to put such 
perceptions into practice. Regarding technology, it includes some 
provisions that deal generally with the issue of transfer. In this 
respect, Article Two of Chapter 1, considered as capital: 
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"Intangible assets, such as patents and trade marks registered 
with member states of the international convention for the 
protection of industrial property or in accordance with the 
rules of international registration contained in the 
international conventions concluded in this respect and held 
by residents abroad and pertaining to the projects. 
This article means that the potential investors have been allowed 
to capitalize on intangible assets such as patents and trade marks. 
And as seen above this article did not succeed in attracting foreign 
know-how embodied in patents. But it might succeed in introducing 
many trade-marks to the local market. This mechanism throws some 
light on the type of technology introduced into this country as we 
shall discuss in Chapter 5. Having done so, nevertheless this law 
has not embodied any provisions that organise the process of the 
transfer of such assets or monitor their introduction. 
Among provisions that have implications for the whole process of 
transfer is Article Three, which has given a special priority to 
projects that require advanced technical expertise or which make use 
of patents or trade-marks of Worldwide reputation. As far as machinery 
is concerned the legislation ~as allowed their introduction into the 
country on the condition that they should be new and compatible with 
modern technological development and have not been used previously. 
It may be interesting to mention that according to Article 16 'Capital 
goods and component materials may be exempted from or granted the 
privileges of deferred payments or instalment payment for all or part 
of the customs duties and any other taxes or duties'. In addition 
all capital equipment introduced and used in Free Zone Areas is 
exempted from custom duties and other taxes and duties (Article 36 
of Law 43). 
From the previous provisions it is clear that Egyptian policy related 
to OFI, has disregarded the question of monitoring the transfer of 
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technology either in the OF! law or separately. This situation, in 
the absence of a strategy regarding the technological development 
of the country led to the UNCTAD mission to Egypt in 1978 noting: 
II •••• , there is no means of knowing how much of the 
imported technology was necessary from the national 
pOint of view, taking into account alternatives, 
domestic actual and potential nor is it possible to 
tell whether the terms in which such technology was 
acquired are in any sense reasonable (UNCTAD, 1980:15). 
Thus, the OF! legislation inter alia has made the situation for 
technology transfer much worse instead of rectifying it. The previous 
provisions, in addition to the other issues discussed before have 
permitted the importation of complicated and highly sophisticated 
technology to the country in some cases side by side with technology 
products. This issue will be discussed in detail when considering 
the survey results in Chapter 5. 
4.9 Conclusion: 
Government policies, particularly in developing countries, have a 
promising potential with regard to the issue of technology transfer. 
The importance of these policies emanates from the position of both 
the supplier and recipients of technology on its international market 
as discussed above. These policies also have a wide variety of fields 
to affect such as legislation, education, R&D, industrial 
development and so forth. 
Egypt has embarked upon a new policy in the 1970s based upon the 
necessity of importing and introducing foreign technology into the 
country. Yet the fruitful outcome of such a policy hinges, as hinted 
above, on many other inter-related policies in the fields mentioned 
above. 
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In this country, these policies have been suffering from some serious 
deficiencies. These could be easily concluded from the non-existence 
of a global technological strategy as an integral part of a strategy 
of economic and social development. This absence has had reverse 
repercussions on the other aspects. So up to now, there is no 
legislation or even broad guide lines to regulate or monitor the 
importation of technology and to protect local potential. Thus all 
aspects related to the whole question of technology transfer have been 
left to be handled by market forces. 
In Education, although the country has achieved a sizeable reservoir 
of skills through educational policies, a significant part of this 
reservoir has not put what they learned into practice and some of them 
have been misallocated. This situation exacerbates the 'Brain Drain' 
and thereby deprives the dearest asset of the country from taking 
effective part in developing the country. So, complaints arise from 
the shortages of skills and technicians and hence affects the type of 
behaviour towards importing technology. The same could be said for R & 
o activities, which have been suffering from such problems as shortages 
of finance, equipment, and above all, its link with the productive 
sector is kept to the minimum; a situation that has led to its 
alienation from the productive sector in the country. Even more, local 
scientists in order to retain their identity have identified themselves 
with the international scientific community. This tendency makes R&D 
in this country rigid and inflexible with respect to what the 
particular local environment requires and hence technological 
dependency becomes inevitable. 
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The industrial sector's dynamism has thus depended on external sources 
for its continuity. This is clear from the heavy emphasis put on 
consumption industries from durable and non-durable goods, while 
manufacturing machinery have been accorded little attention, if any at 
all. Such an imbalance leads to more imports of this sector's 
requirements of machinery, equipment and hence raw materials. This all 
happens, while the country opens its doors widely to OF! and the TNC, 
to choose where to work and how to work, what to produce and what not 
etc. 
Consequently, such a situation might lead in the long run as Sagasti 
suggested, to self-defeating development policies (Sagasti, 1973:58). 
In consequence, it is crucial now, to explore the effect of these 
policies on the role of the TNCs in the transfer of technology to 
Egypt. This question will be the main theme of the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Transnational Corporations and Transfer of Technology to Egypt 
This chapter draws upon the findings of a survey undertaken in 1984 of 
the subsidiaries of transnational corporations operating in Egypt. 
The analysis of these findings will follow the structure of the 
argument in the first two chapters, concerning the rationale that 
rests behind the decision of TNCs to invest in foreign markets and 
their role in the transfer of technology to developing countries, 
together with the local policies and context that might affect the 
performance of the TNCs in this area, discussed in the third and fourth 
chapters. 
The study which this chapter comprises adds to other empirical studies 
on the role of the transnationals in technology transfer to developing 
countries. (Aggarwal, 1978; Adikibi, 1981; Adheghian, 1982; Akpakpan, 
1983, Alizadeh, 1978; Blinder, 1980; Barker, 1974-75 and UNCTC, 1982). 
It reveals, in addition, that the behaviour of these companies in Egypt 
does not show much difference from their behaviour in other developing 
countries. Furthermore, it adds further empirical support to the 
theoretical argument, outlined in the second chapter, that the TNCs 
do not embark upon a genuine transfer of technology to these countries 
(Chapter Two). 
The Questions: 
This study, in fact, seeks not only to provide information about the 
TNCs' transfer of technology to Egypt, but also aims to shed some light 
on factors that might underlie this process in Egypt. It is guided by 
the following broad questions: 
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(1) What is the nature of the technology introduced by the 
transnationals to Egypt? 
(2) Is the technology transferred appropriate to the specific 
conditions prevailing in Egypt? If not, has any process of 
adaptation taken place to make it more suitable? 
(3) Under what conditions and at what price have they introduced 
their technologies? 
(4) What is the role played by the transnationals in training local 
personnel? What are the characteristics of such training? 
(5) What is the role played by these companies in R&D inside the 
country? Do they have relationships with local R&D units 
and/or universities and other higher education institutions? 
If yes, what sort of relationship? 
(6) What is the extent of their integration into the local economy, 
viz, have they made sub-contracts with local suppliers or 
manufacturers? If yes, what kind of co-operation do they have? 
What is the relative weight of their imports from outside 
compared with local purchase 1nternally? 
(7) What 1s their role in exports? Are they free or restricted to 
export? What sort of restrictions, if any, are there. 
(8) What kinds of products do they make? Are they different from 
those which they used to produce at home? Are these products 
complementary or competitive with local products? 
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(9) Finally, did the national policies and local contexts affect 
the performance of the TNCs, regarding the transfer of 
technology? If yes, how? 
These broad questions are represented in the more specific 
questionnaire prepared for the proposes of this study. In order to 
prepare such a questionnaire, technology transfer literature was 
surveyed, and some other empirical studies were consulted (for example, 
Reuber, 1973, Langdon, 1981, UNCTAD, 1982, etc.). 
Taking into account the previous considerations and in order to answer 
the questions noted above, the survey was based on, first, the 
questionnaire, secondly, interviews, and thirdly, plant visits. The 
questionnaire was the main tool of the survey. Concurrently, a series 
of interviews with senior representatives of some of the selected 
companies took place. The purpose underlying such interviews was the 
desire to get some information which the companies might be reluctant 
to reveal in written answers to the questionnaire. 
Plant visits, in addition, provided a valuable complementary source of 
information. By undertaking such visits, it was possible to get access 
to, and a clearer idea about, some crucial points so far as technology 
transfer is concerned, such as the degree of mechanization, training, 
and localisation of employment. Also, it was possible to have some 
constructive discussions with engineers and employees about a variety 
of issues as will be illustrated below. 
Moreover, many visits were paid to the local authorities that might 
have connections with the transfer of technology. They included the 
General Authority for Foreign Investment (GAFI) and the General 
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Organization for Industrialisation (GOFI). Such visits were 
intended to get some data about issues such as technology price, 
exports, imports, and production. The Academy of Scientific Research 
and Technology (ASRT) was visited, especially the Patent and 
Transfer of Technology Offices, the aim of such visits being to get 
data about the relationship that might exist between foreign companies 
and local R&D units and between these companies and patents. 
Thus, every effort possible was made in order to ensure that the 
information provided reflected the actual performance of surveyed 
companies. But before entering into the subject matter, we should 
briefly discuss the sample on which the survey was based. 
The Sample: 
Relying upon sources such as the Directory of Foreign Investment in 
Egypt, obtained from the British-Egyptian Chamber of Commerce in 
London, lists provided by the Department of Trade and Industry about 
the British firms investing in Egypt and lists provided by Barclays 
Bank especially about American investment, a list of companies was 
prepared. 
This preparation was guided by three factors. First, the degree of 
foreign ownership of equity: companies with a high foreign equity share 
were preferred. This was on the premise that, foreign companies 
(American, European, Japanese) represented the likely source of 
technology transfer. Secondly, companies actually in operation were 
preferable to those that were in a state of preparation. This aimed to 
gain information that reflected the current behaviour of foreign 
companies. Thirdly, bearing in mind the previous factors, a great deal 
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of attention was given to make the selected companies provide a 
suitable and representative sample of different industries. 
Based on these considerations, a sample of 45 enterprises (see above) 
was prepared (see table 5.1), from different broad industrial 
categories that include a wide variety of activities within them. 
Also, as this table shows, about 25 finms co-operated in a significant 
way, whilst, 20 were excluded for different reasons: in five cases, 
enterprises were not accessible because of wrong addresses, in six 
cases, they refused openly on the grounds that they would like to avoid 
any problems such research might create for them; in seven cases, 
companies answered, but inadequately; so, they were excluded; in two 
cases, refusal was based on limitations of time. 
In spite of these refusals, the sample remains representative. First, 
all the different industries chosen for the survey are still 
represented. Secondly, most foreign finms have been engaged in similar 
lines of production within the same industry, and using, more or less, 
similar production techniques, as will be illustrated below, and to 
some extent, even few firms may represent the industry. 
TABLE 5.1 
Sample Survey Companies 
Sector Total Number Co-operating Excluded 
Chemicals 14 4 10 
Engineering 14 9 5 
Food 1 1 
Metallurgy 6 4 2 
Pharmaceutical 5 4 1 
Textiles 5 3 2 
TOTAL 45 25 20 
SOURCE: Questionnaire Survey. 
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The surveyed sample has many other properties which together with the 
main issues related to technology transfer constitute the main data 
obtained by the questionnaire. So, the analysis in this chapter will 
run as follows: 
Part II provides some basic information about the firms studied, 
including date of establishment, nature of activity, structure of 
ownership, financial structure, together with the motives to invest in 
Egypt. Part III, deals with the main issue, which is the production 
technology. It embraces issues such as the nature of technology 
introduced in this country, whether adaptation has taken place, 
the sources of technology, the form of its supply, its cost, and the 
question of choice of technology. Part IV tries to identify the 
relationship between technolgy transfer and control. Part V will 
discuss issues related to employment and training such as the number 
of local employees, what positions they hold, whether there is training 
courses, and how they have been taking place. Part VI assesses the 
transnationals' role in undertaking R & 0 inside Egypt, in addition to 
their links with local R & 0 units. Part VII investigates whether 
these companies work as an integrated part of the national economy or 
works as enclaves. Part VIII will examine the role of the TNC, and OFI 
in exports of Egypt. In addition Part IX will identify the pattern of 
their products and whether or not they meet the basic needs of the 
masses. Part X draws conclusions from the findings of this chapter. 
5.2 The Surv!yed CGlpanies basic inf~tion 
This section aims to provide some background information about the 
surveyed firms: 
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Ownership Structure: 
According to foreign investment law, companies investing in Egypt 
should take the form of joint-ventures (JVs). Nonetheless, they can 
take the form of 100~ foreign ownership in certain cases conditional 
upon a two-thirds majority of the Foreign Investment Board of directors 
(Law 43, Article: 4). 
In fact the rationale behind this article is, as seen in Chapter Two, 
the belief that local participation might make the control and decision 
making process more sensitive to local interests. 
Regarding the sample firms, it was found, as shown in table 5.2, that 
firms with majority local ownership (MLO) come on top with 44i of the 
total. In second place came majority foreign owned firms with 32i of 
the surveyed firms. They are followed by 12' for firms with wholly 
foreign ownership and the same percentage for 50/50 ownership. So, as 
far as the sample firms are concerned, it is clear that both foreign 
and local ownership in approximate terms in number are equal. But does 
such structure has some connection with control? This will be explored 
in a later section. 
TABLE 5.2 
Ownership Structure of Sample Firms 
I Structure Number t I ______________________________________ ~----+---
I 
I - Majority Local Owned (MLO) 
I - Majority Foreign Owned (MFa) 
I - Wholly Foreign Owned (WFO) 
I - 50/50 
11 
8 
3 
3 
44 
32 
12 
12 
I I------------------------------T-O-TA~L------r-~--;-~ 25 100 
I --------------------------------------------~----~----
SOURCE: Survey Results. 
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In this connection, the findings of the survey suggest that companies 
with WFO and MFO are concentrated in industries such as 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and engineering. Further, in firms with 
MFO the foreign share ranged from 60~ to 95~. On the other hand firms 
with MLO tend to be concentrated in field such as textiles, metallurgy 
and engineering, where the foreign share is as low as 20% in some 
cases. This would suggest that foreign firms wanted to capitalize on 
the position local firms enjoy in the local market in such industries. 
The Financial Structure: 
For the sample firms, it was found that capital per project differs 
considerably from industry to industry and from one project to another. 
While some firms were found to have a fixed capital of some millions, 
others have about a million. In addition, firms with sizeable fixed 
capital were found to be mainly concentrated in industries such as 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, engineering and food, and such 
concentration was more tangible in firms engaged in manufacturing 
activities. 
The other feature that characterizes the financial structure is the 
source of finance. It was found, contrary to the premise that 
ownership structure is usually coincident with the source of finance, 
that there is no straightforward connection between the two in Egypt. 
Some firms with MFO, raised the largest part of their capital 1n the 
local market, mostly via loans. Such a source represented in some 
cases 90~ of the total fixed capital of such companies. 
The third feature is that surveyed companies' size in terms of the 
average capital invested per project is higher than the general 
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average in firms which started operations before 31-12-1982. While the 
average was about fE 1,250,000 for the latter, it accounted for about 
fE 3,500,000 in the former. This is because the focus in selecting the 
sample was, directed to large firms as far as was possible given what 
we noted above about the choice of the sample. 
The Commencement of Production: 
In fact, most firms which co-operated in this survey started 
production very recently. Of the 25 firms, represented in table 5.3, 
just 4 firms started operation about 10 years ago, while the majority 
began only 5-6 years ago. Against this situation, it was necessary 
during the field survey to give more attention to the actual 
performance of the firms studied, in addition to their plans for the 
forseeable future regarding the issue under concern. 
With regard to the production of the surveyed firms, it is of interest 
to note that figures for their production were not accessible either 
from firms or from the GAFI. This is since both of them considered 
this as a matter of secrecy. Nevertheless, there were some companies 
which disclosed their figures. 
TABLE 5.3 
Date of Commencement of Production of Cooperating Sample Companies 
Year Number 
Before 1974 1 
1974 1 
1975 2 
1976 1 
1977 4 
1978 2 
1979 6 
1980 4 
1981 4 
1982 
TOTAL 25 
SOURCE: Questionnaire Survey. 
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One important indicator of performance is value-added created in Egypt. 
This also, unfortunately, was hard to calculate for the reasons listed 
above and because of the inaccessibility of figures relating to imports 
of production requirements, wages, profits, rent and capital 
depreciation rates. So, it was impossible to estimate exactly how much 
value added was created and retained in Egypt and how much of it was 
repatriated. 
Nonetheless, this performance indicator could be deduced indirectly 
from the nature of the surveyed firms activities. Of these firms as 
shown in table 5.4, the majority responded that they are engaged in 
manufacturing activities (80t). They are followed by assembling and 
combining as in the case of pharmaceuticals and chemicals (40t). 
Finally, activities like packing, re-packing, reformulating rank third 
with about 12%. This structure indicates that the value added in 
production in Egypt is relatively significant. However some firms are 
engaged in more than one activity. For example, some companies, in 
addition to manufacturing some products, combine some others, package, 
re-package or re-formulate imported elements and provide them to the 
local market. Such activities were noticeable in the pharmaceutical 
and chemical industries. 
TABLE 5.4 
Nature of Samples Firms Activities 
1 Status Number 1------____________________________ -+ ________ -4 __ __ 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Manufacturing 
Assembling & Combining 
Miscellaneous Activities 
20 
10 
3 
80 
40 
12 
S~OomR~C~E~:--,Qr.u~e~s~t'r.·o~n~n~aTir~e~S~u~rv~e~y~.----------------~----------~---
N.B. The total number and percentage are more that the total 
surveyed companies, since some companies reported more 
than one activity. 
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These firms have been producing a variety of consumer products of 
durable and non-durable goods. In the engineering industries they 
produce razors, oil seals, gear boxes, assemble lifts, parts of 
extinguishers, and computers. In the chemical industry, they produce 
dry and liquid batteries, pesticides, and mUltipurpose plastic tubes. 
In the pharmaceuticals industry, firms surveyed produce a wide variety 
of drug products such as rimactane 300 mg capsule 80 H.P., Spasmo 
ciba1yine Supp S, tanderi1 100 mg tablets 30, Tavegy1 100 m1 Syrup 100 
m1, ve10sef, sao mg capsule 12, pridi10ne tablets 10, in addition to 
medical equipment. Also, products such as metal doors, windows, 
frames, and construction bars have been produced in the Metallurgical 
industries. Dry milk, pasteurized milk, together some other different 
sorts of processed food are produced by the food producing firms. And 
in textiles, ready made clothes, mainly from ribbon synthetics have 
been produced. 
The striking feature in this respect is that at a time when foreign 
finms and JVs are producing such a range of consumption goods, they are 
reluctant to get involved in manufacturing-machines-industries as 
we shall see in the next chapter. 
Motives for Investment in Egypt: 
There is no consensus about the rationale of foreign investment by the 
TNCs. Thus, there are, as seen in the first chapter, many 
different hypotheses which seek to explain the phenomenon from 
different perspectives. In the case of Egypt, the evidence from our 
survey is summarized in table 5.S. This structure of motives, shows 
that the local market has represented the main rationale of foreign 
investment in Egypt. This deduction was, in fact supported by 
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interviews with senior managers of some surveyed companies. One of 
them mentioned that: 
"Egypt has an enormous market that grows at an increasing 
rate with developed and varied tastes and requirements". 
TABLE 5.5 
Motives for Investment in Egypt 
Local Market 
Cheap Labour 
Government Incentives 
Cheap Raw Materials 
Patents 
SOURCE: Questionnaire Survey. 
Number 
20 
13 
11 
8 
o 
I 
I % 
I 
I 
I BO 
I 52 
I 44 
I 32 
I 0 
I 
N.B. The total of responses exceeds the total surveyed 
companies because some of them reported more than one 
factor. 
As for the second factor, cheap labour, it was found, as will be 
illustrated in Chapter Six, that the foreign expert commands a salary 
about 10 times higher than his local counterpart. 
In addition, raw materials as a rationale were mentioned by companies 
operating in the textile, food, and metallurgical industries. 
Furthermore the generosity of the Egyptian law of foreign investment 
played a significant role in this respect. 
It was noted above (Chapter Two) that patents might represent an 
impulse for firms to invest in foreign markets. However, this effect 
could not be found to operate in the case of Egypt. Not one of the 
surveyed companies mentioned that they invest in Egypt in order to 
exploit their patents. In fact, this situation coincides with what has 
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been argued in Chapter two that patents per se, have a poor record in 
transfer of technology directly or indirectly. 
Thus, having discussed the fundamental available information which 
represents a background to this survey, we now turn to the main issues 
concerning the role of the TNCs in technology transfer to Egypt. 
5.3 Production Technology 
This section intends to discuss the introduction of foreign technology 
into Egypt by the TNCs, such as its nature, appropriateness, 
adaptation, and direct and indirect costs. 
It was noted above (Chapter Two), that the TNCs tend to introduce 
highly-sophisticated and capital-intensive technology into developing 
countries. Such technology is mostly identical to what is used in 
developed markets and hence, more capital-intensive compared with what 
similar local firms use. 
In the case of Egypt, it was concluded in the light of the findings of 
the survey, that the situation in this country does not show much 
difference either from what has been argued above or what has been 
noted in other developing countries (see Chapter Two). From the 
analysis of the field survey, it was found that about 80' of the 
surveyed firms introduce and use technology similar to that used in 
their home markets and in other developed countries, while some 20' use 
less sophisticated technology. 
For these companies with less advanced technology, the available 
evidence suggests that their operations were mainly confined to last 
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stage assembly of imported parts, especially in some engineering and 
metallurgical industries. Further, it was observed that their products 
were in most cases assembled parts of electric bulbs for street 
lighting being metal bars and metal frames. 
On the other hand, firms that use advanced technology are mainly 
engaged in whole lines of manufacturing including assembling as well. 
This was noticeable in the chemical, pharmaceutical, food, engineering 
projects and textile industries. 
In this connection, it was necessary to illustrate the capital 
intensity of surveyed companies. Such intensity is measured by using 
data provided by these firms about their fixed capital and number of 
employees. It is also measured by using a capital/labour ratio (K/L) 
measurement. The possibility of using other means of measuring was 
very limited because of the dearth of information on such variables as 
output and value-added. Thus, it was necessary to employ one method in 
order to give some indication of capital-intensity. Bhalla in this 
respect commented that: 
"For purposes of comparison a common value denominator 
may be essenti al even though imperfect". (1981: 35) 
Based on the previous measurement, it was deduced that the K/L ratio 
for the surveyed firms, as represented in table 5.6, is relatively 
high. From this table, the general average amounted to fE 18,814 per 
employee and about fE 23,644 per operative. (1) Further, this ratio 
approaches higher levels in industries such as chemicals and 
(1) By operative we mean in this study those who are engaged 
directly in the different stages of the production process of 
managers, technicians, and those who store output. 
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TABLE 5.6 
The Capital/Labour ratio of the firms surveyed 
(iE) 
Ca~ital/Labour Ratio 
Industry Average of Capital Average Number of Fixed Capital Fixed Capital 
Per Finn Employees Per Finn Per Employee Per Operative 
Engineering 2 061 333 130 15 856 18 739 
Phannaceuticals 4 550 625 120 37 921 46 435 
Metallurgy 4 061 000 300 13 537 17 429 
Chemicals 4 594 333 070 65 628 76 572 
Textiles 2 134 769 305 6 999 9 084 
Food N N N N 
TOTAL 17 402 060 925 18 814 23 644 
SOURCE: Questionnaire Survey. 
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pharmaceuticals. Such a level, in fact, exceeds by 2.5 to 3.5 times 
what is used in similar 10cal firms in general lAbdel-Kha1eK, 1982: 
277). And for the pharmaceutica1s and chemicals, the ratio exceeds by 
more than four times that in similar local firms (Ali, 1983: 322)(2). 
Moreover, the tendency to use capital-intensive and highly advanced 
technology was emphasized by the interviewees during the undertaking 
of the survey. In an interview with a senior manager of a joint-
venture I was told that: 
"We are proud that we are in the forefront of using the latest 
advanced technology in our company. You imaginel There is no 
difference between what we use and what is used in .•• (the 
parent country)lI. 
As a matter of fact all managers met during the survey showed the same 
spirit. 
Such an inclination is supported by what was noticed during field 
visits to some plants. In one medical equipment plant, the production 
process was divided (during the visit time) into five stages: Feeding 
machines; processing; quality control; stamping and printing; and 
packaging. 
(2) Regarding K/L ratio, as noted by Sakr, one must take into 
account such factors as: 
Decrease in the value of the Egyptian pound in 1977 and 
afterwards and its effect on the capital - value of foreign 
projects. 
Public-Sector Firms' capital is assessed according to its book-
value, so it sometimes appears to be less than their reality. 
The policy of recruitment in public-sector firms, of over-
staffing (Ali, 1983: 322). 
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The first stage was fully automatic. Intermediate inputs were pumped 
into containers and mixed by machines, and then re-piped to the the 
second stage of processing. I was told by one of the firm's engineers 
that this stage of feeding could be done manually. But, he, in a 
response to a question about the previous level of automation, said 
that, machines are preferred to labour for two reasons: first, they 
give a proper mixture of inputs; secondly, they are quicker, i.e. 
automatic mixing and piping go smoothly with the speed of processing 
machines. 
The second stage was not fully automised. Products were transferred 
from one machine to another by unskilled workers (women). This is 
because women generally charge low wages than men. All they do is to 
transfer the products between machines. I was also told that in the 
near future, they are going to replace these women by machines. As 
for the third stage, the quality control task was tackled by a trained 
woman who used some mechanical devices supplied by the parent company 
together with the necessary instructions. 
In the fourth stage, stamping was achieved totally automatically, with 
products moving from one machine to the next. After that, the products 
reached the last stage which is packaging. On the contrary, this 
stage was noted to be labour-intensive, depending totally on the labour 
force and representing over 70~ of the total labour force employed by 
this firm. 
Such a situation was more or less, similar to what was found in some 
other plants. In addition, it was found that local partners either 
public or private firms were as eager as foreign firms in using the 
- 230 -
most advanced technology, irrespective of its socio-economic 
repercussions on the economy as a whole. 
Adaptation: 
The question of adaptation is one of the major issues that arises from 
technology introduction by TNCs into host developing economies. In 
this regard it has been argued that these companies are, mostly, 
reluctant to embark upon a genuine adaptation of such technology. This 
argument, as seen in Chapter Two, has ample evidence to back it up. 
As far as Egypt is concerned the evidence at hand reveals that the 
above argument holds beyond any doubt, insofar as the vast majority of 
surveyed companies were noted to be reluctant to modify or adapt their 
technology to fit local market peculiarities. Of the total firms, 
about 72~ responded that they have done no adaptation while about 28~ 
replied, in contrast, that they have undertaken some sort of 
modification. 
Regarding the last category and guided by the distinction made by Lall 
in Chapter Two between 'core' and 'auxiliary' production technology it 
was found that the overwhelming majority of adaptations were restricted 
to auxiliary technology. What these companies achieved was some sort 
of modification in the size of their products, especially in textiles, 
to suit local consumers; and some modification of the material used in 
painting products in order to cope with the high degree of temperature 
in the country especially 1n summer. 
Thus it is not surprising to find that those who claimed adaptation 
responded that in this process costs were negligible. Additionally, 
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they replied that the slight modification of products was undertaken by 
the parent corporation computer. 
In conclusion, surveyed companies, not only have introduced capita1-
intensive and advanced technology, but are also reluctant to adapt it. 
Even worse, the slight modification that has taken place was made by 
the parent firms. Thus, they deprived local employees from getting 
experience of this process. 
Such behaviour prevents the diffusion of foreign introduced technology 
in the economy. For instance, during my field work, I was told that 
two local engineers were trained in one advanced country to work on its 
subsidiary in Egypt. For certain reasons they left that company in 
order to work in another one from another advanced country working in 
the same industry. After a while they found themselves unable to get 
familiar with the new organisation of production either in terms of 
management, and new production techniques. This was in spite of the 
higher salary in that firm. So, they expressed, unsuccessfully, their 
wish to return to the first company. Consequently, the engineers 
will leave Egypt for other countries because of the absence of local 
firms similar to the company which initially trained and employed 
them. 
As a correlate, it is not surprising to find that parent corporations 
represent the main and in most cases the sole source of technology 
elements for the surveyed firms. Such elements were for the 
overwhelming majority introduced in a package form. The parent 
corporations represented the sole source of soft technology, know-how, 
and technical assistance in all co-operated firms. While, regarding 
hard technology i.e. machinery, and equipment, a tiny part was 
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introduced from elsewhere other than their parents. These 
exceptions were observed in industries such as textiles, chemicals, and 
pharmaceuticals. Nonetheless, such transactions were recommended by the 
parent firm. 
Thus, this situation, by and large has caused serious problems to 
employment, balance of payments, and income distribution as will be 
illustrated in the Chapter to come. 
Choice of technology decision and its preparatory and complementary 
elements: 
With regard to the choice of technology decision, according to the 
available evidence, it was left by and large to be determined by the 
foreign investor. The foreign partner, as is demonstrated in table 5.7 
was alone responsible for technology choice in 80~ of the cases. 
Meanwhile, about 16~ was left to both foreign and local partners 
together, and in 4~ of the total cases the choice was concentrated in 
the local partner l s hands only. In this respect, it is worth noting 
that the previous 80~ includes the firms with wholly foreign ownership 
in addition to some joint-ventures. 
Nevertheless, further insight into the 16~ of co-operatives, reveals 
that such co-operation is a myth rather than a reality. In these four 
firms as indicated in table 5.7, it was apparent that the local partner 
was a public sector firm. Hence, in such a situation, the 
representation of the local side becomes a necessary formality. But, I 
was told that the final word always rests with the foreign partner. 
According to one manager: 
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"This is the reason for which we accept their partnership. 
And frankly they are more competent than us in this regard". 
Even more, in the case reported where the local partner had an 
effective role, from a discussion with a senior manager, it was 
understood that the foreign partner recommended some alternatives from 
which choice should be made. In the end, the chosen source was a 
company from the home country of the foreign partner. 
Such a situation reveals beyond doubt, how negligible is the role of 
the local partner in the choice of technology. 
TABLE 5.7 
Representation for Technology Choice 
I 
I Number I ____________________________________ ~------+----
I 
I - Parent Company 20 80 
I 
I - Local Partner 1 4 
I 
I - Consultant Company 
I 
I - Both Local and Foreign Partner 4 16 I ____________________________________ +-____ -r __ _ 
I 
I TOTAL 25 100 
I------------------------------------~------~---
SOURCE: Questionnaire Survey. 
Additionally, the respondents were asked; who was principally 
responsible for, feasibility studies; product design; plant 
construction (its technology, and its supervision); and the accounting 
system. The responses as summarized in table 5.7 and figure 5.1 
indicate that foreign investors have the 1ion 1 s share of control in 
fields such as product design (96~), feasibility studies (72~), and 
construction technology (71~). 
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TABLE 5.8 
Distribution of Contributions in Issues Below. 
Foreign Local Both I G.A.F.1. Consultant 
Investor Investor I Co. I TOTAL (1) (2 ) 1 +2 (3) I (4 ) (5) 
I I I 
N % N I % N I % I N I % N I % 
I I I I 
I I I I 
- Feasibility Studies 18 72 1 I 4 6 I 24 I - I - - I I 25 
- Product Design 24 96 
- I - I 1 4 I - I - I - I 25 
- Supervision on 
Construction 3 12.5 8 33 7 29 I - I - 6 25 24 
I I 
- Construction 
Technology 17 71 1 4 3 12.5 I - I - 3 12.5 I 24 
- Accountant System 6 24 14 56 5 20 I - I - I - 25 
I I I 
- Management 13 52 3 12 9 36 I - I - I - 25 
SOURCE: Survey Results. 
_ .2.3'+ dI-
These figures have left no room for doubt that all activities related 
to technology were dominated by the foreign investors. Thus, such 
domination could be depicted in terms of category of technology 
transfer contributed by investors in figure 5.2 as follows: 30% for 
product design, 22.5% for feasibility studies and 22% for construction 
technology thus: Personnel management 16%; accounting systems 7%; and 
4% for supervision on construction of the projects. In the meantime 
the local partner role was more tangible in activities such as 
accountancy (52%), construction supervision (30%), and personnel 
management (12%), etc. Thus, the more technology is concerned, the 
less the role the local partner would play and vice versa. 
In fact, the previous phenomenon could be regarded as a cause and/or a 
result of the previous performance of introducing capital intensive and 
advanced technology, mostly in a package form and without significant 
adaptation. It could be a cause, since in the absence of effective 
local partiCipation the decision to choose technology would leave such 
corporations free to apply their strategies, such that, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, aim, inter alia, to expand the use of their superior 
technology as widely as possible. And it could be a result since the 
tendency on both sides, both the local partner and foreign investors, 
to introduce the technology described above makes such concentration 
imperative. 
Consequently, performing in this way leads to what Vaitsos labelled 
• pseudo' transfer of know-how. This 1s because most of the elements 
contained in the package are never understood or assimilated by the 
reCipients (1974: 398). Moreover, such a situation, seen in Egypt 
deprives local personnel from getting into the technology markets to 
look for more suitable technology and may be at a cheaper cost. In 
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FIGURE 5.1 
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addition, leaving of the choice of technology to be imposed by the 
foreign investor leads as Ikonicoff, (1979: 282) remarked, to some sort 
of imbalance in the economy. This question that will be examined in 
the next chapter. 
Costs of Technology Transfer: 
Taking all the previous issues in retrospect, one should ask, at what 
cost does the foreign investor introduce technological elements into 
the recipient country? This question has been in fact a subject of 
debate at all levels, politically, economically and socially. In this 
connection, it has been argued, (see in Chapter two), that technology 
transfer imposes heavy costs on developing countries. In the meantime, 
the technology transfer is costless for the TNCs, since they are 
introducing the same technology used abroad and in most cases without 
adaptation. Even in cases where adaptation takes place, its cost is so 
modest that it may not be proportionate to what these companies 
charge for their technology, and this is not to mention their over-
pricing of hard technology. (see Chapters One and Two). 
As far as Egypt's case is concerned, the findings of our survey proved 
that this country has experienced different kinds of technology costs. 
To start with direct costs, it was found that they take the form of 
royalties, equity, lump sums or a combination of some of these. It was 
also found that royalties as shown in table 5.9 represent the dominant 
form of payment for the respondent companies (21). In this respect, 
90% of the,' surveyed fi rms' payments for technology took the form of 
royalties either separately or in combination with other fonms. This 
was followed by lump sum and equity fonms for 43% and 33% of the 
companies, respectively. 
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TABLE 5.9 
Distribution of Payments for Technology by Method 
I 
Form Number I ~ 
I 
I 
Royal ty 19 I 90 
I 
Equi ty 7 I 33 
I 
Lump Sum 9 I 43 
I 
SOURCE: Questionnaire Survey. 
N.B. The sum of these companies is more than the total 
surveyed, because there are some companies which 
mentioned more than one form of payment. 
Thus, it is clear that the respondent firms prefer payments in the form 
of royalties. Further, it was observed from information provided by 
GAFI that this form is more common in the pharmaceuticals, chemicals 
and engineering industries. Not only that, but also its level was high 
in these industries compared to other industries: while it was about 5~ 
for the former, the average was about 2~ for the latter. 
However, as a result of the inaccessibility of data related to sales 
amounts, cost, and market prices, it is difficult to draw a judgement 
on the rate of royalties. Rather important, it was noted that most of 
contracts of between 1.5 - 3~ of net sales royalties are characterised 
by long duration period of 25-50 years, while other duration periods 
range from 5 to 10 years, albeit renewable automatically in most 
cases. It was also noted that the level of royalties in Egypt, in 
general is low compared to the international levels. While the rate 
in Egypt as seen above revolved around 1.5 to 5', it was estimated to 
be around 10-30~ of sales in most developing countries (Patel, 1974: 
10). 
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From the evidence at hand and so far as direct costs are concerned, it 
was found that some joint-ventures (33~), tend to capitalize on their 
know-how in order to increase their equity share in the firm. Some 
firms within this category contribute their know-how as capital. This 
question raises two important points. First, this kind of 
participation means that the foreign partner is going to continue to 
get profits for his know-how as long as the firm operates, even if his 
know-how becomes obsolete. Second, who is going to evaluate the 
offered know-how as a share in the proposed firm? According the 
article (13) of the executive regulation of law 43 of 1974, it is 
stipulated that: 
liThe authority (Foreign Investment Authority) shall assess the 
value of imported and intangible assets contributed to any 
approved project by any investor ••••• , in the light of: 
(a) Submitted documents. 
(b) World Prices. 
(c) Assessment by customs department. 
(d) Consul ti ng some qual1 fi ed experts". 
If we are to analyse this article, taking into account the nature of 
the international technology market, the strategies of the 
transnationals as seen in Chapter Two, together with the local settings 
and policies towards OFI and technology transfer as seen in Chapter 
Four, we would seriously doubt its effectivity. The developing 
countries are weak in the technology market which is dominated by the 
TNCs. These companies represent overwhelmingly the main source of 
technology to developing countries. And Egypt is no exception to that. 
Thus, Egypt suffers from the 'communication gap' i.e. its knowledge 
about world prices and alternatives is relatively limited. As for 
qualified experts, who are mostly expatriates, they in fact would not 
necessarily differ from the TNCs. So, the source that will be recorded 
the decisive factor is the documents offered by the foreign partner. 
It is, then most likely, as seen above that the transnationals over-
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value their know-how. This means that they are going to capture more 
compensation than actually contributed. 
As regards lump sums, they represent a significant portion of payments 
of the technology cost structure. They are as shown in table 5.4 
reported by 43t of co-operating firms. It could be noted regarding 
this form that: 
(i) It represents a significant method of payment. 
(ii) Lump sums had to be paid irrespective of the commencement of 
production or the profitability of the firm. 
(iii) Also during the field work, it was noted that some companies 
combine three forms of lump sum form: one part to be paid at 
the beginning according to the agreement; a second sum to be 
paid for every produced unit, and the third to be paid for every 
sold unit. 
This means that the transnationa1s do not spare any effort to maximize 
their returns from their technological assets. 
In connection with this issue, a very important question emerges, that 
is, whether the sort of technology explained above is worth this price. 
In fact, the evaluation of this question depends on the level of 
analysis i.e. a micro or macro. So, regarding firms which are 
recipients of technology either private or public, the introduced 
technology might be worth this price or even more. This is since such 
firms are guided by their own interests, and as long as technology 
enables them to produce and market their production competitively, they 
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would welcome it. This is especially when technology is accompanied 
by trade marks with a worldwide reputation as was the case for 40% of 
the firms in the survey. 
In this respect it has been argued that the technology price never 
reflects the value of technology (Ikonicoff, 1979: 283). In addition, 
Vaitsos suggested that: 
liThe difference between the expl icit price paid for know-how and 
the marginal cost of its transfer to the seller constitutes a 
properly defined monopoly rent". (1970: 46) 
As for the worthness of technology on the macro level it, in fact, 
must include the indirect cost. Such costs are usually connected with 
machinery and equipment technology as well as other requirements of raw 
materials, and inputs, where the TNCs, as we have seen in Chapters One 
and Two, tend to over-price. 
Regarding the case of Egypt, it was difficult to draw a firm conclusion 
in this regard for several reasons, among them are, first, data 
necessary for estimating some elements of indirect costs such as 
transfer pricing were not available for nearly all the surveyed 
companies. Secondly, the very nature of some of these cost elements 
cannot be converted directly into figures. These elements include 
such factors as the inappropriateness of introduced technology, and the 
effect on local technological capabilities. 
Nevertheless, it was possible to get some indications that the 
situation is roughly similar to that prevailing in other developing 
countries. The available evidence suggests that these companies impose 
heavy restrictions not only on their subsidiaries but also on local 
authorities promoting foreign investment: 
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(i) It was found that some TNCs with a worldwide reputation 
made the condition that the foreign investment authority should 
not authorize the establishment of competitive firms. And if 
necessary, it should consult the concerned companies. 
(ii) Public Sector companies operating in the industry in which the 
foreign partner operates must not be enlarged for a certain 
time. 
(iii) Conditions related to the prevention of disclosure of 
information to a third party were reported. This was in 
addition the undertakings by employees who have access to such 
information to preserve its secrecy. 
(iv) Also, there were conditions which confined exports to some 
neighbouring countries. 
(v) Tie-in-clauses were found in some companies. In one of these I 
was told that the foreign partner obliged the company to 
purchase raw materials at 150t over its normal price. 
(vi) In connection with the joint-ventures, if the company were to 
purchase raw materials elsewhere, the foreign partner should 
test such materials in order to see if they are consistent with 
the quality control standards required by the parent firm. Such 
an obligation, of course, put some sort of pressure on the firm 
to purchase the required materials from the parent corporation. 
So, it has the same effect as that of tie-in-clauses. 
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Nonetheless, one does not intend to generalize since contracts 
disclosed in this respect were as few as the data gathered via 
interviews. But the lesson that could be learned here is that the 
performance seen by the TNCs in other developing countries is very 
likely in Egypt. 
But how could such situation be interpreted? In fact, the performance 
described above could be understood in the light of some factors that 
might contributed to it. Some of these factors are related to the 
local situation, and some others are connected with the TNCs. 
Regarding the local situation, it could be argued that it encourages 
the introduction of capital-intensive and advanced technology, since 
Law 43, at a time when it embraces no single article to organise the 
transfer of technology, encourages the introduction of the most 
advanced technology (articles, 2, 15, 15). This legal standpoint, in 
fact, reflects the absence of a technological strategy or even a policy 
in the short run as illustrated, in Chapter Four. A situation like 
this naturally gives no impulse for foreign investment sector firms to 
adapt their technology to fit local conditions. 
Moreover, the TNCs as seen in Chapters One and Two, are keen to 
maximize their returns from their technological superiority. This goal 
could be achieved by expanding its exploitation intact in as many 
markets as possible. In addition, they tend, as will be seen below, to 
produce products similar to that which they are producing at home. 
Finally, these companies' subsidiaries tend to be concentrated in 
industries such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and to a lesser extent 
engineering. In the first two industries, according to UNIDO, the 
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potential for substitution of labour for capital is limited only to 
about 5~ to 10~ (1969: 43). Nevertheless, no difference between 
industries was noticed regarding the TNCs' role in adaptation. 
5.4 Management and Transfer of Technology: 
This section is an attempt to shed some light on the relationship 
between management, and hence control, and technology transfer to 
Egypt by the TNCs. This is since, as alluded above, there has been 
some stress on the necessity of local ownership and on the finm being 
in the fonm of a joint-venture. In fact this version, in Egypt, as in 
most of the other developing countries is based on the understanding 
that joint-ventures are the ideal form of DFI, since it means, in the 
view of J.V.s advocates, participation in control, maximizing returns, 
and aquisit10n of knowledge and as seen 1n Chapter Two this view is 
supported by some theoretical argument. 
However, there is a strong counter argument that the link between the 
degree of equity participation and the TNC's control over their 
subsidiaries may not be straight forward i.e. the more local ownership 
does not necessarily mean more effective local control over the 
operations of the venture. So, these companies under host government 
pressure may reduce their equity share, but in the meantime, they 
exercise control firmly over the critical decisions (lecraw, 1984: 30-
41). In this respect Vernon commented on the flexibility of some 
transnationals and the establishment of more joint-ventures, by saying 
that: 
"I would be surprised if on balance Multinational Enterprises 
had greatly reduced the degree of control over their global 
operations" (1981: 525). 
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In the case of Egypt, the material available at hand, tend in fact to 
confirm the second line of theoretical argument. From a comparison 
between tables 5.2 and 5.8 above, it is quite clear that foreign 
investors have dominant control. This is so, since while foreign 
investors have the equity majority of about 11 firms, they dominate the 
management in 13 firms. On the contrary, while the local investors 
hold the equity majority in about 11 firms, they hold the management 
only in three firms, while the other 9 firms are managed equally by 
both partners. Thus management and control are not always positively 
proportionate with ownership of the host firms. 
Furthermore, foreign investors even in these companies with local 
majority or equal management tend to concentrate the decisions related 
to technology and production in their hands. For instance, the 
foreign managers have a right of 'veto' in some of these companies 
against any decision of which they do not approve, although they are a 
minority. 
Even worse, in a surveyed finm with majority foreign ownership, it 
was found that the local partners are excluded totally from the 
management board. This was justified on the grounds that the existing 
board has been working in the interests of all the partners. 
In general, it was found for these companies that the foreign managers 
are mainly responsible for: 
(i) choice of technology, feasibility studies, product design and 
other related activities such as quality control; 
(ii) putting detailed plans into operation. 
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In sum: the TNCs tend to concentrate control over their subsidiaries in 
their hands. This is irrespective of the level of equity participation 
by these companies. 
Such behaviour could be explained on the grounds of first, the nature 
of the technology introduced by these companies: the more advanced the 
technology the more the concentration of control in foreign partner 
hands. In addition, in a document provided by a surveyed firm in the 
metallurgical industry, after describing the different stages of 
production, it was found that the technical department was absolutely 
in the foreign partner's hand. When they were asked about the reasons, 
the answer was this was because of the advanced nature of the 
technology which needed special skills. Secondly, it has been noted 
by Kaplinsky that the TNCs are keen to keep the control in their own 
hands to increase their share of company returns and to maintain 
control when a conflict of interests arises between both partners. 
(Kaplinsky, 1976: 20). In addition, such a tendency could be 
attributed to the intrinsic nature of the TNCs, where they tend, as 
seen in Chapter 2, to operate according to a global strategy. Hence 
maintaining the control over their subsidiaries is vital for organising 
their operations in a harmonized way. In this connection, it may be 
useful to note that, the U.S. Chemical Marketing Association in its 
advice to its members recommended: 
"If you have the necessary balance of resources, a wholly owned 
subsidiary is preferable to a joint-venture. If you use a joint-venture, secure control". (Balasubramanyan, 1984:730) 
Thirdly, the bargaining power of the transnationals increases with the 
level of technology they introduce into the host countries. The more 
advanced the technology, the stronger the position these companies 
would have. In addition, the TNCs position gets stronger, the more the 
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host countries' dependence on them for such elements as technology, 
marketing, and advertising, increases. (Lecraw, 1984:30-41). This 
analysis, by and large, holds for Egypt's case. The transnationals, 
are mostly introducing highly advanced technology. And it was noticed 
also that these companies with wholly foreign ownership have an 
international reputation for their technologies. 
Fourthly, on the side of the local partners, no evidence was found to 
indicate that they are significantly connected with the issue of 
control, since, all that matters to them is a secured source of foreign 
technology or trade marks, encouraged by the absence of a law to 
monitor technology transfer. All that the government has done up to 
now is to insist that foreign investment should be in the form of a 
joint-venture, believing that ownership is synonymous with control. 
This belief is shown to be far from reality. 
5.5 E!plo,Yllent and the Transfer of Technology: 
This section tries to examine the surveyed firms' participation in 
employment creation and training. It has been expected as has been 
argued above in chapters 1 and 2 that these companies are introducing 
labour-saving technology and this is likely to make their contribution 
in creating employment very limited. In addition, these companies 
mostly employ expatriates in key technical positions. So, the benefits 
for those who are locally recruited are insignificant so far as 
technology transfer 1s concerned. Further, it has been noted that the 
TNCs do not regard training as of significant concern 1n terms of 
expenditure, equipment, and key information underlying hard 
technology. 
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Regarding the question of employment, in the case of Egypt the 
available data suggests that the surveyed finms, as seen in Table 5.6 
above, are capital-intensive and employ less labour compared to local 
finms. The dimensions that such a situation implies for the whole 
economy are discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
For those lucky enough to get a job in these companies at salaries as 
high as 2 to 3 times the prevailing rate in the local industries, it 
was found from the field-work that they are mostly confined to 
peripheral jobs. They comprise about lOOt of clerks, production 
and services workers and about 85t of accountants. This structure 
coincides with the tendency as seen above that the less connected is 
the task with advanced technology, the more use is made of local 
personnel and visa versa. 
Turning to training, 24 firms out of 25 replied to the questions on 
this issue. It was found that about S8t of them organised some sort 
of training course, while 42~ do not. These figures may give the 
impression that these companies in general are active in this respect 
in contrast with what has been argued theoretically. Nevertheless, the 
quantitative figures lead to a superficial understanding, and emphasis 
should be put on the qualitative aspects as well. 
Thus the respondents were asked about the duration and nature of 
courses, the curricula, expenditures, and equipment. It was found that 
some courses for engineers had taken place in the parent corporation's 
plants. The duration of such courses amounted, on average to 6-12 
weeks. From the interviews with some managers, the general response 
was that they send some managers and engineers abroad in order to see 
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what is going on in these countries. Nevertheless some companies send 
their employees for between 24 and 48 weeks. 
As for courses arranged locally for workers, it was noted that their 
duration was too short: 3-6 weeks on average. These courses were run 
by local engineers and some fonner employees with long experience who, 
mostly came from public sector finns operating in similar industries. 
For those workers the training they had was in how to handle the 
materials and products between machines and how to package the product. 
This was in addition to some theoretical lectures about safety measures 
and work discipline. 
Even for engineers all that they learned was how to make the machines 
operate smoothly. But they have not been taught the key infonnation 
necessary to understand the detailed operations of these machines. 
This was really emphasized during the plant visits. $0, how could it 
be possible for these finns to adapt, modify, or even develop such 
sophisticated technology? 
And, unfortunately, it was impossible to translate training efforts 
into figures, since no one company was found to have plans for 
training. $0, there was no special budget or plans for manpower 
planning. 
In brief, there was no training that could possibly result in the 
implementation of technology into the country in the sense Akpakpan 
suggested: 
"Indigenous personnel employed in the firm are trained 
in the critical aspects of the operations and let into 
the secrets of the technology, to the extent that they 
are able to perform the relevant operations from start 
to finish without recourse to external agencies" (1983:185). 
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This situation in Egypt could be interpreted, in addition to what is 
noted in Chapters 2 and 4, by the fact that these companies are 
employing mostly workers who used to work in similar local industries. 
Hence, what they all need to know is how to deal with the new machines. 
So, there is no rationale for the transnationa1s to incur loss of time 
and money for further training especially if, as seen above, they are 
guarding their technology secrets jealously. 
5.6 Research and Development and Technology Transfer (R I D): 
Research and development is one of the aspects closely connected with 
OFI in general and transfer of technology via the TNCs in particular. 
There is a consensus in the economic literature, as seen in Chapter 2, 
that these corporations tend to concentrate their R & 0 activities in 
their home countries. Further, the vast majority of such activities 
outside the home country are channeled into other advanced markets. 
Hence, the share of developing countries in these efforts is very 
limited. This argument is supported by ample evidence as seen in the 
same chapter. 
As far as the case of Egypt is concerned, the analysis of our findings 
suggests that the actual practice of these companies has shown no 
contradiction with the argument summarized above. Two out of twenty 
five companies said that they undertake R & O. Nevertheless on 
investigation it transpired that what they claimed is not R & 0 in the 
sense noted in Chapter two, but they are doing tests on some 
chemical inputs in their own laboratories according to standards 
dictated by their parent firm. In addition both companies were in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Not one company of the 25, including these 
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two has plans, budget, staff or any sign that indicates that they may 
consider embarking on R&D in Egypt. 
Thus, since the beginning of their production up to now, no one company 
reported the invention or the development of any their products or 
processes locally. And hence, they are, as seen above, absolutely 
dependent on their parent firm for technology and its R&D 
requirement. 
Furthermore, the respondents were asked about the extent of their links 
with local R&D units and universities. The response was that all 
companies but one, have no relation of any kind with such local 
institutions. And in the unique case, it was found that it had some 
sort of link, albeit unsystematic, with Ain Shams University in order 
to research the best ways for the storage of their products. In 
consequence, there were no exchange visits, lectures, studies or any 
financial support even in the form of scholarships for those who are 
working in the local institutions in fields related to the activities 
of the TNCs. 
But one might ask why is this in a country which has great potential in 
this regard, as we have seen in the last chapter? This could be 
attributed to many factors, some of them are related to the TNCs and 
others are connected with the situation in Egypt. 
On the one hand, the respondent companies tried to justify their 
position on the grounds of the smallness of their size. Such a 
justification raises an important question about the relationship 
between R&D and the size of the firm. This question is in fact a 
subject of controversy. Some see that large size and monopoly power 
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are important pre-requisites for firms to perform R&D (Pavitt and 
Worboys, 1977:36), while others argue that small firms are more 
efficient at performing innovative activities and represent the main 
source of innovations. (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1982:43). A third group 
adopted a compromise between the two standpoints above and suggested 
that: 
"Both large and small firms play essential roles in the process 
of technological innovation, and ••• these roles are 
compl ementary, interdependent and ever changi ng." (1) (Pavi tt & 
Worboys, 1977:37). 
And as far as the TNCs are concerned, it may be useful to mention that 
they are, mostly, producing products similar to those they are 
producing in advanced markets. Hence there is no logic, from their 
point of view, in undertaking new R&D to produce different products 
or to use different methods to produce the same products. Secondly, in 
addition, it has been noted by the ILO that: 
"Foreign companies are keen to circulate their R&D efforts 
within the company and dislike to get rooted to the host 
countries, especially if they are developing ones." 
OLO, 1976:25). 
On the other hand, some factors related to the attitude of the Egyptian 
government in this regard could be noted. First, this government has 
paid no significant concern to the question of R&D. So foreign 
firms are left free to link their production in Egypt with R&D 
undertaken in another country. Secondly, as for local R&D 
institutions, it was found that they also paid no attention to 
establishing a relationship with the Foreign investment sector. 
These factors are in addition to what has been noted in Chapter 4, 
(1) For more detail see: Rosenberg, 1976, 109 and Parker, 1973 
Chapter 8. 
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regarding the lack of links with the productive sector and the 
domination of basic rather than applied research, etc. 
Ultimately, these factors together have contributed to the creation of 
the situation described above. 
5.7 Inter-Sectoral Relations: 
This section seeks to present results regarding the extent to which the 
surveyed firms are rooted in the machinery of the local economy. The 
relations between these companies and the rest of the productive sector 
could take the form of: a) backward linkages, in order to obtain 
machinery, equipment, intermediate inputs, raw materials and other 
requirements of production and b) the supply of technologies, 
components and inputs, to other industries or sectors of the economy. 
The potential role that the TNCs may play in this regard depend upon 
such factors as: 
a) The global strategy of the TNCs, taking into account the nature 
of the technology transferred, its adaptation, and R&D. 
b) The socio-economic and political situation in the host 
country. 
c) Government policies (Lall, 1978: 1). 
(1) For more detail see Watanabe, 1972: 427; Lall, 
1980: 208-209. 
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This issue has been argued in the economic literature as, we have noted 
in Chapter Two. The dominant view is that the TNCs are reluctant to 
get rooted in the developing host economies and hence, they hardly buy 
their requirements or establish supplying industries in these markets. 
In the meantime, these companies are deeply connected with their 
economies and keen to keep developing economies' markets open for their 
products abroad, a situation which would enable them to maximize their 
returns, albeit in a hidden way. 
In the case of Egypt, 24 firms out of twenty five responded to 
question on this issue. A deep insight into the data provided by them 
suggests that forward linkages were so limited that they may be 
negligible. Only one company out of 24 responded that it has a 
systematic relation with a public sector marketing company in order to 
market its products. 
Furthermore the contract conditions included no technical assistanceJn 
market research and in the art of marketing. Beyond this case, no one 
firm was found to provide systematically local industries with some of 
their inputs requirements or the means of manufacturing them. 
As for the backward linkages, it was noted that they are relatively 
more significant. Raw materials purchases represent, as shown in Table 
5.10 about 69% of all mentioned linkages. For capital goods, the 
evidence suggests that the respondent firms have been outward looking 
for their requirements viz, they import the vast majority of their 
needs of such goods from foreign sources. This is apart from one firm 
that was found to obtain some of its machine tools, no other company 
was found dOing the same. This was in addition to few other companies 
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that unsystematically purchase their needs from local markets in food 
and textile industries. 
TABLE 5.10 
Frequency Distribution of Relation Between Survey Companies 
and Other Local Firms 
Number % 
Forward Linkages 
Backward Linkages: 
- Capital Equipment 
- Intermediate Inputs 
- Raw Materials 
- Specific Manufactured Inputs 
- Other Contracts 
TOTAL 
SOURCE: Questionnaire Survey. 
1 
1 
1 
9 
1 
12 
7.7 
7.7 
7.7 
69.0 
a 
7.7 
100 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that purchases in the local market are 
concentrated in industries such as textiles, food and metallurgy. 
Moreover, these purchases account for a tiny portion of the total 
purchases of these companies. It was a common feature to find during 
the plant visits that there was a bias towards importing machinery, 
equipment and the complementary parts in addition to the vast majority 
of inputs and raw materials that fit in. In one firm, I was told: 
lilt is easier and safer to purchase the machinery 
and their requirements from abroad. Since when 
we come back locally produced anciliary products 
may fi t the machi nery or may not". 
In addition, in an interview with a senior manager of a firm operating 
in the pharmaceutical industry and which obtains 4% of its requirements 
of raw materials locally and 96% from abroad, he said that: 
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"Our parent company is reconvnending the specifications of raw 
materials to produce the same product as in (the parent 
country). This is why we are purchasing the raw materials from 
the same source that prov i de them in (the pa rent country) II • 
The previous situation outlines the fact that these companies are 
locked into specific sources of supplies of raw materials, spare parts, 
machinery, equipment, rather than in to the local market. Moreover, 
nothing was noted to indicate that these companies have engaged in 
manufacturing some of their requirements locally or prepared any plans, 
in this regard for the forseeable future. This is in spite of the fact 
that the country has a great potential, if used, in industries such as 
natural plants for drugs, textiles, food, metal 1 urgical s, and capital 
goods. 
Of course, this performance represents an extra burden on the balance 
of payments, a question that will be examined in the next chapter. 
But why is there such a heavy reliance on external sources? Again, 
this situation is due to many factors. Among them are: first, 
according to the replies of the respondent finns, they believe that 
local inputs of raw materials are uncompetitive being not of a quality 
as high as the imported ones. They are afraid of the delay in delivery 
which might cause a loss because of stoppages or below capacity 
working. All these companies in fact mentioned the unavailability of 
machinery, equipment and most of the required inputs and raw 
materi al s. 
Secondly, factors which are related to the transnationals' strategy. 
These firms as seen above tend to introduce advanced technology. Such 
a technology requires raw materials and inputs, etc., which are not 
available, in most cases in the local market. In addition, as seen 
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above, these companies are not keen to undertake R & 0 in the country 
in order to adapt their technology to use more local resources. And, 
it is not coincident with these companies' interests to establish local 
complementary industries as long as they produce the same supplies 
abroad and even more, they might maximize their returns from such 
supplies as will be seen below. So, as Hymer noted: 
II I nternati ona1 fi nns may fi nd it much easi er to 
import than to search for ways to use domestic sources". 
(Baranson, 1966: 276). 
Thirdly, the attitude followed by the Egyptian government regarding OFI 
in general and technology transfer in particular encourages the 
previous behaviour. At a time when there is no clear vision of what 
the country expects from OFI as we have seen in the previous chapter. 
The present Law article (15), stipulates that firms operating under 
it: 
II sha 11 be allowed to import, on condition of in specti on 
but without a license, whether by themselves or through 
a third party, the production facilities, materials, 
machinery, equipment, spare parts and transportation 
equipment required for the installation and operation 
of the proj ect ••• II • 
Additionally, there were many other concomitant measures that aimed to 
liberalize importation such as Law No. 118 of 1975 on exports and 
imports, the system of importing where imports were permitted for any-
one possessing hard currency. Such an atmosphere partly encouraged 
these companies not to consider getting their requirements locally 
either via sub-contracting or by manufacturing them. 
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5.8 Exports and the Transfer of Technology: 
In fact the question of exports by the TNCs from developing countries 
is a controversial one. Some argue that these companies via their 
advanced technology, high marketing skills, and their access to 
markets, are in a position to export more than local firms. In the 
meantime, there are some others who contend that the transnational 
corporations do not tend to export significantly from developing 
countries and their priorities are the markets of these countries 
(see Chapter One, Section 2 (II)). 
The advocates of O.D.E.P. in Egypt presumed that the TNCs would bring 
in advanced technology that would improve product quality. Thus these 
products would be more competitive, and hence exports would follow 
automatically. So, the national legislature has given a priority to 
projects that aim to export, (article 3 of Law 43 of 1974). 
As far as the surveyed companies' are concerned, the available data 
suggest that these companies record in exports is far from 
satisfactory. Four firms out of 25 exported some part of their 
products while the other 21 only supplied the local market. These four 
firms, as table 5.11 shows, differ between themselves, one exporting 
some 42% of its total production, while the others export between 3% to 
10.5% of their total production the rest being directed to the local 
market. This situation has resulted in an unfavourable position for 
local finms which are working in similar industries as we shall show in 
the next chapter. 
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TABLE 5.11 
Exports Value as a Percentage of Total Production 
by Exporting Companies of the Survey 
Firms Total Production Exports 
(1) (2) 
Metallurgy ) 13,244,000 4,198,000 
Pharmaceutical 9,255,000 255,000 
Textiles 984,000 45,000 
23,483,000 4,498,00 
SOURCE: GAFI 
I 
~ I (2/1 ) I 
I 
I 
31.6 I 
I 
3 I 
I 
4.5 I 
I 
I 
19 I 
I 
From Table 5.11 above, it can be seen that the surveyed firms, in 
general, have a poor export record. This is consistent with the fact 
that the total exports of 'Infitah' firms accounted for fE 16,872,800 
mn up to the end of 1982, representing about 2~ of total manufactured 
exports from Egypt. (Al Ahram Iktisadi, 1984). This performance is not 
surprising, since, as seen in the beginning of this chapter, the 
Egyptian market was given the first priority by the vast majority (80~) 
of the surveyed firms. The loose policy of the government in this 
regard did not encourage firms to consider exporting significantly. 
Up to now there 1s no obligation imposed on those companies to export. 
In contrast, their behaviour might sometimes be justified. For 
instance, 1n an interview the vice-chairman of the GAFI in the daily 
newspaper (ALAKHBAR) asked: 
"How can you make these companies export goods, which 
the local market imports from abroad". (27-10-1984). 
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This statement reveals that the local policy is contradicted in this 
regard. At a time when a priority is given to firms that mention in 
their application for investment that they are going to export, their 
failure to do so is justified by the same authority. Then why is this 
set as a priority from the beginning! 
5.9 Products of Foreign Sector Finis and the Transfer of Technology: 
This section is an attempt to examine to what extent products of 
the technology introduced by the TNCs in Egypt are appropriate to the 
needs of the masses. It has been argued, as noted in Chapter Two, that 
the inappropriate technology these corporations usually introduce into 
developing countries yields inappropriate products. Such technology 
produces luxury goods which concentrate on unnecessary and artificial 
ingredients of products rather than essential ones. In so doing TNCs' 
products mostly cater for a very tiny portion of the population in 
developing host economies (Chapter Two, III(A». 
Regarding Egypt, it was possible to obtain data which suggests that: 
First, the foreign investors were reluctant to get engaged in the 
capital goods industry, in the sense discussed in Chapter Two. In 
fact, this was so, since foreign investors were found to be reluctant 
to enter this field except for one firm from West Germany which formed 
a jOint-venture with a public sector firm in 1979 to produce 
distribution transformers up to 1,500 KVA/1 KV (UNCTC', 1982: Schedule 
II p. 294). This means so far as technology transfer is concerned, 
that the country is deprived of a) establishing a well founded capital 
goods industry integrated into the local economy, which could respond 
to its requirements more appropriately and b) further it is deprived of 
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creating a very important centre for spreading technological skills 
throughout the economy, in the sense discussed in Chapter Two. 
Secondly, contrary to the dearth of foreign investment in capital 
goods, it was noticed that the vast majority of foreign capital is 
directed towards consumption industries, both perishable and durable. 
This phenomenon, in fact may be considered a blessing, if such 
industries cater for the masses of the population. But, based on the 
available evidence, it was discovered that this tendency falls far 
short of meeting the basic needs of cheap clothing, food, housing, 
health services, essential and unavailable drugs. This is, because, it 
was found that the surveyed finns produce products identical to those 
produced in the advanced markets and at high prices which are far from 
the capacity of the ordinary people to pay. Not only have they done 
that, but also, most of their products are substitutes for products 
already locally produced and used to satisfy similar needs at lower 
prices. 
So, perhaps a review of some products would put the situation in a 
proper perspective. In the textile industry, which used to dominate 
the Egyptian industrial sector together with the food industry, it was 
found that surveyed finns in this industry, mostly, produce ready made 
clothes identical to what is sold in the advanced markets. What 
matters in this respect is two fold; first, the prices of these clothes 
are so high that only a very tiny portion of the population can afford 
them, apart from those who work in Arab oil-rich countries. Secondly, 
manufacturing these materials does not suit the local climate at all, 
especially in summer with hot weather. So, the products cause some 
skin problems to the body. 
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Another example is from the pharmaceutical industry. Here, it was 
found that the situation is not different from that seen above. Firms 
studied in this sector either wholly or majority foreign owned are 
engaged mainly in producing products that have the medical effect which 
products produced by local firms have. Nevertheless, their products 
are more expensive than their local equivalents as shown in Table 
5.12. 
From figures shown in this table, it is clear that foreign 
subsidiaries' products price exceeds by 15% - 100% the price of local 
firms' products. In the meantime the local market is suffering from the 
shortages of some important drugs for heart disease, diabetes and 
inflammation (October Weekly, No. 468, October 13, 1985). 
Moreover, these companies have embarked on heavy campaigns in order to 
create the impression that their products are superior compared with 
local ones. In this regard they have concentrated mainly on direct 
contacts with physicians and pharmacists. They are, in doing so, 
trying to capitalize on their worldwide known brand names. 
However, it was found that there are some intermediate products which 
are needed for economic development; examples of these were found in 
chemical industries such as insecticides, and ground plastic tubes, 
used in agricultural projects. 
Generally, the surveyed firms have been engaged in producing what they 
want to produce rather than what the masses of the population want. 
Such an attitude, in addition to other factors, has resulted in 
unfavourable repercussions on such factors as income distribution and 
local industry, which are discussed in Chapter Six. 
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TABLE 5.12 
Foreign Subsidiaries' Products and Their Local Equivalents. 
Foreign Subsidiaries Products I Price Local Products I Price j', 
.iE (1) I.iE (2) ~ 
I 
1- Rimactane 300mg cap. cap. cap. 8 5.250 RiFadin 300mg cap. cap. 8 I 4.250 124 
2. Spasmo cibalgin Ad. supp. 5 0.800 Supergen Adult supp. 0.500 160 
3. Tanderil 100mg tab. tab. 30 1.600 Oxyzone tab. tab. 30 0.800 200 
4. Velosef 500mg cap. cap. 12 6.550 CeFalexin 500mg cap. cap. 12 4.250 154 
5. De 1 tacortri 1 5mg tab. tab. 20 0.800 PridiLone tab. 10 0.500 160 
6. Dexacillin 500mg Vial. Vial. 1 0.750 Ampicillin 500mg vial 0.650 115 
SOURCE: Interviews with some Pharmacists. 
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The kind of behaviour documented above could be interpreted in many 
ways. First, these companies have been introducing and using advanced 
technology, where they are specialised and have advantages over local 
firms. This sort of technology naturally produces goods of the same 
kind, ; .e. luxury sophisticated, and differentiated goods. As Streeten 
noted: 
"The TNC has no special advantage in supplying simple basic 
needs goods and services". (1981: 399). 
Secondly, the most promising sector in a developing country economy is 
that of luxury consumption goods, where the effective demand of the 
tiny population is concentrated. The mass of the people, without 
effective demand, have limited weight in the market. So, their demand 
could not be reconciled with the interests of the investing companies. 
This situation is described succintly by Alan Bary: 
"The major impediment is the inability to reconcile the demand 
for corporate profits with a product low enough in cost to reach 
the needy in large ntJnbers". (Streeten, 1981: 400). 
Thirdly, the attitude of the Egyptian government of trying to get 
foreign investment at any price shares with the transnationals the 
blame in this regard. The government has invited foreign firms to 
invest in the country without determining the priorities to which 
foreign investment should be directed. Naturally, this is so, as noted 
in Chapter Four, in the absence of a strategy of economic development 
in the long run. 
5.10 Conclusion: 
This chapter sought to identify in empirical terms the role the TNCs 
played in technology transfer to Egypt. The evidence which was found 
and analysed over the previous pages suggested that the surveyed firms, 
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mostly introduce advanced and capital intensive technology compared 
with local firms. Such capital intensity was more noticeable in 
the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Although such technology 
is inappropriate to Egypt since it suffers from foreign exchange 
shortages, no significant adaptation effort was seen to take place 
either in the country nor abroad. 
Moreover, no R&D efforts of any kind could be traced. Such a 
phenomenon was justified on the grounds that these firms are of small 
size. So, these firms were found to be absolutely dependent on their 
parents not only for technology but also for other complementaries, 
a situation that resulted in concentrating the choice of technology and 
other key decisions in the hands of the foreign partner. In addition, 
the relations between these firms and local R&D units and 
universities were cut off. 
Rather noticeable was the absence of a genuine training of local 
personnel on the key information and knowledge underlying introduced 
technology. So, a real transfer of technology by these companies to 
Egypt is in serious doubt. What aggravates the situation is that the 
surveyed firms were found disintegrated with the national economy. The 
vast majority of production requirements of inputs, raw materials and 
machinery are imported from abroad and mainly from their parents. 
Additionally, it was noted that most of these companies were producing 
only for the local market, while four of the total exported about one-
fifth of their production and the rest channelled into the local 
market. Further, the majority of these products was not coincident 
with the needs of the masses for housing, health, food and drugs, etc. 
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Such behaviour was the outcome of many factors, some of them are 
connected with the strategies of the TNC as an organisation which 
ultimately aims at maximizing its returns. Some others rest with the 
attitude adopted by the Government towards OFI. For example, up to 
now, there is no definite policy related to technology transfer, and 
what the country needs and what it does not need. 
So, logic dictates that the Egyptian government should step in and take 
the necessary measures to implant and anchor technology into the local 
economy. This means that it must abandon the belief that market forces 
would automatically do its task. This is if the country is to achieve 
a self-reliant economic development: 
"Successful industrialization has depended not simply upon the 
transfer of more advanced technology to a backward country, but 
upon the acquisition of the ability to originate technical 
progress". (Sutcliffe, 1971: 335). 
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DtAPTER SIX 
The Econ~ics of Foreign Direct InvestEnt and 
Transfer of Technology to Egypt 
As we have argued and tried to show, the outcome of the transnational 
corporations' involvement in foreign markets is in question. There is 
strong and ample empirical evidence that the results of TNC direct 
foreign investment in developing countries are very disappointing. 
As far as the question of transfer of technology is concerned, it has 
been noted that these companies involvement in developing economies has 
not resulted in a genuine transfer of technology in a way in which 
these countries might be able to master the technology introduced in 
their economies. Nonetheless, it has been noted also that the blame 
rests with the transnationals as well as with the host countries, in 
tenms of their policies towards OFI, technology transfer, their 
commitments to industrialization, R & 0 and education. In addition, 
the introduction of foreign technology in particular and OFI 1n 
general (as we saw in Chapter Two) has immediate direct and indirect 
repercussions on the host economy. Such repercussions can affect the 
whole economy, the industrial structure, balance of payments, 
employment, income distribution, and the potential that the country 
might have for developing technical capabilities. 
Regarding Egypt's case, this chapter presents an attempt to put the 
findings of the survey, detailed in Chapter Five, in a broader context. 
So, its analysis will proceed at the macro level. The aim is 
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to see how far the TNCs and OFI have affected the performance of the 
Egyptian economy. In so dOing, I will draw on the theoretical debate 
reviewed in the previous chapters. 
This chapter will be divided into five broad sections. First we shall 
attempt to explore how far the structure of the Egyptian economy is 
affected by OFI and the importing of new technology. Secondly, we 
shall examine the balance of payments situation under the OOEP and 
assess whether it has improved as was claimed by the advocates of 
this policy. Thirdly, we shall assess the contribution of OFI and 
the introduced technology towards the creation of new jobs in addition 
to the effect that they might have in this respect at present and 
for the future. Naturally as alluded to above, the pattern of income 
distribution would be affected under the new mechanism at work in 
the Egyptian economy and this question will be examined in the fifth 
section. The sixth section will try to estimate the impetus that 
foreign companies might give to the development of local technological 
capabilities. The chapter will end with a conclusion summarizing 
its main findings. 
6.2 TNCs. Transfer of Technology and Structural Changes in the 
Egyptian Econ~ 
The development trends of any economy's structure could be deduced 
from features such as the relation between production factors, for 
instance the relation between labour and capital, the aim of the 
production e.g. whether it produces to satisfy basic needs. The method 
in which certain economies managed and directed viz, by planning or 
market forces; the relative weight of economic sectors; and the 
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relations between the economy with other external economies [Abdel-
Khalek, 1978:363]. 
In the case of Egypt, the effect of DFI on the structure of the economy 
has not yet become clear. However, there are many changes that might 
bring us towards a tentative conclusion in the light of the field 
survey findings revealed in Chapter Five. 
The notion held in the early 1970s was that the mere opening of the 
economy towards foreign investment, including the TNCs, would be 
followed by an inflow of capital and technology and hence economic 
development (Waterbury, 1983: 126). Thus, foreign investors have been 
left free in making their decisions about the field of investment, 
products, techniques, location and so forth. Naturally, these 
investors were to choose fields in harmony with their own interests 
irrespective of the country's urgent needs. (1) 
The analysis of the structural distribution of the investment that 
actually took place as presented in Chapter Three (section two), backs 
up the previous argument. Such a distribution could be summarized 
as follows: 
(1) This attitude on the side of the government of that time could 
be deduced clearly from the announcement made by the Premier 
of Egypt at the early stages of this policy: 
"Every condition is a restriction, and every restriction 
is incomprehensible. The thing is to let the investor 
direct himself to his natural place according to his own 
freedom of action and the dictates of the needs of the 
Egyptian market •••• Anything that leads to an increase 
in production and self-sufficiency and prosperity, we 
must accept and not refuse. We must accept all Arab 
and foreign capital that finds its way to investment in 
Egypt". (Al-Akhbar in Waterbury, Ibid). 
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(i) Industry takes the lead with 39.8~ of the total number of 
projects and occupies second place in terms of capital with 
19.6% of the actual invested capital up to the end of 1982. 
(ii) Service and finance projects take second place with 38.7~, 
but are in the lead so far as actual invested capital is 
concerned with 68.7%. 
(iii) The construction sector, in turn occupies third place with 
16.1% of projects and the bottom place in capital with 4.8~ 
of the total. 
(iv) Finally, the agricultural projects come nearly at the bottom 
with 5.2% and 6.8% of both number of projects and total capital 
respectively. 
In fact, these figures seen above speak for themselves. Comparatively, 
in spite of a slight difference between finance and service projects 
and the industrial ones in terms of number (1.1~), the former projects 
are very well ahead in terms of capital. Their share is nearly three 
and half times (350%) the share of industrial projects. It is also 
about ten and fourteen times more than capital invested in both 
agriculture and construction respectively. Such a bias towards finance 
and service projects resulted, as noted in Chapter Three (Section 
two) in a rapid increase in the number of commercial agencies. 
Another result of the bias towards finance and service projects and 
the 'laissez faire ' policy is the mushrooming increase in foreign and 
joint-venture banks. Those banks numbered 63, by the end of 1982 
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not only exceeding the country· s needs but also working against the 
desired objective of allowing them in. They, at a time when they 
are reluctant to finance long-term transactions, are financing short-
term ones (Male, 1983: 32). And, during a period they were supposed 
to inject new capital into the economy, they siphoned it off. 
According to the central bank reports in 1977 foreign banks held 
foreign exchange deposited with them by Egyptians working abroad in 
accounts with their parent banks outside Egypt. Their initial capital 
was £E 26 mn, whilst they transferred to their parent banks about 
£E 160 mn, i.e. 6 times over their original capital (Oessouki, 1982: 
81). 
Such behaviour attracted the attention of public opinion, press and 
the specialists as well. Gritli questioned the justification for 
the existence of such banks in the Egyptian economy and suggested 
that the country should support and encourage the indigenous banks. 
(Gritli, 1977: 275-76). 
Again, though there is no clear-cut causal relationship between OFl, 
technology transfer and structural changes in the Egyptian economy, 
the previous structural distribution of foreign investment is 
coincidental with some structural changes this economy witnessed over 
the last ten years or so. These changes as depicted on table 6.1, 
could be illustrated as follows: First, agriculture·s share in the GOP, 
though it averaged around 30% from 1972 to 1973, dropped from its 
peak (34.1%) in 1974 to 20% in 1982, experiencing a steady decline 
over the period 1978-1982. In addition, its proportion of total 
investment over the period 1974-1979 witnessed a decline it did not 
witness since 1952 (El-Zohry, 1984: 119) the same fate was experienced 
in its share of employment as will be seen below. This is while the 
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i ABLE 6.' 
National GOP by Sector at Current Factor Cost 1971/72 - 1981-82. 
Year/Sector 1971172 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Agriculture 29.6 31 .6 33 34.1 32 30.1 27.5 29 26 22.4 
Menufacturlng 
Industries 20.5 18.8 18.7 18.3 18.2 17 17.1 16.3 14.8 13 .6 
Petroleum 1 .5 1 • 1 1 • 1 1 .5 2.7 5.4 7.2 8 • 1 14 18.4 
Electricity 1 .7 1 .5 1 .4 1 .3 1 .6 1 .3 1 .2 1 • 1 1 .0 0.9 
Construction 4.1 4.1 3.3 3.6 3.2 4.3 4.3 4 4.2 5 
Trensport, 
Communlcetlon & 
Storege 5.1 5.2 4.9 4.5 5 7.0 7.3 5 4.4 4.2 
Suez Cenal - - - - - - 2.4 2.2 4 
4.2 
Trede & Flnence 
Insurence 9.1 9.5 9.7 10.8 10.9 11 .7 9.8 11 .8 10.8 10.2 
Hotels & 
Resteurents - - - - - - - - - -
Housing 4.2 4.1 3.9 3.4 3 2.3 2.2 1 .9 1 .6 1 .4 
Pub IIc Uti IIties 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Service ) 
Prlvete ) 
Soclel ) 23.6 23.6 13 .6 21 .1 21 .0 20.1 20.1 19.7 18.3 19.1 
Insurence ) 
Services 
Flnence - - - - - - - - - -
Grend Totel 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
SOURCE: yeers from 1971/72 to 1975 from Centrel Benk annual Report 1976 in Abdel Khalek 1978:382 
years from 1976 to 1981/82 from N.B.E., 1983 vol.XXXVI No.1 Teble 611 
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" ,.... ...... -_ .... 
1980/81 1981/82 
20.6 20 
12.3 13.5 
18.4 14.9 
0.8 0.5 
4.6 4.7 
3.6 4.3 
3.7 3.5 
17.2 18.3 
1 .3 1 • 1 
1 .8 1 .8 
0.2 o • 1 
3.6 4.2 
11 13 
100 100 
country's imports of food have been increasing over time. Their 
imports represent, according to the Minister of Economy, about (40%) 
of the country's total needs (Al-Akbar, August, 6,1985). Secondly, 
as for manufacturing industries, their share in GOP witnessed a steady 
decline over the last ten years, as table 6.1 indicates a drop of 
54% over the period 1971/72 -1981/82. Thirdly, there has been, in 
contrast with the commodity sector, a relatively steady increase in 
the trade and finance sector's share. It rose by about (100%) over 
the same period. Fourthly, these changes were in addition to the 
increase in the share of oil in GOP from (1.5%) in the beginning of 
this period to about (15%) at the end. The Suez Canal revenues started 
to benefit the economy after 1977 and their share in the GOP rose 
from (2.4%)"in 1971/72 to (3.5%) in 1981/82. By the some token some 
other activities not in the commodity sector have experienced increases 
as Table 6.1 shows. 
In brief, the economy of Egypt witnessed the development of an economic 
structure biased towards the finance and service sectors, whilst 
industry and agriculture were badly and adversely affected, over the 
period 1971/72 - 1981/82. And such a development was concomitant 
with a similar pattern of OFI distribution structure as seen above. 
This situation was naturally to be reflected in the structure of 
exports and imports development, insofar as both exports and imports 
have witnessed a dramatic change over nearly the same period and under 
the same conditions in terms of both quantity and destination. As 
for the development of exports of finished, semi-finished manufactured 
goods and raw materials (oil, raw cotton, etc.), figures shown in 
Table 6.2 clarify the fact that exports of manufactured goods are 
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deteriorating. In absolute terms they declined over the last three 
years, since 1979. In some detail traditional exports of semi-finished 
goods as cotton yarn, essential oil, and ingot aluminium, dropped 
by 34% since 1979. In addition, the exports of finished goods 
experienced a decline by 4.7% over the same period. Correspondingly, 
their share as a proportion of total exports was declining since 1978 
from 43% to 15% in 1982 (NBE 1983: 103). This drastic change could 
be interpreted as a consequence of the increasing local consumption. 
But why under the ODEP, did other exports of other goods not offset 
such a decline, when increasing exports was one of its declared aims! 
In fact there are many other reasons as will be discussed below in 
turn. 
So, the Egyptian economy came, in an unprecedented way since the 1960s, 
to be highly dominated by exports of raw materials. Oil exports for 
instance, accounted for 66% of the total in 1982. Thus, 011 and raw 
cotton, in addition to some other raw materials accounted for 85% 
of Egypt's exports in 1982 instead of 62% in 1974. This deteriorated 
position reminds one of the position which prevailed in the pre-1952 
era as seen in Chapter Three (Section one). 
Thus the structural changes seen above clearly affected the pattern 
of trade. On top of that imports increased very rapidly over the 
same period 1974-1982, as we shall observe in section III below. 
In addition, what constitutes a noticeable change in the economic 
structure is the shift of its trade away from centrally planned 
economies toward capitalist markets over the period 1972-1982. In 
this regard, as table 6.3 demonstrates, at the beginning of this period 
the largest proportion of exports was channelled to centrally planned 
economies and just about one-third of imports came from these 
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TABLE 6.2 
The Development of Exports of Finished, Semi-finished Goods and 
Raw Materials 1974-1982. 
Year Total Exports of % of (2/1) % of exports 
Exports finished and of primary goods 
semi - fi ni shed 
goods 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1974 593.3 224.8 38 62 
1975 548.6 248.6 45 55 
1976 594.4 219.5 37 63 
1977 668.4 245.8 38 62 
1978 679.8 292.4 43 57 
1979 1. 787.5 402.5 31 69 
1980 12. 132.2 360.6 17 83 
1 
1981 12. 262.9 381.2 17 83 
1 
1982 12. 184.1 316.6 15 85 
1 
SOURCE: Calculated from table 2/3, N. B. E. 1983, p.103 
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countries. At a time when the country imported about one-half of 
its needs from the market economies, it exported about one-fifth of 
its total exports to them. And the situation with the third group 
(developing countries) was relatively equal. But, over time and under 
the adoption of OOEP and the concomitant policies to liberalize the 
economy as seen above, the situation became different. As the same 
table reveals, trade with the centrally planned economies dropped 
in terms of both exports and imports. In the meantime, trade with 
developed markets witnessed a sharp increase to approach over 50% 
of total exports and nearly 75% of total imports. And its share of 
exports going to developing countries increased by 61% while the share 
of imports from these countries decreased by 26%. 
In addition to the structural changes noted above, which took place 
under the aegis of OFI led development, there is a similar situation 
regarding OFI in the industrial sector. The general presumption as 
seen in Chapter Two is that TNCs prefer to invest in the consumer goods 
industries and are reluctant to invest in capital goods manufacturing 
in developing countries. This argument was supported by empirical 
evidence from many of these countries. 
In this connection, Egypt is no exception. During the field-work, 
we could not discover significant OFI in the machinery manufacturing 
industries except for a joint-venture established in 1979 between a 
public sector company and a West German firm (see Chapter Five). 
This point is supported also by Professor Gameh: 
"Law No.43 of 1974 has not achieved its purpose until now. 
It (OFI) does not produce capital goods or equipment necessary 
for the production process. What we have seen are a variety 
of consumpti on goods". (Al-Ahrami K ti sad;, 1981: 15) 
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TABLE 6.3 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
The Egyptian International Trade by Economic Groups. 
1972-1982. 
Centrally Planned 
Countries 
Capitalist Developed 
Countries 
Developing Countries 
EX ~ 1M ~ EX ~ 1M ~ EX ~ 1M ~ 
61.1 32.3 20.9 48.4 17.8 19.1 
55.1 29.5 28.3 53.1 16.5 17.2 
55.4 24.1 30.8 62.6 13.7 13.2 
67.7 19.1 14.4 65.4 11.5 15.4 
48.9 14.8 31.9 68.3 19.1 16.8 
44.1 16.1 34.8 68.9 20.9 14.9 
49.3 14.4 43.8 69.4 21.4 16.1 
26.1 10 .8 63.5 73.0 10.2 13.1 
18.1 13.3 60.2 73.0 21.6 13 .5 
17 .6 13.1 52.1 54.3 30.1 32.4 
17.7 13.2 53.1 72.6 29.1 14.0 
SOURCE: Calculated from N.E.B., 1983, Table 2.2 
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In this respect, there are limits, as we saw 1n Chapter Two, for 
setting up capital goods industries in the Third World countries. 
It has been noted that a capital goods sector is a function of market 
size (Rosenberg, 1977: 143). Therefore, the narrower the market, 
the limited the chances of establishing such a sector. In fact, this 
argument is very strong. Yet, it does not explain the behaviour of 
foreign companies in Egypt for the following reasons. First, this 
country has a promising potential market for such goods. Imports of 
capital goods as illustrated in next section, have been growing at 
about lOOt per annum, since 1973. This increase could be ascribed 
to the rehabilitation and modernization of existing local firms 
(see Chapter Four), in addition to the increase resulting from imports 
by project operating under the ODEP. According to UNCTAD, Egypt's 
imports of metal cutting and metal forming machine tools increased 
from $59 mn to $65 mn in 1977 and 1979 between contant prices (UNCTAD, 
1982: Part III). Secondly, Egypt is relatively the most industrialized 
country in the Arab world. So, it has an encouraging potential to 
export capital goods to these countries' markets. 
So, what could be the reasons behind the reluctance of the TNCs towards 
investment in such a crucial industry? As a matter of fact, as far 
as Egypt's case is concerned, no particular reasons were found. In 
consequence, one may draw on the theoretical explanations for this 
behaviour. Colman & Nixson, have noted, among other reasons (see 
Chapter Two), that capital intensive techniques and the reluctance 
of the TNCs to invest in machinery-manufacturing-industries support 
each other. This is since the adoption of capital intensive techniques 
of production by the transnationals necessitates highly advanced and 
specialized machinery, a situation that constrains the demand for 
machinery that could be manufactured in developing countries (1978: 
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234-235). Not only this but also there is a 'demonstration effect ' 
that might push local firms to buy advanced technology and hence 
compatible advanced machinery from foreign sources. This sort of 
behaviour eventually would detach them from local suppliers. 
On the other hand, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, the TNCs are keen 
to introduce consumer goods similar to those produced in their home 
markets. Such goods are often luxuries as far as the majority of 
people in developing countries are concerned. Their production 
requires advanced techniques and hence sophisticated machinery, and 
this demand can only met from developed countries. So, as seen in 
that chapter, an indirect relationship between the consumers and the 
manufacturers of capital goods in developed countries might arise. 
Therefore, a local capital goods sector in developing countries, if 
there is any, would be damaged or at least undermined. 
In the light of this argument, one may claim that this is the situation 
that at least exists in Egypt now. In Chapter Five, the findings 
of the field work revealed that these companies introduce mostly 
capital intensive techniques, produce products similar to those seen 
in developed countries, and campaign heavily for such products. So, 
the 'vicious circle ' is working in the Egyptian economy instead of 
the 'virtuous circle ' as illustrated in Chapter Two. 
As a corollary, technological dependence as defined by Merhav as 'the 
dependence on imports of capital goods ' becomes unavoidable (Merhav, 
1969: 16). In addition, from the pattern of the goods produced it 
is clear that they cater for a certain tiny class who could afford 
them (see Chapter Five). This issue, in fact, adds further dimensions 
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to the change in the economic structure. We shall discuss this 
question, in detail in Section IV below. 
The consumption goods produced by the TNCs have represented a major 
challenge to local industry as a result of fierce competition. Since 
the TNCs are enjoying many privileges under the foreign investment 
law, as seen in Chapters Three and Four, having a superiority in 
advanced production technology, marketing skills and high product 
differentiation capacity, they are in better position to dominate 
the market. As a result, local industries which produce products 
that satisfy similar needs to those which the transnationals products 
satisfy, have been suffering. 
The pharmaceutical industry, one of the most successful local 
industries, saw its share in the local market decline from 88.2~ in 
1973 to 78.3~ in 1980. Even worse, some of the local firms began 
to achieve losses for the first time (Galal, 1983: 240-41). In fact, 
this is not because of the inefficiency of these firms, but because 
as seen above, foreign companies enjoy a variety of incentives, and 
they are embarking upon very heavy campaigns to promote their products, 
especially the direct contacts with the physicians and pharmacists. 
More recently they appealed to the last group in the local newspaper 
offering reduction in their prices of 10~ off the normal price 
of their drugs. (different issues of Al Ahram newspaper, see No. 
November 1984). 
This sort of performance is taking place, despite what Galal noted: 
"Foreign subsidiaries shared or not with Egyptian capital have 
proved to be as poor channels for technology transfer as their 
parents' MNCs". (1983: 240). 
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In this respect, the ASRT in one of its studies came to the conclusion 
that foreign companies' investment in pharmaceuticals is a waste of 
resources. And it suggested that such investment would be more 
effective if channeled into manufacture of inputs and capital goods 
necessary for the pharmaceutical sector which needs more capital and 
high technology (ASRT, 1983: 14). 
The crises are not confined to this industry, but they, also, extend 
to include some other successful industries such as tyres and textiles, 
(Abdel Fadil, 1983: 6). In brief, Lloyds Bank Group in one of its 
reports commented that: 
"0DEP has been damaging Egyptian local industry rather than 
encouragi ng devel opment". (1982: 12) 
So, OFI is not only accentuating unbalanced development especially 
between capital and consumer goods sectors, but it also affects 
adversely existing local consumer goods industries. 
To summarize and conclude, the Egyptian economy has experienced various 
structural changes under the ODEP as follows: 
(i) The declining share of industrial and agricultural production 
as a proportion of GOP. 
(ii) In contast with the commodity goods, the increasing share of 
trade and finance, in addition to fields such as oil and Suez 
Canal, in the GOP. 
(iii) A decrease 1n the ratio of manufactured exports to total 
exports, in addition to the decreasing share of domestically 
produced goods in the local market. 
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(iv) An increase in the dependence on the advanced capitalist markets 
for trade with either or both the centrally planned economies 
and developing countries. 
(v) The imbalance between capital and consumer goods sectors and 
the dependence on developed market economies for importing 
the first category of goods. 
Such changes mean that, first, the Egyptian economy became more 
dependent upon unsteady revenues from sources such as oil, tourism, 
remittances of Egyptians working abroad, the Suez Canal and foreign 
aid. These sources could be characterised in two ways. (1) They 
do not reveal a genuine improvement in the economy. (2). They are 
unstable, viz their value is dependent on the situation on the 
international markets. So, the country's income becomes vulnerable 
to any possible events that might take place on the international 
scene. The clearest and most up to date example is, the decline in 
the national revenues from oil, remittances of workers abroad, the 
Suez Canal, as a result of the drop in oil prices. This is while 
the drop in oil prices has led to the dismissal of many Egyptians 
who used to work in oil exporting countries, the reduction of oil 
revenue and a reduction in shipping going through. Secondly, at a 
time when the government, without a deep and thorough study adopted 
the new policy to industrialize the country, the mechanism of OF! 
has been working the other way round. Thirdly, this means more 
dependence on foreign markets (Capitalist markets) for not only 
manufactured goods but also for food and in order to export the 
country's primary materials. 
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These are the main structural changes the Egyptian economy has 
undergone since 1974. In addition, the situation may get clearer, 
if we consider some of the other aspects of the economy such as the 
balance of payments situation, employment, and income distribution. 
6.3 TNCs Transfer of Technology and the Balance of P~nts 
The balance of payments in developing countries mirrors the structural 
changes that take place, in addition to the performance of the economy 
as a whole. Correlatively, OFI-led development has its impact on 
the balance of payments of countries adopting 'Laissez-faire' policies. 
This could take place via many mechanisms that TNCs employ. Technology 
in the case of OFI, usually is transferred with some amount of capital 
finance. It also is involved in the structure of exports and imports 
of the recipient country, and hence the use of transfer pricing 
becomes likely (see Chapters One and Two). It often has to be paid 
for in foreign exchange and these costs are in addition to some other 
subsidiary payments such as technical fees and expatriates' salaries, 
besides the indirect repercussions that it might have on the economy 
as a whole. 
In this respect, it has been noted that OFI would help to bridge the 
gap between local savings rates and necessary investment rates in 
recipient host economies. So, they might help 1n financing economic 
development and growth in these countries. In the meantime, advanced 
technology introduced by the transnationals could enable local products 
to be competitive and thereby, able to penetrate new markets, 
increasing export revenues and hence improving the balance of payments 
of developing countries (Agarwal, 1978: 83-84). 
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There are counter arguments (Chapter One (Section two) and Chapter 
Two regarding technology cost), which suggest that the TNCs in general 
are reluctant to export from developing countries and their record 
in this respect is relatively poor compared to that of local firms. 
They tend to concentrate in industries with a high import content, 
so their imports are far higher than local firms. 
So far as the Egyptian case is concerned it will, unfortunately, not 
be possible to determine in an accurate way the effect that technology 
transfer might have on its balance of payments. The access to 
statistics necessary for such assessment was not open, and what was 
made available was insufficient. Consequently, this section 
represents an attempt to shed some light on the effect that OFI and 
transfer of technology might have on the balance of payments. 
In Egypt, it was suggested that the best way to attract foreign 
technology was through foreign capital investment. According to GAFI 
(Chapter Three, Section two) the actual total inflow of capital from 
foreign sources (including Arab capital) amounted to fE 617,175 mn 
over the period 1974 - 1982, i.e. an annual average of some fE 
68,575mn. In fact this amount represents an insignificant proportion 
of the annual average investment (fE 3,607mn) over the period 1977 
- 1982. (Ministry of Planning, 1982: table 2: 15). 
Although, this contribution is modest, it may be useful to note, as 
we have seen in Chapter Five, that some of this capital represents 
a capitalization on intangible assets such as know-how and patents. 
In this respect, it has been argued that, the initial inflow of 
resources in kind cannot be considered as net foreign exchange gains, 
since TNCs usually tend to over estimate the value of their goods 
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and services, not to mention their intangible assets (Patel, 1984: 
64). 
The other possible source of contribution could be exports by foreign 
investment sector firms. In 1982, operating firms exported goods 
valued at nearly £E 17 mn out of a total industrial production of 
about £E 663,939 mn, viz, they exported some 2.5% of their production. 
These figures, undoubtedly, outline the fact that foreign companies 
have really a very poor record in this field either in absolute or 
relative terms. Reasons for such behaviour were discussed in Chapter 
Five. 
On the contrary there are many other factors that contribute 
significantly to the negative effects of OFI on the Egyptian balance 
of payments. Among these is the cost of technology that must be paid 
for in hard currency. Here, the exact determination of the price 
is impossible in the light of available and accessible material. 
Yet, it is necessary to refer to what has been noted in Chapter Five, 
that the duration of most licences, could be as long as 25-50 years, 
i.e. the country pays for technology that might be obsolete. In 
addition foreign firms charge different forms of payments for their 
technology such as lump sum royalties, equity share, or a combination 
of some of these. 
Moreover, it may be interesting to mention some examples of the effects 
which technology price might have in the long run. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, for instance, there are joint ventures 
operating Egypt since the 1960s. Their financial position as depicted 
on Table 6.4 demonstrates how royalties alone exceeded the initial 
capital introduced by them. Pfizer Misr, is an American subsidiary 
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TABLE 6.4 
The Actual Situation of Drug's Subsidiaries Operating in Egypt. 
(£E) 
r 
_._. -
--- -
I I 
First I Company Fixed Total Sales Total I Sci enti fi c I 
Year of I Capital Until 1979 Royalties I Offi ce I 3/1 
Production I in 1967/68 I Fees I 
I (1) (2 ) (3 ) I (4 ) I (5) 
I I I 
1962/63 I Pfi zer-Mi sr 1.200,0 51.129.500 1.993.341 I 3.358.493 I 166 % 
I I I 
1965 I Swi ss- phanna 0.313,0 77.360.354 1.146.643 I 8.146.643 I 366 % 
I I I 
1962/63 I H oech-Orient 0.624,0 33.428.259 1.832.975 I 2.006.531 I 294 % 
I I I 
SOURCE: - Capital employed from ~andeussa, 1974, Ph.D 1974, p. 95. 
-
2,3,4, from survey by A.S.R.T., 1981, p. 5-2/26. 
-
(5) calculated by the author. 
-.2.8b-
with 60% foreign ownership. The royalties charged for technology over 
the period 1962/63 - 1979 accounted for 166% more that its capital used 
in 1967/68. The situation for Hoechst-Orient is even much more 
pronounced. The ratio of royalties to the initital capital amounted to 
294% over the same period. And Swiss-Pharma heads the table with a 
ratio of 366% over the period 1966-1979. The last subsidiary paid in 
one year only 1979 as royalties £E 464,438, which exceeded the capital 
employed in 1967 by (48%). These were in addition to the scientific 
office fees that approached some £E 1,346 mn ;n the same year (ASRT, 
1981: 5-2/25). 
This example leaves no room for doubt that royalties work as a source 
of foreign exchange drain. And as seen in the previous section, 
these companies do not really transfer technology. This is since 
although the original period of licenses, for manufacturing certain 
products, was five years it has been repeatedly renewed over four 
times. This implies that these firms have not embarked upon a genuine 
transfer of technology, otherwise they would be able to depend on 
themselves (ASRT, 1983: 12). 
Secondly, profits also, represent another channel for draining foreign 
exchange out of Egypt. Regarding the three subsidiaries above it was 
reported that they achieve a high rate of profits. Such profits were 
115%, 53% and 52% for Hoeschst-Orient, Pfiza-Misr and Swiss-Pharma, 
respectively, of capital employed in 1967, (Gereffi, 1983: 191). 
Moreover, while undertaking the fieldwork for this thesis, it was 
possible to find some more examples. One subsidiary achieved profits 
within three years of the commencement of production of about 85% of 
its invested capital. So, suppose it is going to transfer from these 
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profits, a percentage equal to the foreign ownership share of 95%, 
this means that, it is going to transfer what amounts to 80% of its 
invested capital in just three years as profits. This is without 
counting the soft technology price that accounts for 5% of net sales 
as royalties (Chapter Five). 
In pursuance of profits, a strong correlation was found between the 
OOEP and the increase in repatriated profits from Egypt to abroad. 
In a study by the World Bank, it was noted that externally remitted 
profits were increasing over the period 1974 to 1981/82 as a percentage 
of GOP. As shown on Table 6.5 this rise in remittances is really 
impressive. It accounted in just three years for £E 2,3580 mn. 
This sum exceeds, in fact, the approximate inflow of foreign capital 
iE 617,176 mn over the same period by about four times (World Bank, 
1983 in Zaki, 1984: 16). This means clearly that just profits alone 
over three years were four times the capital brought in over eight 
to nine years. 
Yet, we must note that, these figures do not distinguish between 
sources of these profits since it might be there are other sources 
from other sectors. And, it should be noted also that these figures 
do not include royalties and other payments for foreign technology. 
But still what could be deduced here is that there is a coincidence 
between OFI policy and increasing repatriated profits. And these 
profits are not matched in any sense by foreign capital inflow. 
The question of repatriated profits raises a very important point. 
Namely the nature of such profits? Roythgeb noticed that in 
manufacturing sector profits usually come from sales in the host 
developing market in the local economy (Roythgeb, 1984: 1065). 
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TABLE 6.5 
Repatriated Profits and as Percentage of G.D.P. 
Year Repatriated G.D.P. % of 
Profits as G.D.P. 
(iE) 
(2)(000 ) (1) 
1974 ------- 0.5 
1979 512.0 9.846.0 5.2 
1980/81 806.0 15.808.3 5.1 
1981/82 1.040.0 19.638.8 5.3 
SOURCE: World Bank, 1983 in Zaki, 1984, p. 16 
and G.D.P. figures are from N.E.B. 
1983 Tabl e 6/1. 
- 2.<8'9 -
In Egypt, it was found as made clear in Chapter Five that the local 
market is the most important motive for the transnationals' 
involvement in this country. Hence the bulk of their industrial 
production 97.5% goes to the local market. In this market there are 
two systems of charges. First, these companies might charge for their 
products in foreign exchange mainly from the Egyptians working abroad, 
in addition to many others who are working within the country and 
get their salaries in dollars (Al Ahram Iktisadi, 1986: 7) and/or 
secondly, they might charge in Egyptian pounds and this is, in fact 
the dominant form. 
With regard to the first form, it has the possibility of depriving 
the country of a part of its foreign exchange by siphoning off the 
currencies from those people who are working abroad and possess hard 
currency. In addition, it helps to create a black market for foreign 
exchange transactions, thus adversely affecting the value of the local 
currency. As for the second form, foreign companies in order to 
repatriate their profits and the like, go to banks working in the 
country to do so. By doing so, they decrease the availability of 
foreign exchange in the local market, and hence increase, partly, 
the external debts of the country. 
Thirdly, in addition to the price that must be paid for intangible 
assets, there is the price of the 'hardware-technology' (see Chapter 
5). We have seen that TNCs are keen to import their requirements 
for such technology mainly from their home countries. Needless to 
say that the same tendency was found for the intermediate inputs and 
raw materials, in that these companies mostly, have not shown any 
will to establish locally industries for such needs. The reasons 
behind this policy are discussed in Chapter Five. As a result of 
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this tendency, it is not surprising to find that the foreign sector 
firms' imports of capital goods and other productive requirements 
have soared over the 1980-1982 period as shown in Table 6.6a. 
It is clear from this table that the operations of OFI sector firms 
are a net contributor to the deficits of the balance of payments in 
Egypt. In 1982, for instance, while their exports accounted for 
nearly fE 17 mn, they imported capital and intermediate goods valued 
at fE 558.8 mn. This simply means that their trade balance adds fE 
541.8 mn to the deficits of the national balance of payments. This 
adds to the burden the economy has been suffering, since not only 
are imports soaring in quantity but also, their prices, as shown on 
table 6.6 are increasing very rapidly. The prices of capital goods 
in 1980 were about 2.7 times of 1975 prices. As for intermediate 
goods they were 1.7 times more over the same period. Thus, the more 
the country imports the more it would pay for the same quantity. 
(NBE, 1983, Table 3.1 b). 
Fourthly, an additional source of foreign exchange drain is the 
sizeable salaries of the expatriates working in these companies. 
These salaries are often in foreign exchange and are exempted from 
the general tax on income. In addition, the expatriate has the right 
to repatriate (50%) of his salary to his country (Article 20 of Law 
43). This is, of course, via the formal channels, but in fact the 
expatriate could repatriate all what he wants in other forms such 
as, for example, travel cheques, or take his money in cash home with 
him. On the top of this the annual average of these salaries is not 
only high but also it is by far in excess of what their Egyptian 
colleagues command as shown in table 6.7. As a matter of fact the 
figures in this table speak for themselves, where the gap between 
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TABLE 6.6a 
Value of Imported Goods for Investment Projects in Inland 
1980-1982. 
(.fE,000) 
Years Capital Productive Total 
Goods Requirements 
1980 118.5 151.4 269.9 
1981 202.1 174.4 376.5 
1982 255 303.2 558.8 
SOURCE: G.A.F.I. Annual Report, Sept 1983 p. 104. 
TABLE 6.6b 
Indices of Foreign Trade Prices of Main Imports 1975 = 100 
Year/I terns Capital I ntermedi ate 
Goods Goods 
1976 110.5 80.8 
1977 132.5 89.5 
1978 153.6 118.1 
1979 206.2 141.0 
1980 272.6 171.9 
SOURCE: N.B.E., 1983 table (3.1b). 
both categories is very wide especially in sectors such as agriculture 
and animal wealth, finance and services. 
Fifthly, even the danger does not stop here, but with the increase 
of imports the use of I transfer pricing ' by the TNCs becomes very 
likely. The general argument, as seen Chapter One (Section two) and 
Chapter Two, suggests that the use of this device is in the very nature 
of the TNCs. This could be even if the subsidiary is a joint venture. 
Svejnen & Smith contended that I transfer pricing' plays an important 
part in joint venture mechanisms, especially for products untradeable 
on the international markets (1984: 164). 
Handoussa, in her research on the phanmaceutical industry in Egypt, 
noted that one subsidiary used 'transfer pricing' tactics so that 
the difference between the local value paid by that subsidiary and 
the anms length price for the imported inputs exceeded the value of 
royalties and profits repatriated to the parent company in the same 
year (1) (1974: 116). These practices happened in the phanmaceutical 
industry, in spite of the existence of a central agency to monitor 
imports of drugs and their manufacturing requirements. 
The same behaviour was found in the textile industry, where the foreign 
partner offered to sell the joint venture machinery valued at 
fE 58 mn. In the meantime the same machinery from the same supplier 
was offered at fE 38 mn to a public sector company, i.e. there 
was (52.6%) over pricing for the joint venture (Al Ahram Iktisadi, 
1979). There were also other expenditures surrounding the transaction 
(1) For more detail about this issue in the phanmaceutical industry 
in Egypt see Handoussa, 1974: 116-118. 
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TABLE 6.7 
Ex~atriates & Locals Wages Average Per Employee in a Year 
1n Projects Started Operation up to the End of 1982. 
Sector 
Industry 
Agri cul tural 
& Animal 
Weal th 
Construction 
& Consultancy 
& Housi ng 
Finance & 
Service 
General 
I 
I Expatriates 
I (1) 
I 
I 
I 5,075 
I 
I 
I 
I 22,200 , 
I 
I 
I 10,805 
, 
I 
I 20,486 , 
I 
1(1) 10,633 
I 
I 
I Local s 
I (2) 
, 
I 
, 1,075 
, 
, 
I 
I 795 
, 
, 
I 
, 640 
I 
I 
, 1,321 
, 
, 
1(2) 910 
I 
(iE) 
I I 
I 1/2 I 
, (3) times' 
I I 
I I 
, 5 I 
, , 
, I 
I I 
I 28 I 
, I 
, I 
I , 
I 16 I 
I , 
I I 
I 16 I , , 
I I 
I 11,6 I 
I I 
SOURCE: G.A.F .1. Statistics Department. 
(1) this general average is the result of 
expatriates salaries and the same for (2). 
expatriates number 
N.B. The comparison shown in the above tables does not compare like 
with like as far as expatriates and locals are concerned i.e. it does 
not take into account the difference in skills and occupation. It 
simply indicates that expatriates are in the more highly paid jobs. 
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such as $6.1 mn as commissions and $4.5 mn feasibility study paid 
to an American consultancy company (Ajami, 1982: 501). 
What one can deduce from the above is that the possibility of using 
transfer pricing in Egypt does exist and its use by the TNCs may 
increase especially after the expiry of tax exemption incentives. 
In this connection, it has been argued that the tax differential 
between countries is one of the greatest inducements for using transfer 
pricing by the TNCs (Lall, 1973: 196). And one might add that that 
this possibility is quite likely in Egypt in the DFI sector. This 
is because, there are no monitoring measures or policy to control 
the process of imports. So, firms are free to negotiate their 
transactions terms. 
In the light of what was seen above, we incline to agree with Professor 
Dowi dar that: 
"Technology transfer is a method of dominating and mobilising 
the drain of economic surplus abroad". (Dowidar, 1979: 820) 
The fact of the matter is that these companies' behaviour has had 
adverse repercussions on the economy, and especially on its balance 
of payments. The reasons for this are mentioned in Chapter Five, and 
they could be summarized here: 
(i) These companies main interest is the Egyptian market. 
(ii) They are working according to a unified global strategy. So, 
they have mostly adopted capital intensive techniques in the 
country. 
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(iii) This has made them closely integrated in their home economies 
and working as enclaves in the local economy. 
(iv) The effect that they have had on local industry is very 
damaging. In addition, local firms, in order to match them need 
to import similar technology and machinery. And this effect is 
not confined to the private sector companies but extended to 
include the public sector, (Abdel Fadil, 1983: 6-9). 
(v) So, the machinery of the whole economy is fueled from external 
sources and leads to what Yamazaw & Hirata labelled as 'shallow 
development' viz, development that depends heavily on imports 
and is not rooted deeply in the local economy (1978: 55). 
Naturally, the aggregate outcome has not been in favour of the balance 
of payments. So, figures of imports of capital intermediate and 
consumption goods are increasing very rapidly. Imports of capital 
goods increased from fE 79.2 mn in 1973 to reach fE 1,682.4 mn by the 
end of 1982, i.e. they increased by about 21 fold over the ten years, 
vehicles with a 67 fold increase; electrical machinery 47 fold, 
tractors 45 fold; and machinery for excavation and levelling 26 fold. 
This is in addition to what was mentioned in section two about machine 
tool imports. Also, imports from intermediate products increased from 
& E 131.8 mn to fE 2.033 mn over the same period. 
So, this increase in addition to the rise in imports of consumption 
goods, contributed to increasing the deficits of the balance of 
payments from fE 326.8 mn 1n 1974 to fE 4,170.4 mn in 1982. This 
situation is summarized in Table 6.9 
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TABLE 6.8 
Exports/Imports over the period 1974-1982 in (iE mn) 
YEAR EXPORTS I~O~S DEFICITS 1/2 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1974 593.3 920.1 - 326.8 64% 
1982 2,184.1 6,354.5 -4,170.4 34% 
SOURCE: N.B.E., 1983 vo1.XXXVI, No.1, table 2/5b. 
Thus, the situation of balance of payments, as shown in Table 6.9, 
deteriorated over the period 1974-1982. While, the exports are able 
to pay for 64% of imports in 1974, when Egypt was a net importer of 
oil, this ratio decreased to 34% in 1982, at a time when the country 
became a net exporter of oil. Oil exports alone accounted for 
fE 1,446.7 mn in 1982, i.e. 66% of total exports in that year. So, 
if oil exports excluded the exports would only have been able to pay 
for 11.5% of total imports (N.B.E. 1983, table 2/3: 103). 
So, the aspirations pinned on DFI and technology transfer to extricate 
the balance of payments out of its crises have proven to be unfounded. 
The Ministry of Planning in this regard noted that over the period 
1977-1982 the industrial sector turned out to be a net importer whereas 
industrial exports are still confined to the traditional industries 
such as food processing, shoes, beverages and textiles (Ministry of 
Planning, 1982: 14). Even more, as seen in the previous section some 
of these exports are declining because of the fierce competition from 
the TNCs. Consequently, all the previous factors (fewer exports and 
more imports, outflow of foreign exchange in the form of royalties, 
profits, transfer pricing) have had a steadily adverse effect on the 
balance of payments position. (Ranney, 1983: 13). 
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To sum up the deterioration of balance of pa,-ents situation emerged 
from: 
(i) high technology cost either directly in tenls of soft technology 
such as know-how and technical assistance, or in tenls of hard 
technology such as i.ported .achinery. and equipNent. 
(ii) indirectly, as in the i_perative i_portation of intenlediate 
inputs and raw .aterials cOlpat1ble with capital intensive 
technology introduced by foreign sector finis and their local 
imitators. 
(iii) the excessive repatriation of profits, ~stly generated in the 
local market and frOi capital raised in this .. rket as well. 
in addition to transfer pricing practices. 
(iv) the relittances of foreign expatriates involved with these 
companies. 
(v) the reluctance of foreign cOlpanies to introduce capital into 
the country, in addition to their poor record in exporting 
fral the country. 
(vi) other factors such as the drop in .. nufactured exportl and 
the increase of durable and non-durable conlUlptfon goodl. 
So, against a situation lfk. thil, whit could Egypt could do in order 
to continue in its policy, to sUltain its reputation II a countr,y 
to invest in, and to finance itl investlent progr .... s1 The naturll 
result was that the governlent went to the internltionll finlncfll 
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market, and to other institutions and governaents, seeking loans and 
aid. 
This situation has led to two unfavourable results. First, the 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF for example 
have had some influence on national econa-ic policy. This influence 
is alw~s in favour of liberalizing the econ~ and granting _ore 
room for market forces in allocating the resources and distributing 
the products. Secondly, this situation is one of .any factors that 
propelled Egypt into the 'debt trap'. In this connection, Egypt's 
external debts increased at a very rapid rate over the 1970s and the 
early 1980s. They rose fra- $1.6 billion in 1970, i.e. 23.7' of GNP 
to $2.3 billion in 1974, and reached about $27.8 billion in 1982 of 
short, medilR and long te,.. loans. This lleans that debt per capita 
rose from $58 in 1970 to over $620 in 1982/83 (World Bank, 1983 in 
Zaki, 1984: 330, Akbar AlyoUi. 1982). This is in addition to the 
military debts that accounted for $3 billion for the Socialist 
countries (Zaki. 1984: 33) and $4.5 billion for the U.S.A. alone (The 
Herald Tribune, 1985: 12-2-1985). (1) 
This trap has caused .. ny difficulties to the Egyptian econ~. Apart 
from the political el~nts. the World Bank Report noted thlt Egypt 
would have to pay debt service of about $2,3366.5 ~ in 1982/82 for 
its civil debts only (Zaki. 1984: 34). What is allnling is that the 
interest rate rose frGI 6.1' in 1910 to about 12.5' in 1981 for 
countries described as countries with a -.diUl lev,' of incGle. 
(Sultan, 1984: 4). This phenOienon becGles self-generating, Ifnc. 
(1) An IMF report issued in June 1985 est1 .. ted that Egypt's foreign 
debt rose to $31 bfll (The Herald Tribune, 6-9 - 1985). 
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to face these Oblfgations fn addition to the country's needs. the 
government might have to look for new loans and so on. 
Ironically. this phenOienon is taking place at a tiMe when the Egyptian 
econ~ dfversified its source of foreign exchange. it never 
experfenced before. such as remittances frOi Egyptians abroad. oil. 
Suez Canal. and touriSM. 
6.4 TICs, transfer of tec:hIIolOll ud Ellplopent 
The problem of une.ployaent and under-~ploy.ent is getting worse 
over time in the developing countries. This has been conca.itant 
with the industrialization progr..-es these countries have launched. 
In consequence. there has been increasing elphas1s on creating jobs 
for people. and hence the whole question of OFI and Technology Transfer 
has come under close scrutiny (Ghoshal. 1982: 27). 
In this connection. it has been noted as discussed in Chapter One. 
(Section two. IV). and Chapter Five (V). that the TNCs via transfer 
of capital and technology and hence the creation of Jobs, help to 
ease the prOblei of unelplo~ent in developing countries (B1ersteker, 
1978: 2.3). In the .. ant1.e. there is a counter argUient that these 
calpanies are alleviating the prObl .. (Chapter One, Section two IV). 
As far as Egypt is concerned. it gave this prObl81 a great deal of 
attention. especially in the late 1950s and in 1960, (see Chapter 
Three (Section one)). As a result over a .1111on job opportuniti.s 
were created over all the econ~ and the industrial sector's shire 
of total eMplo~nt increased fra- 8' in 1947 to 13.41 in 1966 
(IbrahiM. 1984: 6 and Abdel Fad11. 1980: 9). 
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By the beginnfng of the 1970, and the adoptfon of the ODEP, a new page 
in the economic policy started in Egypt. So, as a part of this policy 
that gfves market forces _uch _ore fnfluence fn allocating factors 
of production, the government's obligation to find a job for every 
graduate was relaxed. In additfon, the notion held by the advocates 
of the new policy was sf_flar to the one classfcal one, as seen above, 
viz, once foreign capftal started to flow into the country many jobs 
would be created automatically. 
Thus, in the light of this situation, the contribution and impact that 
foreign sector finis have on the elplo~ent question could be discussed 
within two broad eleMents: first, the actual contribution of capital 
invested in Egypt including the 10c41 share, working under law 43, 
to employment; secondly, the potential role that this sort of 
investment may have on this prOblei at the national level and its 
potential for the future. 
Characteristically, Egypt has one of the highest rates of population 
growth in the world. Its average over the period 1966-1979, has been 
around 2.7\ (CAPMS, 1980: 4). Further, there has been an annual 
addition to the labour force of 400,000 workers (Al Ahrar). SOMe other 
estimations put this figure as 450,000 a year (Hansen I Radwan, 1982 
in Aliboni, 1984: 123). Against this fact and as far as the first 
element is concerned the actual contribution of Ofl sector f1n1s over 
8-9 years as shown on table (6.10) aIOunted to 71,459 job 
opportunities. 
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TABLE (6.9) 
The Em~'oyment Structure in OFI finis starting operation up to the end 
of 198 
SECTOR 
Industry 
Agri & Construction 
Finance & Service 
TOTAL 
SOURCE: GAFI, 1983 tables 3. 
NUMBER 
29291 
33794 
9374 
71459 
~ OF THE TOTAL 
41 
47 
12 
100 
This table outlines the structural distribution of ~ployment in the 
OFI sector. It is clear that agricultural and construction ftnls 
have captured the .ajority cOMpared to the other sectors. This is 
in spite of the fact that, as seen in Section II, they contribute 
the least in tenls of invested capital. The industrial sector takes 
second place, and final,y finance and service projects. 
Thus, the total contribution of the OFI sector (71,460) represents 
only a very Modest proportion (0.6~) of total elplo~ent (12,100,700) 
in 1982/83. And the industrial sector share contributed only 1.9\ 
of the total elplo~ent in this sector (1,514,2). (NBE 1983, Table 
6/4). Moreover, the total contribution over 8-9 years represents 
just about 17.8\ of jobs needed in one year only as seen above. 
Furthermore, such a .odest share of OFI finiS does not represent 
a genuine gain to the labour force in this country. Most of these 
jobs were by people who were already working in local finiS in both 
public and private sectors. In fact, the public sector .11 the ~It 
hit one. Its elployees .ainly left their jobs under the lure of high 
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salaries in OFI sector firms (Gillespie, 1984: 138). Rather important, 
the fields most affected by this drain are those of the Most skilled 
and technical labour as well as Middle .anagelent. The ratio reached 
about 10.5\ in each of the previous categories. In addition, the 
higher management lost over 9\ of its people. On the other hand the 
lowest effect was noticeable in the least qualified and the least 
trained employees (Ayubi, 1982: 391). 
So, the prObl~ of the drain in Egypt is not only a 'Brain Drain' 
but also a 'muscle drain'. This prObl~ represents the .ost c~on 
COMplaint whenever one goes along different industries (1). 
If this is the actual contribution of these cOlpanies to elplo~ent. 
what does the future hold for Egypt in this regard? In fact, bearing 
in mind the past perfonaance as seen above and in Chapter Five 
one tends to agree with Muller's standpoint that if the past is a"y 
indication. the natural answer would be that the future is not 
promising (Muller. 1979: 249). 
During the field survey it was found that in aost cases the TNCs 
introduce capital intensive and unadapted technology. The average 
amount of capital needed to create a unit of labour, the capital-labour 
(KIL) ratio; was fE 18,000 in general. Ind fE 23,000 per operltive. 
At the level of the DFI sector IS a whole, it WIS fE 15,000 Iccording 
to GAFt figures. As seen in Chapter Five this ratio is two to four 
ti.es what is used in s1a1lar locil finiS. 
(1) See Al-Ahraa Kt1sldi, 1980: 23, Ayub1, 1982: 391-410; Slglsti 
Negad, 1982: 103; Gillespie, 1984: 137-138 etc. 
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Against this fact and in the light of the actual average rate of 
investment f£ 198 mn including the local share, the expectations would 
be disappointing indeed. This is because by the same measure (K/L) 
the previous sum this sectorls firms in general could create about 
13,200 job opportunities a year cOlpared with the figure of 400,000 
added to labour market every year. 
To create jobs for these workers, the country needs to invest sOle 
f£ 6 bn each year in new fields in different sectors. But, this is 
not likely in Egyptls case for the following reasons. First, the 
contribution of DFI, as seen above, is indeed .odest and does not 
genuinely help in this situation. Secondly, the e.phasis in the 1982 
- 1987 plan as seen in Chapter Four, is on the rehabilitation of the 
ongoing projects and just about 8\ of the planned investMent is 
targeted towards new projects. Thirdly, local finiS, as seen in 
Chapter Five, are trying to follow the s .. e path followed by Foreign 
companies. Thus, it is likely that the unelplo~nt prObl81 will 
become worse in the long run. 
This argUient could be justified in the light of the relative share 
of the econQlic sectors of total elplo~nt, as shown in Table 6.1U. 
The figures delonstrate clearly that the service sectorls relative 
share in total elplo~nt is the only one that showed a significant 
increase over the period 1976-1982/3. In the ~anti.e. the relative 
share of agriculture dropped over the Sale period to just 35\. As 
for industry, its relative share was characterised by relative 
steadiness around 12.4\ over the Sale period although it declined 
from the position (13.41) it reached in the .iddle of the 196U. 
- 305 -
TABLE 6.1Q 
The Development of Employment by Sector 
;n Percentage of Total Labour Force. 
1 1 
1980/1 1981/1 1982/ 
Year/Sector 1 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 81 1 82 1 83 
1 
I 
Industry 1 12.2 12.4 12.~ 12.6 12.6 12.2 1 12.1 12.5 
1 
Agriculture 1 42.1 41.5 40.4 39.4 37.9 37 1 36 35 
1 
I 
Ca.odity Sector 1 
in General 1 60 59.2 58.9 58.7 57.7 56 1 55 1 54.4 
1 
1 
Sen 1 ce Sector 140 41 41 41 42 44 1 45 146 
1 
SOURCE: Calculated fro. NBE, 1983, Table 6.5. 
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1 
While this is the situation in Egypt in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
some other developing countries have achieved a reMarkable success 
in employment. In South Korea and Singapore, for instance, the 
proportion of the labour force in industry j~ped from 9\ to 29\ and 
from 23\ to 39\ in both countries respectively over the period 1960-
1980. Such a successful achieveMent, as noted by Stewart, was a result 
of adopting policies that encouraged the expansion of labour intensive 
industries. Thus, these industries, were able to absorb the labour 
surplus (Stewart, 1984: 288-89). 
So, proceeding in this direction without radical changes in policies 
towards OFI in general and the nature of their technology in particular 
would aggravate the probleM of unemplo~nt in Egypt. In this respect 
Singer suggested: 
liThe larger the rate of population increase, the lIore is 
radically different technology needed to provide productive 
employment and prevent poverty·. (Singer, 1975: 177). 
Also, Franko caalented on the expectations of the advocates of OOEP 
for OFI to create -ore jobs, by saying that, the top 400 U.S. and 
non U.S. TNCs eMploy 30 million people allover the World. The nUiber 
employed in developing countries totalled 5 ~, a nUiber not twice 
as large as the e.ployable population of Catro and consistent with 
the capital intensive not labour intensive nature of the technology 
the TNCs tend to use (Franko, 1977: 21). 
5 TMCs, Transfer of TedIIIolO1l ud l-=-e DtstrilMltt .. 
The question of the effect of OFI in general and the transfer of 
technology in particular on the pattern of 1ncale distribution is one 
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of the most hotly debated issues in the econa.ic literature. It has 
been theoretically argued that OFI usually leads to equali~ in the 
recipient countries. This sort of investlent via injecting new capital 
and setting up new projects creates jobs and hence increases the demand 
for labour. In so doing, it raises wages, while capitalist inca.e 
declines (Moran, 1978: 90). 
However. there is another argument. as seen in Chapter One (Section 
IV). that DFI led industrialization creates a ~chanigl that deepens 
inequality in incOMe distribution in developing countries. And. in 
fact, this arg~ent is supported by ~ple evidence as well. 
Regarding Egypt, the structure of inca.e distribution has witnessed 
different changes under different socio econa.ic policies. This 
country, before 1952, when the role of the governaent was intangible, 
represented a traditional exa.ple of an unequal society. The land 
that was the .ain source of inca.e and wealth was distributed in a 
way that support this argUient. The ownership was concentrated in 
a tiny segment of the population. Two thousand f.-ilies possessed 
same 201 of the land. Meanwhile, there were .any .illions who were 
landless. So, in the early 1950s about 301 of the total incOie was 
captured by only 41 of households (El Issawy, 1982: 102). 
After the 1952 Revolution, there was a series of .. asures to rectify 
the situation. The first .aJor refonl was the land refonl fn 
September of the Sale year, f.e. after few ~nths of the Revolution in 
July. This was followed by other successive .. Isures such IS progress-
ive taxation, control of rents, subsidies, nltionalizltion, Egypt-
ianization, driving up elplo~nt poli~, .ini.UI wlges, free educltion 
for all people, and free health service, (Oessouki, 1982: 100). 
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These measures, and the like, resulted relatively in easing the unequal 
distribution of income the country witnessed before the revolution. 
Waterbury comMented in this respect that: 
"There is no questi on that Nasserist policies 1 ed to far 
reaching socio-economic leveling. In the span of two decades 
Egypt moved from a society in which the inequitable 
distribution of wealth was of a highly skewed latin ~rica 
variety to one which by non-socialist lDC standards was among 
the more equalitarian·. (Waterbury, 1983: 207) 
By the end of the 1960s decade and the early 1970s, especially since 
the adoption of the OOEP, the situation regarding income distribution 
has reversed. Unfortunately because of the non-existence of an 
accurate income distribution map, the analysis will depend upon a 
theoretical analysis, supported by some exa.ples whenever it is 
possible. Drawing on Muller's method of analysis regarding the 
relationship between MNC's technology and incoae distribution, we can 
analyse this question taking three factors into account: first, the 
capital-labour ratio; secondly, who this ratio benefits and thirdly, 
the nature of the tax systel prevailing in the country (1979: 250). 
Given that TNCs introduce capital intensive technology into the 
country, the largest part of generated 1nca.e cOles fra. capital and 
hence is captured by the capitalist. Thus, in a country like Egypt, 
the capitalists who are able to share with the TNCs are fairly few in 
number. In consequence, those who capture the largest part of incOie 
are a tiny class while the _ass of the labour force share in the rest. 
Even more, what aggravates the situation is 'the deaonstration effect' 
that the TNCs have on local businessmen, who increasingly .. ploy 
capital intensive technology. 
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This behaviour results, as seen in the previous section, in an 
increase in unemployment both in the short and long run. This ~ans 
that the share of labour in national 1nc~ is relatively declining 
over the time. KasseM, in his study about Joint ventures in Egypt, 
noted that wages' share in the national incOie distribution declined 
from 45' to 30', whilst, the property rights revenues increased sharply 
(1) (Al Ahrar, 1984). 
Furthenmore, the legal system has granted finis operating under Law 
43 many privileges as seen above in Chapter Three (Section two 1). 
And Law No.159 of 1981 ca.e to extend such privileges and even _ore 
to the local finis (GAfI, 1983: 40). In addition, the tax law has 
been modified many tiMes in favour of large incOMe groups. The 
amendments of 1978, for instance, reduced the li.its of tax for income 
of fE 70,000 and fE 100,000 to 70' and 80' respectively, instead of 
95\ on income of fE 10,000 (Dessouki, 1982: 77). Furthe~re, these 
groups are able to sidestep the tax systel in .aoy ways, by providing 
false statements or nothing at all. In the ~ant1 .. , people with 
limited incOle represent the guaranteed source of direct tax. So, 
about 70' of the tax revenues COMeS frOi indirect taxes (Dessouki. 
1982: 78). 
Moreover, the i~alance of 1ncOie distribution extends to include the 
labour force itself. Within this category. the .. ldistribution is 
quite clear between the expatriates and the locals. And within the 
(1) El- Essawy estimated that wages share in the national 1ncOie 
dropped fro. 50' in 1970/71 to 42.6' in 1976. And he est1 .. ted 
that 5' of population capture about 30' of this 1ncOie. (1982: 
102). 
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last category there is a difference between those who are working in 
OF! sector firms and those who are working in local firms. Regarding 
the expatriates, although they represent about 1.4\ of the total labour 
force in the OF! sector, they get about 14.5\ of total wages. On 
the contrary the locals represent about 98.6\ and get only some 85.5\ 
of total wages (GAFI, 1983: table 3). The difference between the 
two categories by sector is noted in Section III above. 
Even within the local labour force, there is a gap between those 
who work in OFI firms and those who work in local finiS in both the 
private and the public sectors. The first seglent as seen above, 
represents a very tiny fraction of the total labour force and gets 
income in terms of salaries and wages about 3401 of what their 
colleagues receive (~ubi, 1982: 366). 
Thus, the pattern of 1ncOie distribution in Egypt, by and large, has 
witnessed a significant shift COMpared with what prevailed in the 
1960s. The shift is in favour of the profit earners and those who 
are working in co--operat1on with th~, while, the _ajority of the 
population, especially those who have no ~ers of their f .. il1es 
abroad, are suffering a great deal. Their prOb18ls increase under 
an average annual inflation rate of 20' over the 1970s and early 19805. 
This rise really badly hit people on fixed incOie such as pensioners 
and wages earners, (Abdel Khalek, 1982: 275). 
Hursi, (1982: 28) suggested in this respect that the pattern of inca.e 
distribution has been re-shaped during the open-door pol1cy. He 
sunmarized the situation as follows: 
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(1) people living under the poverty line are 44\ in rural areas, 
33\ in urban areas and 37\ at the national level. 
(ii) 5\ of the population obtains 20\ of national income and 20\ 
of the population obtain less than 51. Also, 1n this 
connection, see El-Essa~, 1982: 102). 
To conclude, capital intensive technology, a.ong other factors has 
contributed to re-shaping the pattern of incOie distribution in Egypt. 
In addition to what has been noted above, this link could be 
illustrated theoretically. Moran, in this respect contended that: 
"A capital intensive foreign investJIent .ay rarely bid up 
the wages for a SMall dOMestic labour elite • (1978: 91). 
More preCisely, Vernon SUMmarized the link as follows: 
"If too much capital and too little labour are being used, then 
the class associated with Modern activities reaps ~re rewards 
than it ought to. And if they are sharing in the foreign 
investors monopoly rents by Means of partnership in foreign 
owned enterprises then the inequalities of inca.e distribution 
are greater still (1971: 184). 
Thus, the above analysis reveals how far conventional ideas (as noted 
above) about the inflow of foreign capital and incOle distribution 
could not be substantiated in the case of Egypt. 
In Egypt, as a matter of fact, it is very easy to find the three 
patterns (pattern of technology, pattern of 1ncOie distribution, and 
pattern of consumption) working together in the way noted in Chapter 
Two. In this country, in the 19705, luxury goods cln be found in 
every town, when the ~st needed essential goods ex .. pl., breld Ind 
cooking oil are difficult to find. However, .. ny goods, such IS 
cosmetiCS, biSCUits, .Iny kinds of soft drink, colour TVs, cars, 
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and metallic products are in surplus. Even more. these goods as 
seen during undertaking the field work and presented in Chapter Five 
are accompanied by a very heavy campaign of advertisement on the TV 
and the radio. So. actually one might be safe in arguing that foreign 
investment finms in Egypt instead of satisfying the essential needs 
of the masses are promoting what people do not need. 
Consequently. this sort of investment under the indifferent attitude 
of the government is transferring a way of life that affects adversely 
a developing country economy. The -are people cons~e. the less 
capital is directed towards 1nvestlent and the greater the dependence 
on foreign capital. 
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6.6 TNts, Transfer of Technology MCI Indigenous Technological 
Capability: 
The issue of building up an indigenous technological capability has 
attracted attention in developing countries in recent years. This 
could be a result of the desperation of these countries of the results 
of transfer technology via the TNCs viz: no genuine transfer of 
technology, the introduction of inappropriate production techniques. 
high cost, and unacceptable terms as we have seen in Chapters Two 
and Five. And it could be as a result of realizing that countries 
that have built a significant teChnological base have gained more 
from imported technology imported frQl abroad. and could catch uP. 
and even compete with other advanced countries. So. this issue is 
in focus at both national and international levels now as we saw in 
Chapter Two. 
The role of the Tilts 
As far as Egypt is concerned. apart frOi the internal factors that 
have been discussed in Chapter Four. the TNCs' role could be judged 
in the light of many factors. ~ong these are: genuine training 
of local personnel on key aspects of i.ported technology; genuine 
R&D with access by the local personnel to key 1nfonlation. close 
financial and technical info~at10n with local RID units, and 
integration into the local econ~ instead of creating enclaves for 
operations. 
Bearing these elelents in .1nd and in the light of whit WIS found 
during the field work, the perfonllnce of the TNts in Egypt in these 
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respects is not promising at all. In so far as these companies: 
(i) Are tightly controlling the key aspects related to technology 
such as its choice, nature, its control, feasibility studies, 
products design etc. 
(ii) Have thus introduced of capital intensive technology, no 
significant adaptation and hence no diffusion of technology 
in the economy. 
(iii) Have not introduced genuine training, except on how to use 
the machinery, i.e. to be operative. 
(iv) Have not made any significant R&D inside the country. 
(v) Have not engaged in any technological or specific collaboration 
between investing companies and the local R&D units or 
universities. 
(vi) Have not initiated significant systematic sub contracts with 
local suppliers except occasionally in very few of firms. 
Even in those few cases, it was not possible to trace any kind 
of technical or financial co-operation with local suppliers. 
So, there is no encouragement for creating an entrepreneurial 
class that could accelerate the development process in the 
future. 
(vii) Have maintained an absolute dependence of these firms on their 
parents for all technological needs. 
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So, the TNCs, instead of bridging the gap between local R&D units 
and the productive sector, came to make it even wider and deeper. 
The effects of this behaviour extends to accentuate the gap between 
local firms and R&D institutions, under the demonstration effect 
seen above. As Mytelka demonstrated, local managers get used to depend 
on foreign sources for technology, even if it is available locally 
(1978: 103,123). This is despite the fact that it might cost less. 
(Moore, 1980: 98). 
This situation pushes the most reliable class of scientists to 
emigrate. Hence the possibility for building a local technological 
capability becomes far removed and the technological dependence 
is maintained. The position that results is summarized by Lall & 
Streeten thus: hindering the potential for even slight adaptive 
research; avoiding putting what already developed locally into 
practice; confining the local efforts in science and education to 
theoretical aspects; and finally, hampering the efforts, if there 
are any, for achieving technological independence (Lall & Streeten, 
1977: 73). 
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6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter is an attempt to put the findings of the field survey 
in addition to other information collected during undertaking this 
survey into a broader context. The underlying aim was to examine 
how far the TNCs' performance under the umbrella of ODEP, described 
above, has affected the Egyptian economy. In addition, it aimed to 
test to what extent this performance fits with what has been noted 
in the previous chapters both theoretically and empirically about 
these companies' behaviour in other developing counties. 
In Egypt, the impact the TNCs have had on the whole economy is far 
from satisfactory. Their performance in the absence of a strategy 
for economic development in general and for technological 
transformation in particular has affected the economy adversely. 
Thus, there is an unbalanced development: the share of both industry 
and agriculture as a percentage of the GOP declined in favour of the 
trade and service sectors; the external relations of the country are 
biased towards the North-West hemisphere at the expense of the 
relations with both the East and developing countries; the 
concentration has been on the production of consumption goods that 
cater for a tiny proportion of the population at the expense of the 
majority, in the meantime there is a bias against capital goods 
industries in the sense seen above. 
In consequence, it was natural for such an imbalance to have its effect 
on the rest of the economy is sectors. So, the share of both 
agriculture and industry as a proportion of total employment decreased. 
Exports of industrial manufactured and semi-manufactured goods 
declined. Thus, the dependence on the exports of primary goods 
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especially petroleum and raw cotton rose to an unprecedented level 
since 1952. In the meantime the dependence on foreign markets for 
imports has been increasing very rapidly so that the exports (excluding 
oil) could pay only for about 11.5~ of imports in 1982. That situation 
adds to the crises of the balance of payments inasmuch as this balance 
is suffering from other sorts of draining of capital outside the 
country such as the repatriation of profits, royalties, expatriate 
salaries, and other drainage resulting from the performance of the 
transnationals in this country. On the other hand their positive 
contribution to the balance of payments has been very limited in terms 
of export revenues and inflows of capital. 
On the top of that the TNCs' contribution to solving the problem of 
unemployment is insignificant. But even more they have made the 
situation for it more difficult via the introduction of capital-
intensive technology. This could result, inter alia, in an unequal 
distribution of income not only between the haves and the have nots 
but also between those who work in these companies and those who do 
not. In doing so, the TNCs could create a market for their products 
of luxury and non essential goods. In addition, the way these 
companies perform 1n such as non genuine training, R&D, controlling 
technological information keys and subcontracting cannot lead to the 
building up of a local entrepreneurial class nor to the development 
of an indigenous technolog1cal capability. 
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS: 
This study has mainly sought to assess the contribution of the TNCs 
to the transfer of technology to Egypt. The analysis over the previous 
chapters has revealed that most of the corporations perform, more 
or less, in a similar way in developing countries. Also, it is clear 
that the policies adopted by the recipient countries with regard to 
the transfer of technology in general and by the TNCs via DFI might 
affect the ultimate outcome of these companies' operations. 
Thus, the theoretical hypotheses set up to explain the motives of the 
transnationals for investment in foreign markets together with the 
debate about their performance in developing countries were presented 
in the First Chapter and supported by some empirical data. It was 
concluded that the phenomenon of OFI is the outcome of a combination 
of factors rather than one of them. These factors which enable the 
investing firms to have an edge over their potential competitors are 
such as easy access to financial resources, manegerial skills, 
technical skills and personnel, and highly advanced technology. 
Nonetheless such factors, although necessary, are not sufficient. 
Some other important factors such as large host markets, favourable 
host policies and environment, cheap labour, and raw materials have 
some impact on the foreign investment decision. 
From the debate in the second section of the first chapter we conclude 
that there are strong links between the rationale of the transnationals 
to invest abroad and their behaviour in the host developing countries. 
It was found that these companies do not inject a sizable amount 
of money in host developing economies, rather they raise the bulk 
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of their money from internal sources. They, further, siphon off 
many times the amount they brought in via dividends, royalties, fees, 
profits, and the use of transfer pricing. In exports the empirical 
evidence revealed that these companies are interested in keeping 
developing countries' markets open for their exports rather than to 
export from them and this in addition to the unfavourable impact they 
they have had on other fields such as employment, income distribution, 
pattern of comsumption, and local industry. To sum up, it became 
clear that the positive character of TNCs' contribution to the 
development in host developing economies is in question not necessarily 
positive. 
Chapter two presented the analysis of the major aspects that connected 
with the transfer of technology via the TNCs such as technology market, 
major mechanisms of transfer, technology cost, and capital-goods. 
It could be concluded that these corporations' behaviour in this field 
is not much different from that seen in other fields. Thus, the 
transnationals proved to be unwilling to transfer genuinely their 
sources of power to their potential competitors that might preempt 
their activities in the domestic markets. It was clear that the TNCs 
are concerned to develop the international network in order to 
distribute the exploitation of the unique assets they have and hence 
maximise the returns from them. In consequence, they embarked upon 
introduCing in developing countries a technology identical to that 
which is used in developed markets, without a significant adaptation. 
In addition, their records in R & 0, and training in countries are 
very poor indeed. 
Moreover the TNCs' investment in developing countries is characterised 
by imbalance. This is where it is biased towards the consumer goods 
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sectors, while the capital-goods sector is suffering fron the shortages 
of investment. In addition, the contractual arrangements of the 
transfer of technology are, mostly, characterised by having many 
restrictions such as these which confine exports to certain markets 
or prohibit them totally and tie-in-clauses which require the recipient 
to buy production requirments of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
from the same supplier of technology. 
Chapter Three traced the development of the industrialization process 
in Egypt, especially since the early 1950s. We concluded that the 
difficulties that the economy underwent in the late 1950s paved the 
way for the advocates of liberalizing the economy to capitalize on 
this situation. As a result, Egypt has adopted the Open Door Economic 
Policy since 1974. Thus, there has been some sort of foreign 
investment. However, this investment fell very short of achieving 
the aspirations of the new government. There was very limited actual 
investment in terms of the implemented projects in general and in 
industry in particular. Exports were negligible, and the bulk of 
their products were channeled into the local markets. 
As for the technology transfer to Egypt, it was discussed in the last 
three chapters. Chapter four tried to analyse the domestic factors 
that might have some influence upon the performance of the TNCs in this 
respect. Here we discovered that a genuine transfer of technology 
to nationals has not been of significant concern for the Egyptian 
government. This could be deduced from the absence of a global stategy 
for development and transfer of technology, and the absence of 
legislation to monitor and organise the process. The majority of 
economic sectors are depending on foreign technology that is imported 
just to meet the markets' needs for certain products. The OF! Law came 
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empty of provisions to regulate technology transfer by foreign 
corporations. Moreover, although Egypt has an enormous number 
of education and R&D institutes, they have been suffering from some 
deficiencies such as the concentration on basic research, theoretical 
education and unsystematic links with the needs of the economic and 
productive sectors; and a lack of links between domestic R&D units 
and the productive sector. 
ThuS, the influence of these factors in addition to the factors that 
are related to the TNCs have been manifested in their performance in 
Egypt as the analysis of the findings of our survey revealed in chapter 
five. 
In fact, these companies' behaviour in Egypt regarding technology 
transfer is not contradictory to what has been argued and seen in other 
developing countries. The evidence at hand suggested that the TNCs are 
performing according to the dictate of their global interests. They 
are biased towards the exploitation of their exisiting stock of 
sophisticated technology developed and used in advanced markets. 
Meanwhile, it was clear that these companies are reluctant to take 
the plunge of adapting such type of technology, to fit the milieu 
of developing countries which is, mostly, different from that of 
developed countries. 
The transnationals were seen to concentrate the control of their 
operations in Egypt in their hands, even in cases, where they are a 
minority. This was conspicuous in the decisions and tasks that are 
related to technology. Thus, by so doing they were always able to 
maintain control over the key decisions in the choice of technology, 
feasibility studies, product design, and construction technology. 
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As far as R&D was concerned, no sign of undertaking such activities 
by the TNCs could be found in the Egyptian case. The available 
evidence suggested that these companies were in absolute dependence on 
the parent companies for ready made technology and its requirements of 
R&D activities even in the very minor cases needed for slight 
adaptations. In consequence, these companies, had no significant links 
with domestic R&D institutes or universities. These companies are in 
fact, accentuating rather than alleviating the gap between these 
institutes and the productive sector. 
Furthermore, the records of these corporations in employment are poor. 
Such an outcome came as a result of the capital intensity of technology 
introduced in this country. And it was the result of the recruitment 
policy of employing people who were working in similar industries from 
the domestic sector both public and private. In accordance with this 
policy, the TNCs showed no significant concern for training and 
building up local skills in a genuine way. Local personnel were not 
only in most cases, kept away from tasks connected with technology, but 
also, in the few cases, they had no access to key information 
underlying technology introduced and used by these companies in Egypt. 
Thus, it is not unexpected in such a situation to reach the conclusion 
that transnationals are working in the Egyptian economy as 'enclaves'. 
In addition to what was seen above, they were importing the bulk of 
their needs and requirements from external sources rather than the 
internal ones. Correspondingly, raw-materials, inputs, equipment, and 
capital- goods, were mostly imported from abroad. They made no effort 
to set up industries to develop and produce some of their requirements, 
- 323 -
a situation which externalizes rather than internalises the dynamism of 
this sector within the country. 
In the light of these companies' behaviour in Egypt, it is not 
difficult to deduce that their contribution to create a local 
entrepreneurial class is in serious doubt. 
Moreover it is natural that inappropriate technology produces 
inappropriate products. The bulk of these companies' products caters 
for a tiny segment of the population, resulting in a shift of local 
resources from meeting the basic needs of essential goods, health care, 
housing, and clothing. Rather worse, the vast majority of the TNCs 
products were pouring into the local markets so their record in exports 
was limited. Thus local products which used to satisfy similar needs 
faced fierce competiton, resulting in heavy losses for many of local 
companies especially in the textile and chemical industries. 
It is against this background that it could be concluded that the 
introduction of foreign technology by the TNCs in a random way, not 
only fell short of achieving government objectives but affected 
adversely the Egyptian economy as a whole. There have been 
unfavourable changes in the structure of the economy. These changes 
were manifested in the shrinking of the share of both industrial and 
agricultural production and the increase in the share of service 
sectors as a percentage of GOP over the period of 1971/72 to 1981/82. 
This phenomenon manifested itself in fewer exports and more imports; 
less employment, an unequal pattern of income distribution and an ill-
fitted pattern of consumption. The economy has been increasing its 
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dependence on outside soures for its development rather than achieving 
some sort of self-reliant development. 
Correspondingly, on account of this position Government intervention 
became by and large, imperative. Such intervention need to tackle 
both OFI by the TNCs and the domestic policy context. Egypt must 
have a long-term policy towards transfer and development of technology 
as an integrated part of a global strategy for economic and social 
development. The proposed policy should be guided by the objective 
that the introduction of foreign technology in general either by the 
TNCs via OFI, or by any other means results in the development of 
local technological capabilities and hence helps towards the 
achievement of self-reliant development. The implementation of the 
required policy needs some coherent measures and tools intergrated 
with one other in such a way as to achieve the desired result. First, 
measures are required to the suppliers of technology which are mainly 
the TNCs. One of the most advocated tools in this respect is the 
promulgation of legislation in order to control and monitor all aspects 
of the transfer of technology. It may be worth mentioning some examples 
of countries that intervened in the transfer of technology and acheived 
some success. In Japan according to the foreign investment act of 
1950, the licencee must get the validation of his contract from the 
competent minister, otherwise he would be liable to imprisonment or 
a fine. Although Japan liberalised the introduction of foreign 
technology in July 1st 1974, the fair trade commission issued some 
guide lines that should be observed in contracts which introduce 
foreign technology. Thus Japan toughly controlled the importation 
of foreign technology until very recently. When they strengthened 
their technological position and became able to stand-up for foreign 
competition they liberalised its introduction. Nevertheless, they 
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laid down some guide lines to be followed in this regard (Lahera, 
1981:84:87). 
Also, in general it is clear that in sectors where governments 
intervened by protection and support of local technological efforts 
they have shown a stronger technological position. In India for 
example, where in the electronic industries foreign suppliers' share 
accounted for 95% over the period 1960 - 1965, this share declined 
to about 10% just after less than 15 years, as a result of controlling 
technology by the government (Griew, in Poznanski, 1984:144). The 
same phenomenon was noted in Brazil, in the steel industry (Lall, 
1980:42). 
Thus, the proposed law in Egypt should necessitate the registration and 
inspection of all contracts and investment applications considered to 
introduce technology into this country. This law should have 
provisions that: 
(i) eliminate restrictive practices imposed by TNCs in technology 
transfer contracts, and which might make such agreements 
abortive and add an unjustifiable burden on to the Egyptian 
economy. 
(ii) regulate the terms of payments for technology. It should 
prohibit the long duration of contracts, taking into 
consideration the size of sales, profit, and the rate of 
payments. It should prohibit the restrictive provisions. 
(iii) unpack the imported technology package by determining 
clearly the elements which could be considred as transfer 
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of technology and exclude the other ones such as capital, 
and raw-material, and inputs. Thereby, the position of 
national negotiators may be strengthened, where they can get 
some of other elements from other sources on more favourable 
conditions. More important, by doing so, a demand for local 
sources of supply may be created. 
(iv) prohibit the introduction of technology that could be developed 
and obtained locally. Even more, the proposed law should 
encourage and oblige firms investing in Egypt to purchase 
the available technology developed in the country. 
(v) prohibit the imports of raw-materials, intermediate inputs, 
equipment and even capital goods which could be obtained from 
local sources and protect those that can be developed within 
the country. This could be carried out, in addition, via a 
review of some existing tariffs and foreign investment 
legislation in order to abolish provisions contradictory to 
this aim. Further, differentiated treatment should be given to 
these projects which establish industries to provide them with 
their requirements. 
(vi) encourage and enforce foreign firms to undertake a genuine 
R&D in Egypt, not only to adapt their technology but also to 
develop some products and processes locally. Again, a special 
treatment should be granted to firms engaged in such a task 
such as tax write-off on research expenditures and the offer of 
higher investment allowances. Such encouragement should extend 
to strengthen their links with domestic R&D institutes and 
universities. 
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(vii) focus significantly on training local personnel and engineers 
not only on the operation and maintenance of the plant, but 
local personnel to assimilate, operate and maintain imported 
technology, Chapter 2.3.2. 
In fact, similar provisions were found in other industries (Bell, 
1984:198). Moreover, the Korean government maintained a free hand to 
refuse contracts that did not satisfy it and chose other contracts from 
other sources if the latter terms were more favourable (Enos, 1982:74). 
On the domestic side, the previous broad suggestions should be 
accompanied by positive policies, if the imported technology is to be 
acquired and mastered by nationals. These policies should extend to 
include the educational process, local R & 0, training, industrial 
policy and the regulation of OFI. 
(i) In education, as seen in Chapter Four although the country has a 
significant number of students enrolled in different stages and the 
number of graduates is great and increasing over time, it is suffering 
from some problems that make its contribution to the process of 
development limited. Thus, this system needs to concentrate vigorously 
on the applied side and together with technical and vocational 
training, develop and proceed in response to the economic and social 
development requirements. 
(ii) The same pOint is valid for R & O. At a time when the country 
has many specialised institutions in every field, their contribution to 
the productive sector is marginal. So, such institutions' activities 
need to be (i) co-ordinated to avoid duplication of research; (li) 
linked closely to the productive sector and (iii) concentrated on the 
applied and development sides of research rather than the basic one. 
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These efforts suggest that some part should be played by the 
government, such a part embracing increasing R & 0 expenditures as a 
percentage of GOP, moral and material support to the people working in 
this field, marketing and promoting the products of these institutions 
via encouraging and enforcing firms operating in the country to use 
them by granting them some privileges in terms of financial assistance, 
buying their goods embodying local technology and marketing them. 
Also, the government should encourage the private sector firms to 
undertake their R & 0 by granting them some favourable treatment. 
(iii) In this connection, national consultant companies and 
institutions must be given a first priority and every possible 
encouragement by employing their efforts wherever and whenever it is 
possible. In cases where it is necessary to depend on foreign 
companies, they must be joined with local ones and local personnel at 
every stage of the required work. 
(iv) The present traditional patent law should be revised in the 
light of the benefits that accrue to the country from it. Other forms 
of industrial property protection should be considered such as an 
inventors' certificate. 
In addition a differentiation in granting patents should be considered 
according to the industry concerned. For example, patents should not 
be granted in fields such as food and pharmaceuticals. Further, in 
other fields, it must be clear that the introduction of patented 
products 1s no substitute for exploiting the patent inside Egypt. 
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Correspondingly, a system of intelligence should be created in order to 
know the different sources of similar and alternative types of 
technology, how long they have been used abroad, their terms, and cost. 
Such a system may enable the competent authorities to deal with the 
suppliers and potential investors from a strong position. In so doing 
it could enable the country to get the right technology at the right 
cost to give the right products to the country, and hence save the 
domestic economy much burden. 
Equally important the existing apparatus of Laws regarding OFI, taxes, 
industrial development, and tarrifs should be revised, for all to 
be in harmony according to a national strategy of economic and social 
development. 
Such an immense task must be given a first priority by the government 
if an explicit objective of different policies and different Laws is 
to be reached and achieved. 
In this thesis we have tried to examine the performance of the TNCs 
in the transfer of technology to Egypt on a macro-economic basis 
according to the available data. Far more empirical work is needed 
on the social costs and benefits of foreign technology on a case by 
case basis and the effect of incentives on both OFI and the national 
economy. In addition further research is required about the future 
of the local technological capability under the present policy in 
the long run and on the alternatives to the policies so far adopted 
by the Egyptian Government. 
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THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FOREIGN COMPANIES 
Part I: Background Inforwatlon 
1. Name of company 
Name of foreign investor 
Name of domestic investor, if any 
2. Year of foundation in Egypt 
Year of partnership in jOint ventures, if any 
3. Nature of industrial activity 
manufacturing 
assembling 
components 
on the following dates 
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(i) At the commencement of production 
(ii) 5 years after the commencement of production 
If any plans for future changes, please specify. 
4. Motives for investment in Egypt 
incentives from the Government 
local market security 
(i) overcome barriers 
(ii) forestall rivals 
cheap labour 
cheap raw materials 
combination of these 
More details, if possible, please. 
Could you please indicate to the relative importance of each? 
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5. What has been the nature of ownership in your firm? 
Wholly foreign owned 
Majority foreign owned 
(il foreign 
(i1) local 
50/50 
Minority foreign owned 
(i) foreign 
(1;) local 
Are there any plans for changes? 
6. What has been the financial structure of your firm? 
fixed capital 
working capital 
total 
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capital raised in Egypt debt ~ equity ~ 
capital raised in home country debt ~ equity ~ 
capital raised in third countries debt ~ equity ~ 
Part 2: Production Techniques 
1. How do the production techniques your company uses in Egypt 
compare with those your parent company and/or your other 
subsidiaries use in Europe? 
2. Were/Will any technological adaptation be made for the Egyptian 
environment? 
(i) product design 
(ii) production equipment 
(iii) production techniques 
(iv) different scale of output 
Reasons for adaptation: 
(a) scaling down to lower volume for narrow market 
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(b) lack of local skilled labour 
(c) lack of capital 
(d) difference in environment 
(e) difference in raw materials and components 
(f) difference in labour quality 
(g) fear of breakdowns 
Nature of adaptation: 
Cost: domestic currency equivalent: 
More details please. 
3. To what extent are local partners involved in the adaptation 
process? 
4. Outline the technical services provided and state whether these 
technical services were provided and separately charged for, in 
the initial period, or were covered by contracts. 
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5. Does your firm buy technological elements from different 
sources? 
Yes 
No 
Reasons: 
( i1) 
6. The form of technolgical elements transferred 
separate elements 
a package 
Conunent: 
7. If payments are made for technical elements, what form did/will 
they take? 
(a) 1 ump- sum 
(b) royalty 
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(c) equity 
(d) combination of these 
Comments: 
8. On what basis have these payments been founded, e.g. are they a 
percentage of output? 
9. Does: will your project team make its own management decisions 
in the following areas: 
(i) choice of technology 
(ii) production market development 
(iii) production volume 
(iv) production price 
(v) additional capital financing 
(vi) recruitment of employees 
Comment: 
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10. For each of the following, indicate who was principally 
responsible, i.e. 1, 2, etc. 
1. foreign investor 
2. foreign and domestic investors together 
3. domestic investors 
4. general authority for investment and free zones 
s. a consultant company 
6. others, please specify 
(i) feasibility studies 
(ii) selection of production technology 
(iii) production design 
(iv) plant construction 
(a) supervision of construction 
(b) technology for it (blueprints, etc.) 
(v) accounting system 
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(vi) inventory control 
(vii) organisational structure 
(viii) personnel management 
Please comment: 
Part 3: E.ployEnt Aspects 
1. The total number of employees and their classification: 
Total Expatriates Locals 
directors 
production workers 
clerical 
accountants 
management 
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technicians % 
engineers 
services 
Total: 
2. Is there a training scheme for local employees? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, could you please specify: 
(a) duration of training programmes at various levels 
(b) location of training 
locally in Egypt, at the project's 
facil i ties 
abroad (please specify) 
(c) the nature of the training 
(d) the role of your company 1n the training 
- 340 -
(e) future plans 
Further comments: 
3. What has been the estimated cost of training as a percentage of 
value added, and by whom was it paid? 
cost: 
domestic currency equivalent: 
Further comments: 
4. How many of your local employees have: 
university degrees 
any other technical or professional training 
secondary schools' diplomas 
More details if possible. 
5. Approximately what percentage of the following group leaves the 
factory each year to work elsewhere or to do something else? 
(i) engineers 
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( i i ) sk ill ed 1 abourers 
(iii) unskilled workers 
(iv) supervising personnel 
(v) others (please specify) 
Further comments: 
Part 4: Research and Developaent (R & D) 
1. Does your company undertake R&D in Egypt? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, please specify the sort of R&D and the years of 
establishment. 
basic research 
applied research 
development research 
Further comments, if any: 
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2. What products or processes were developed internally in Egypt? 
3. Are there contracts with public and/or private research units or 
universities? 
Yes 
No 
Please give further details if possible. 
4. Participation of scientific and technical staff of the 
subsidiary in the activities of local research centres: 
research work 
teaching 
Comment: 
5. Proportion of local researchers and engineers amongst your 
company's research staff. 
6. Future plans in R&D field in Egypt. 
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Part 5: Patents and Trade Marks 
1. Has the technology you used in Egypt been patented? 
Yes 
No 
Comments: 
2. What role did your Egyptian patent play in your decision to 
invest in Egypt? 
crucial 
major significance 
minor significance 
no effect 
3. Did you supply only patented technology or was it in combination 
with particular know-how? 
patented only 
patented and know-how 
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unpatented 
Any further comments: 
4. Was the use of trade-marks or brand names available or 
involved? 
Yes 
No 
Part 5: Inter-Sector Relations 
1. Has your company made sub-contracts with local suppliers? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, in what sectors: 
capital equipment 
consumer goods 
civil engineering 
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construction 
components 
others (please specify) 
Further comments: 
2. Is there financial co-operation between your firm and the local 
suppliers? 
Yes 
No 
Further details, if any. 
3. Is there technical co-operation between your firm and the local 
suppl iers? 
Yes 
No 
Further details, if any. 
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4. What percentage value of total requirements of materials and 
services was supplied by: 
(i) indigenous Egyptian firms 
(ii) locally based foreign subsidiaries 
(iii) parent company 
(iv) parent company suppliers 
(v) others (please specify) 
Further details: 
Start 
of the 
Project 
Projected 
1984 
5. If import requirements are substantial, is this because local 
suppliers are: 
not available 
not competitive 
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not up to quality specifications 
other reasons (please specify) 
Further comments: 
6. Did/will you take any steps to manufacture components and/or 
other intermediate parts locally? 
Yes 
No 
Further details: 
7. Imports of parts and components from abroad: could you please 
provide information on 
percentages of parts imported from parent company 
the specific parts and components 
their percentage share from the total value of 
input used in production 
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8. Could you please provide information on percentages of 
(i) total imported machinery 
(ii) imported machinery from parent company 
(iii) any chances of such capital goods being available 
locally? 
Part 6: Exports of Egypt 
1. What was/is the annual value of exports 
in the first year of production 
after three years of production 
as in 1984 
Further details: 
2. The major direction of exports: could you please show the shares 
of the largest markets as a percentage if possible; and give 
reasons why this destination is preferred to others. 
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3. Is there any agreement with the parent firm about territories to 
which you may export? 
4. Does the Egyptian Government exert any pressure over exports? 
Yes 
No 
Details: 
5. Please specify the type of products being sold 
at the commencement of production 
5 years after commencement of production 
as in 1984 
Any further details: 
6. How much emphasis does your firm place on advertising? 
Show if possible as a percentage of value added and/or total 
sales. 
-
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7. Are the products offered 
identical to those in country of origin 
adapted 
peculiar to the local market 
8. Where was the decision take to launch a new product, if any 
at head office 
at Egyptian company 
elsewhere (please specify) 
Further details: 
9. Is the full range of products of the parent company available on 
the local market? What proportion of them is manufactured on 
the spot compared with those imported? 
10. What are your plans for the future? 
Thank you 
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